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A	  few	  hours	  of	  mountain	  climbing	  make	  a	  scoundrel	  
and	  a	  saint	  two	  fairly	  equal	  creatures.	  
Fatigue	  is	  the	  shortest	  path	  to	  equality	  and	  fraternity	  –	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Abstract	  
	  
This	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths.	  	  I	  begin	  with	  
an	  analysis	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  psychopathy	  by	  situating	  it	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
central	  debate	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  psychiatry	  over	  the	  conceptual	  nature	  of	  
mental	  illness	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  an	  inherently	  value-­‐laden	  
concept.	  	  I	  argue	  against	  the	  disease-­‐model	  of	  psychopathy	  and	  against	  their	  
automatic	  exemption	  from	  moral	  responsibility	  as	  argued	  for	  by	  many	  moral	  
philosophers.	  	  Psychopaths	  possess	  sufficient	  agency	  such	  that	  exempting	  them	  
from	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  problematic	  both	  epistemically	  and	  morally.	  	  Yet	  
psychopaths	  frequently	  offer	  reasons	  for	  their	  behavior	  that	  reveal	  their	  
distance	  from	  full	  moral	  agency.	  	  So	  how	  are	  we	  to	  respond	  to	  such	  middle	  
ground	  moral	  agents	  when	  they	  do	  terrible	  things	  to	  other	  people?	  	  The	  
discussion	  then	  turns	  to	  the	  normative	  question	  of	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  
wrongdoing	  psychopaths.	  	  This	  analysis	  begins	  with	  the	  framework	  for	  general	  
responses	  to	  moral	  wrongdoing	  as	  provided	  by	  moral	  philosopher	  P.F.	  Strawson.	  	  
The	  enduring	  distinction	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view	  is	  
challenged	  as	  overly	  coarse	  and	  potentially	  morally	  disrespectful	  to	  the	  mentally	  
ill,	  including	  specifically,	  psychopaths.	  	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  
or	  not	  psychopaths	  are	  ‘in	  fact’	  morally	  responsible	  remains	  open	  and	  thus,	  
forces	  us	  to	  take	  up	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  should	  understand	  our	  responses	  to	  
psychopathic	  wrongdoing,	  including	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  can	  or	  should	  hold	  
psychopaths	  responsible.	  	  The	  case	  of	  psychopaths	  reveals	  to	  us	  alternative	  ways	  
of	  understanding	  how	  we	  ‘hold	  responsible,’	  beyond	  resentment	  and	  blame	  for	  
example,	  that	  do	  not	  loose	  moral	  content	  simply	  by	  straying	  from	  the	  
paradigmatic	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  If	  we	  forgo	  the	  blame	  paradigm	  of	  moral	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Introduction	  
	  
This	  dissertation	  takes	  up	  the	  question	  of	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  
psychopaths,	  including	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  wrongdoing	  
psychopaths.	  	  Although	  several	  prominent	  moral	  philosophers	  are	  engaged	  herein,	  
this	  dissertation	  is	  written	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  psychiatry.	  	  
The	  debate	  over	  psychopathic	  responsibility	  is	  thus	  enriched	  by	  a	  greater	  
appreciation	  of	  the	  philosophical	  challenges	  presented	  by	  the	  concepts	  of	  mental	  
illness,	  including	  the	  concept	  of	  psychopathy,	  an	  alleged	  illness	  of	  moral	  agency.	  	  
Moral	  philosophers	  frequently	  appear	  to	  presuppose	  that	  psychopathy,	  along	  with	  
various	  other	  mental	  illnesses,	  are	  sufficiently	  like	  physical	  diseases	  such	  that	  those	  
inflicted	  lack	  the	  requisite	  control	  over	  their	  actions	  typically	  believed	  to	  ground	  
moral	  responsibility,	  (Levy,	  2007,	  2010;	  Strawson,	  1993;	  Watson,	  1993;	  Wolf,	  1987;	  
Elliot,	  1996,	  Fisher	  &	  Ravizza,	  1998;	  Fischer	  and	  Tognazzini,	  2013).	  	  The	  views	  on	  
the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths	  held	  by	  moral	  philosopher,	  P.F.	  Strawson,	  and	  
neuroethicist,	  Neil	  Levy	  are	  closely	  and	  directly	  engaged	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  
Accordingly,	  this	  dissertation	  attempts	  to	  navigate	  two	  equally	  difficult	  
concepts	  that	  we	  often	  find	  mutually	  offsetting:	  mental	  illness	  and	  moral	  
responsibility.	  	  This	  task	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  tendency	  of	  moral	  philosophers	  to	  
cite	  some	  specific	  mental	  illness	  (typically	  schizophrenia,	  addiction	  or	  psychopathy)	  
as	  intuitively	  obvious	  and	  paradigmatic	  cases	  of	  non-­‐morally	  responsible	  agency.	  	  As	  
a	  former	  mental	  health	  professional	  and	  as	  a	  philosopher	  specifically	  interested	  in	  
conceptual	  and	  ethical	  issues	  that	  surround	  mental	  illness,	  I	  find	  such	  analyses	  and	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conclusions	  problematic.	  	  We	  need	  to	  confront	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  mental	  illnesses	  
may	  not	  represent	  a	  total,	  or	  even	  partial,	  exemption	  from	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  In	  
our	  confrontation,	  however,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  clear	  about	  exactly	  what	  practices	  of	  
‘holding’	  mentally	  ill	  persons	  responsible	  we	  are	  warranting,	  and	  why.	  	  We	  do	  not	  
want	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  mentally	  ill	  are	  morally	  responsible	  simply	  so	  that	  we	  are	  free	  
to	  harshly	  judge,	  cathartically	  blame	  and	  resent	  the	  ill	  wrongdoer.	  	  Harsh	  judgment	  
and	  resentment	  may	  be	  practices	  that	  we	  need	  to	  forego	  more	  generally	  toward	  the	  
healthy	  and	  ill	  alike.	  	  We	  want	  to	  be	  very	  cautious	  in	  dismissing	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  
the	  mentally	  ill	  so	  that	  we	  remain	  vigilant	  against	  the	  many	  forms	  of	  disrespect	  and	  
dehumanization	  that	  comes	  with	  objectifying	  the	  mentally	  ill.	  	  By	  seeking	  to	  protect	  
the	  mentally	  ill	  from	  moral	  blame	  we	  may	  well	  bring	  more	  harm	  than	  we	  sought	  to	  
avoid.	  	  	  
In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  argue	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  view	  that	  psychopaths	  possess	  
sufficient	  agency	  to	  be	  considered	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  wrongdoing.	  	  At	  the	  
very	  least,	  I	  favor	  the	  view	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  that	  the	  empirical	  basis	  alleged	  
to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  responsible	  has	  thus	  far	  failed	  to	  
make	  its	  case.	  	  However,	  clearly	  establishing	  the	  case	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  ‘in	  fact’	  
responsible	  must	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  holding	  psychopaths	  responsible	  
simply	  licenses	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  affective	  expression	  of	  resentment.	  	  There	  is	  a	  
more	  robust	  sense	  of	  ‘holding	  responsible’	  that	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  affectively	  charged	  
blame	  and	  resentment.	  	  This	  dissertation	  thus	  offers	  ways	  of	  holding	  psychopaths	  
responsible	  that	  are	  beyond	  the	  dispositional	  stereotype	  of	  blame	  and	  resentment.	  
We	  are	  all	  too	  aware	  of	  the	  unedifying	  spectacle	  of	  moralizing	  blame	  and	  how	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sustained	  resentment	  can	  sour	  a	  soul.	  	  Even	  if	  some	  psychopaths	  came	  to	  be	  
psychopaths	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  their	  own,	  say	  as	  a	  result	  of	  severe	  childhood	  abuse	  
or	  a	  broken	  region	  of	  their	  brain,	  (a	  conjecture	  that	  is	  far	  from	  established),	  then	  we	  
should	  not	  be	  insensitive	  to	  this	  in	  gauging	  our	  responses	  to	  their	  ongoing	  
wrongdoing.	  	  Taking	  up	  such	  a	  morally	  insensitive	  disposition	  to	  the	  psychopath	  
would	  put	  us	  in	  the	  ironic	  position	  of	  exhibiting	  moral	  insensitivity,	  a	  trait	  that	  
alleges	  to	  define	  psychopathy	  itself.	  	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  good	  case	  to	  be	  made	  that	  
we	  can	  hold	  the	  psychopath	  responsible	  for	  his	  wrongdoing	  and	  that	  we	  can	  do	  so	  
from	  both	  an	  informed	  and	  morally	  sensitive	  approach.	  	  I	  aim	  to	  defend	  such	  a	  view	  
in	  this	  dissertation.	  
This	  task	  is	  complicated	  by	  a	  set	  of	  unclear	  concepts	  all	  of	  which	  will	  be	  
scrutinized	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  including:	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  moral	  illness	  of	  
psychopathy,	  and	  the	  twin	  questions	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  person	  ‘is’	  responsible	  and	  
whether	  or	  not	  we	  should	  ‘hold’	  her	  responsible.	  	  Although	  I	  devote	  some	  attention	  
to	  the	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  psychopath	  ‘is’	  responsible	  by	  challenging	  the	  
disease	  status	  of	  psychopathy,	  I	  focus	  more	  closely	  on	  the	  analyzing	  the	  question	  of	  
‘holding’	  the	  psychopath	  responsible,	  and	  which	  of	  the	  meanings	  of	  ‘hold	  
responsible’	  are	  appropriate	  or	  justified	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  responses	  to	  
psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  The	  common	  view	  among	  moral	  philosophers	  is	  that	  we	  
must	  first	  answer	  the	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  psychopath	  is	  ‘in	  fact’	  responsible	  
and	  only	  after	  which	  can	  we	  take	  up	  the	  normative	  question	  of	  how	  we	  should	  
respond	  to	  his	  wrongdoing,	  including	  variations	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  ‘hold’	  persons	  
responsible.	  	  Thus,	  my	  contribution	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  attending	  to	  the	  ‘hold	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responsible’	  question	  that	  has	  been	  largely	  neglected	  in	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  
regarding	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths.	  	  	  
The	  common	  view	  also	  holds	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  completely	  morally	  blind	  
(alternatively,	  psychopaths	  categorically	  lack	  moral	  understanding)	  and	  that	  they	  
are	  incorrigible	  in	  that	  there	  is	  no	  possibility	  or	  hope	  for	  moral	  improvement,	  
however	  miniscule	  the	  gains.	  	  This	  pessimistic	  view	  is	  underwritten	  by	  the	  disease-­‐
model	  conception	  of	  psychopathy	  that	  seeks	  to	  explain	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  medical	  
and	  empirical	  terms.	  	  Here,	  the	  perspective	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  psychiatry	  stands	  
to	  offer	  considerable	  insight	  into	  the	  situation	  by	  challenging	  the	  conceptual	  
assumptions	  of	  psychopathy	  that	  moral	  philosophers	  assume	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  in	  
their	  discussion	  of	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths.	  	  If	  we	  attend	  more	  
closely	  to	  these	  conceptual	  assumptions	  of	  psychopathy	  we	  find	  that	  the	  disease	  
model	  is	  far	  from	  established	  and	  without	  this	  assumption,	  the	  complexion	  of	  
psychopathic	  responsibility	  shifts	  significantly.	  	  Hence,	  when	  engaging	  the	  question	  
of	  psychopathic	  responsibility,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  two	  normative	  concepts.	  
After	  summarizing	  the	  common	  view	  on	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  
psychopaths	  held	  by	  the	  moral	  philosopher	  P.F.	  Strawson	  and	  neuroethicist	  Neil	  
Levy,	  I	  expose	  an	  optional	  understanding	  of	  ‘holding’	  psychopaths	  responsible	  that	  
avoids	  a	  key	  concern	  held	  by	  both	  philosophers	  while	  exposing	  the	  moral	  problems	  
of	  the	  response	  called	  for	  by	  the	  common	  view,	  that	  we	  should	  isolate	  and	  
indefinitely	  detain	  the	  wrongdoing	  psychopath.	  	  Such	  disengagement	  does	  not	  
represent	  a	  morally	  enlightened	  response.	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Chapter	  1:	  Conceptual	  models	  of	  psychopathy	  
1.0	  Introduction	  
	  
This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  many	  themes	  related	  to	  psychopathic	  
responsibility	  that	  will	  be	  explored	  and	  clarified	  in	  greater	  depth	  throughout	  the	  
dissertation.	  	  Central	  among	  the	  themes	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  conceptual	  model	  that	  
views	  psychopathy	  as	  moral	  disease.	  	  Philosophers	  customarily	  skip	  this	  analysis	  en	  
route	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  mental	  disorder	  renders	  psychopaths	  not	  morally	  
responsible.	  	  This	  is	  an	  omission	  that,	  when	  filled	  by	  closer	  conceptual	  examination,	  
may	  very	  well	  alter	  such	  a	  conclusion.	  	  We	  will	  find	  that	  contrary	  to	  the	  common	  
view	  among	  philosophers,	  psychopaths	  (or	  those	  persons	  so	  labeled)	  are	  not	  
necessarily	  completely	  morally	  blind	  nor	  do	  they	  suffer	  from	  an	  incurable	  disease.	  
Just	  what	  is	  a	  psychopath?	  	  Are	  psychopaths	  a	  natural	  kind,	  perhaps	  akin	  to	  
what	  we	  sometimes	  describe	  as	  a	  force	  of	  nature	  such	  as	  tornados	  and	  earthquakes?	  	  
But	  psychopaths	  are	  human	  beings	  and	  we	  typically	  refer	  to	  persons	  as	  ‘forces	  of	  
nature’	  only	  in	  a	  metaphorical	  sense.	  	  Perhaps	  psychopathy	  is	  a	  moral	  disease,	  (odd	  
as	  this	  concept	  sounds),	  that	  is	  itself	  a	  force	  of	  nature	  acting	  on,	  and	  through,	  
unsuspecting	  agents.	  	  But	  this	  is	  to	  imbue	  psychopathy	  with	  an	  independent	  
ontology	  distinct	  from	  the	  person	  over	  which	  it	  has	  a	  grip.	  	  Perhaps	  what	  
philosophers	  call	  a	  ‘psychopath’	  is	  merely	  a	  counterfactual,	  or	  hypothetical,	  critter	  
used	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  But	  
counterfactuals	  and	  stipulating	  features	  (like	  complete	  and	  terminal	  moral	  
blindness)	  ignore	  at	  least	  two	  things:	  that	  those	  diagnosed	  with	  psychopathy	  (or	  
Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder	  to	  use	  the	  clinical	  title)	  are	  real	  people	  and	  it	  ignores	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key	  evidence,	  as	  little	  as	  there	  is,	  that	  we	  have	  about	  actual	  people	  diagnosed	  with	  
this	  disorder.	  	  In	  this	  case	  philosophers	  should	  speak	  of	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  
‘counterfactual	  critters’	  rather	  than	  ‘psychopaths.’	  	  And	  since	  the	  diagnostic	  clinical	  
term	  that	  people	  are	  diagnosed	  with	  is	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder,	  not	  
‘psychopathy,’	  it	  may	  very	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  ‘psychopath’	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  
a	  name	  philosophers	  have	  given	  to	  this	  counterfactual	  critter.	  	  But	  we	  want	  to	  know	  
how	  we	  should	  respond,	  morally	  speaking,	  to	  wrongdoing	  committed	  by	  real	  people	  
who	  have	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  this	  disorder.	  	  We	  want	  to	  know	  if	  we	  should	  at	  least	  
attempt	  to	  hold	  them	  morally	  responsible.	  	  	  
My	  own	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘psychopath’	  refers	  to	  an	  actual	  class	  of	  people	  
diagnosed	  with	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder,	  rather	  than	  a	  stipulated	  
philosophical	  concept	  that	  presumes	  moral	  blindness	  and	  moral	  incorrigibility.	  	  We	  
want	  to	  know	  as	  a	  practical	  matter	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  real	  people	  are	  morally	  
responsible	  and	  how,	  if	  at	  all,	  we	  should	  go	  about	  holding	  them	  responsible.	  
Looking	  then	  to	  psychologists	  and	  psychiatrists	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  
psychopathy	  (Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder),	  we	  find	  it	  initially	  described	  as	  a	  
steady	  pathological	  state	  of	  one’s	  personality.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  term	  ‘psychopath’	  
alleges	  to	  describe	  core	  features	  of	  an	  agent’s	  personhood.	  	  But	  ‘psychopathy’	  can	  
only	  be	  diagnosed	  by	  way	  of	  behavioral	  criteria,	  which	  we	  also	  refer	  to	  as	  
‘symptoms.’	  	  Perhaps	  then,	  psychopathy	  is	  a	  conceptual	  device	  and	  a	  term	  of	  
convenience	  used	  to	  distinguish	  persons	  according	  to	  behavioral	  patterns	  (in	  this	  
case	  patterns	  of	  criminally	  violent	  behavior).	  	  But	  this	  does	  little	  to	  aid	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  psychopath’s	  status	  as	  a	  moral	  agent	  and	  says	  less	  about	  his	  
	   7	  
ability	  to	  ever	  improve	  on	  the	  pathological	  state	  of	  his	  morality.	  	  And	  so	  we	  find	  the	  
psychologists	  understanding	  of	  psychopathy	  inadequate	  with	  respect	  to	  conceptual	  
clarity	  and	  unequipped	  to	  answer	  questions	  about	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  these	  
persons.	  
Embedded	  in	  these	  understandings	  of	  psychopathy	  are	  assumptions,	  
conceptual	  and	  causal	  assumptions,	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  psychopathy	  that	  have	  
direct	  bearing	  on	  the	  question	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths.	  	  Since	  we	  do	  not	  
blame	  forces	  of	  nature	  like	  hurricanes	  and	  tornados	  for	  the	  destruction	  they	  cause,	  
(though	  we	  may	  very	  well	  find	  human	  responses	  to	  such	  phenomena	  that	  include	  
blame	  or	  praise),	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  blame	  psychopaths	  for	  the	  destruction	  they	  
cause	  will	  depend	  on	  our	  conceptual	  understanding	  of	  psychopathy.	  	  If	  psychopaths	  
are	  indeed	  a	  similar	  force	  of	  nature,	  then	  we	  should	  similarly	  not	  blame	  them	  for	  the	  
destruction	  they	  cause.	  	  But	  some	  might	  find	  this	  analogy	  rather	  strained.	  	  If	  
psychopaths	  are,	  however,	  unlike	  more	  typical	  forces	  of	  nature,	  then	  what	  are	  they?	  	  
As	  I	  hope	  to	  show	  in	  this	  chapter,	  when	  we	  ask	  this	  question,	  are	  we	  asking	  a	  
conceptual	  question	  in	  which	  both	  empirical	  facts	  and	  moral	  values	  are	  inexorably	  
involved.	  	  	  
The	  main	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  far	  from	  being	  value-­‐free	  
empirical	  concept	  (like	  physical	  disease)	  psychopathy	  is	  morally	  value-­‐laden	  
concept.	  	  On	  my	  understanding,	  psychopathy	  is	  informed	  by	  both	  empirical	  and	  
moral	  concepts	  and	  is	  thus,	  conceptually	  thick.	  	  There	  is	  considerable	  conceptual	  
ground	  to	  cover	  to	  show	  this	  conceptual	  complexity	  and	  to	  additionally	  show	  why	  
this	  matters	  for	  understanding	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths.	  	  Since	  we	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commonly	  appeal	  to	  historical	  concerns	  in	  assessing	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  given	  
agent	  (or	  action),	  the	  etiology	  of	  psychopathy	  is	  pertinent	  to	  such	  assessment.	  	  
There	  is	  also	  the	  matter	  of	  addressing	  significant	  empirical	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  
the	  view	  that	  psychopaths	  lack	  the	  requisite	  causal	  control	  over	  their	  actions	  
required	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  (In	  this	  dissertation,	  empirical	  evidence	  will	  be	  
handled	  in	  two	  stages.	  	  The	  first	  stage	  comes	  in	  this	  chapter’s	  conceptual	  analysis.	  	  
The	  second	  comes	  later	  in	  chapter	  3	  which	  engages	  more	  detailed	  and	  recent	  
evidence	  cited	  by	  Levy	  to	  support	  the	  conclusion	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  
responsible.)	  	  The	  general	  argument	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  responsible	  assumes	  
psychopathy	  to	  be	  a	  disease	  with	  a	  causal	  etiology.	  	  The	  common	  view	  argument	  can	  
be	  summarized	  as	  follows.	  	  If	  psychopaths	  do	  not	  cause	  the	  onset	  of	  their	  
psychopathy	  (qua	  moral	  disease),	  and	  psychopathy	  causes	  violent	  behavior,	  then	  
psychopaths	  are	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  their	  actions	  (including	  violent	  actions)	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  one	  must	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  their	  actions	  in	  order	  to	  be	  morally	  responsible.	  	  
Although	  this	  argument	  comes	  with	  some	  variety,	  many	  philosophers	  share	  the	  
general	  conclusion	  and	  take	  this	  view	  quite	  seriously.	  	  But	  they	  do	  so	  without	  paying	  
much	  attention	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  psychopathy	  and	  either	  assume	  or	  stipulate1	  that	  
psychopaths	  suffer	  completely	  and	  incorrigibly	  from	  ‘moral	  blindness’.	  	  In	  the	  minds	  
of	  many	  philosophers,	  psychopaths	  suffer	  from	  an	  incurable	  disease	  that	  adversely	  
affects	  the	  morality	  of	  those	  so	  diagnosed.	  	  But	  once	  we	  show	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  
psychopathy	  has	  an	  alternative	  value-­‐laden	  understanding,	  that	  the	  concept	  itself	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Strawson	  (1993),	  Watson	  (1993),	  Levy	  (2007),	  Talbert	  (2008),	  Fischer	  and	  
Ravizza	  (1998),	  stipulate	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  categorically	  morally	  blind	  and	  
diseased.	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appears	  to	  be	  morally	  value-­‐laden,	  then	  the	  view	  of	  the	  psychopath	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  
diseased	  agent	  (in	  a	  strictly	  empirical	  sense)	  that	  is	  assumed	  by	  so	  many	  
philosophers,	  is	  unsatisfactory.	  	  And	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  reach	  a	  verdict	  on	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  psychopath	  based	  on	  an	  unsatisfactory	  understanding	  of	  
psychopathy.	  	  
We	  must	  also	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  even	  if	  we	  reject	  a	  value-­‐free	  disease	  model	  
of	  psychopathy	  it	  does	  not	  straightforwardly	  follow	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  
responsible	  enough	  to	  justify	  blaming	  them	  (either	  by	  our	  internal	  convictions	  or	  
expressions	  of	  those	  convictions	  in	  our	  reactive	  attitudes).	  	  Perhaps	  psychopaths	  
really	  are	  responsible	  but	  we	  ought	  not	  blame	  them,	  or	  even	  feel	  negative	  reactive	  
attitudes	  toward	  them.	  	  But	  if	  they	  are	  in	  some	  degree	  morally	  responsible,	  then	  
perhaps	  we	  are	  justified	  in	  a	  measured	  degree	  of	  blame.	  	  There	  is	  a	  vast	  middle	  
ground	  between	  fully	  responsible	  moral	  agents	  (adults)	  and	  fully	  not-­‐responsible	  
‘agents’	  (children),	  and	  perhaps	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  hold	  the	  middle-­‐ground	  
agents	  (adolescents)	  responsible	  should	  be	  suitably	  tailored.	  	  We	  must	  also	  
recognize	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  extant	  responsibility	  of	  a	  given	  agent	  at	  a	  given	  time	  
need	  not	  simply	  be	  symmetrically	  matched	  with	  a	  likewise	  fullness	  of	  moral	  
response.	  	  Well-­‐tailored	  reactions	  to	  moral	  wrongs	  by	  such	  middle	  ground	  agents	  
may	  call	  for	  demand	  more	  than	  an	  agent	  is	  currently	  capable	  of	  meeting.	  	  Sometimes	  
we	  need	  be	  more	  considerate	  of	  the	  diachronic	  nature	  of	  agents	  when	  expressing	  
our	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  Doing	  so	  may	  also	  be	  a	  measure	  of	  respect	  for	  middle	  ground	  
agents.	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What	  does	  our	  conceptual	  understanding	  and	  model	  of	  psychopathy	  have	  to	  
do	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths?	  	  First,	  it	  is	  empirically	  the	  case	  that	  the	  
disease	  model	  of	  any	  mental	  illness,	  psychopathy	  included,	  impacts	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  mentally	  ill.	  	  This	  reflects	  a	  central	  
conceptual	  debate	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  psychiatry	  that	  will	  be	  briefly	  discussed	  in	  
the	  following	  section.	  	  Experimental	  philosophy	  has	  proven	  fruitful	  in	  
demonstrating	  the	  tendency	  of	  this	  belief	  in	  the	  general	  population.2	  	  Many	  
philosophers	  who	  comment	  on	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  the	  mentally	  ill	  reflect	  
this	  tendency.	  	  However,	  when	  conceived	  solely	  through	  the	  disease	  model,	  (or,	  
when	  viewed	  as	  a	  disease)	  mental	  illness	  is	  uncritically	  taken	  as	  an	  intuitively	  
obvious	  exemption	  from	  responsibility.	  	  But	  this	  may	  not	  be	  true	  and	  we	  need	  to	  
confront	  the	  fact	  that	  mental	  illness	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  categorical	  exemption	  from	  
responsibility.	  	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  subtle	  and	  unique	  ways	  in	  which	  specific	  mental	  
illnesses	  affect	  moral	  responsibility	  but	  without	  removing	  it	  entirely.	  	  To	  investigate	  
this,	  below	  I	  offer	  some	  cases	  involving	  different	  mental	  illnesses	  in	  order	  to	  probe	  
how	  our	  intuitions	  position	  the	  psychopath,	  along	  with	  other	  mental	  illnesses,	  along	  
the	  continuum	  of	  responsibility.	  	  	  
	  
1.1	  A	  central	  debate	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  psychiatry	  	  	  
	  	  
	   The	  concept	  of	  mental	  illness	  remains	  essentially	  contested	  and	  the	  
philosophical	  debate	  has	  yielded	  two	  distinct	  general	  accounts.	  The	  descriptive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  Knobe	  (2008)	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account	  (disease-­‐model)	  holds	  that	  mental	  illness,	  like	  physical	  illness,	  can	  be	  
explained	  in	  objective,	  value-­‐free	  terms	  of,	  say,	  a	  failure	  of	  biological	  functioning	  
(Kendall,	  Boorse,	  Wakefield).3	  	  Normative	  accounts	  range	  from	  the	  stronger,	  anti-­‐
psychiatrists	  (Szasz,	  Foucault,	  Laing),	  to	  weaker	  non-­‐descriptivist	  accounts	  (Fulford,	  
Thornton,	  Nordenfelt,	  Edwards).4	  	  To	  varying	  degrees	  all	  normative	  accounts	  
acknowledge	  the	  inescapable	  role	  of	  values	  (social,	  legal	  and	  moral	  norms)	  involved	  
in	  classifying	  mental	  conditions	  and	  behavioral	  problems	  as	  discretely	  diagnosable	  
mental	  illnesses.5	  	  
The	  normative	  camp	  in	  the	  mental	  illness	  debate	  resists	  the	  extension	  of	  a	  
strictly	  biological	  account	  of	  physical	  illness	  to	  mental	  illnesses.	  The	  rejection	  of	  the	  
analogy	  amounts	  to	  this:	  while	  the	  focus	  on	  specific	  organ	  function	  provides	  a	  useful	  
and	  relatively	  simple	  account	  of	  physical	  illness	  as	  objectively	  factual	  and	  
independent	  of	  values,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  similarly	  simple	  value-­‐free	  account	  of	  
mental	  illness	  because	  the	  practice	  of	  such	  classifications	  are	  based	  on	  inherently	  
value-­‐laden	  assessments	  of	  behaviors	  rather	  than,	  for	  example,	  reference	  to	  a	  lesion	  
of	  an	  organ.6	  Diagnostic	  criteria	  for	  virtually	  all	  psychological	  disorders	  listed	  in	  the	  
DSM	  IV	  TR	  confirm	  this	  worry.7	  No	  fMRI	  or	  genetic	  testing	  is	  required	  for	  someone	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Kendall,	  R.E.	  (1975);	  Boorse,	  C.	  (1997);	  Wakefield,	  J.C.	  (1992,	  2009)	  	  
4	  Szasz,	  T.	  (1974,	  1998);	  Fulford,	  KWM	  (1989);	  Nordenfelt,	  L.	  (1987);	  Edwards,	  C.	  
(2009);	  Thornton	  (2007)	  
5	  For	  a	  relevant	  example	  of	  an	  evaluative	  criterion,	  see	  A.1	  for	  Antisocial	  Personality	  
Disorder:	  “failure	  to	  conform	  to	  social	  norms	  with	  respect	  to	  lawful	  behaviors.”	  	  
Thus,	  no	  quick	  dismissal	  of	  the	  role	  of	  social	  values	  in	  ASPD	  is	  available.	  
6	  See	  Szasz	  (1978,	  1998,	  2006)	  for	  the	  strongest	  version	  of	  this	  argument	  
7	  DSM	  IV	  TR	  (2000):	  The	  diagnostic	  and	  statistical	  manual	  of	  mental	  disorders,	  
fourth	  edition,	  text	  revision.	  	  The	  DSM,	  among	  other	  influences	  it	  has,	  sets	  the	  terms	  
and	  standards	  for	  how	  various	  mental	  disorders	  are	  defined	  and	  classified.	  Since	  the	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to	  be	  diagnosed	  with	  a	  psychological	  disorder.8	  Rather,	  behavioral	  criteria	  continue	  
to	  solely	  serve	  this	  purpose.	  Because	  the	  practice	  of	  diagnosing	  mental	  illnesses	  
concerns	  persons	  and	  their	  behavior	  rather	  than	  organs	  and	  their	  function,	  the	  
actual	  reference	  of	  the	  symptoms	  is	  to	  (socially	  dysfunctional)	  behavior	  rather	  than	  
to	  discrete	  biological	  dysfunctions.	  	  Furthermore,	  those	  espousing	  the	  normative	  
account	  worry	  that	  the	  disease	  model	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  ‘medicalizing	  the	  moral’	  and	  
redefining	  the	  boundaries	  of	  our	  moral	  landscape	  on	  conceptually	  mistaken	  
grounds.	  	  Much	  of	  this	  debate	  has	  centered	  on	  the	  psychotic	  disorders	  
(schizophrenia	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  ‘delusion’),	  where	  the	  intuitions	  of	  many	  tend	  to	  
lean	  more	  strongly	  toward	  the	  disease	  model.	  	  And	  if	  the	  psychotic	  disorders	  (e.g.,	  
schizophrenia)	  are	  conceptually	  controversial	  (with	  regard	  to	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  
disease	  model),	  then	  the	  personality	  disorders	  (especially	  one	  that	  alleges	  to	  
describe	  a	  diseased	  moral	  character)	  appear	  anything	  but	  a	  value-­‐free	  disease.	  	  The	  
very	  idea	  of	  a	  value-­‐free	  concept	  of	  a	  diseased	  personality	  is	  caught	  awkwardly	  
straddled	  between	  the	  natural-­‐normative	  divide.9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
most	  recent	  philosophical	  writing	  pertaining	  to	  psychopaths	  occurred	  prior	  to	  DSM	  
V,	  I	  use	  DSM	  IV	  criteria	  where	  the	  discussion	  is	  appropriate.	  	  	  
8	  fMRI:	  functional	  magnetic	  resonance	  imaging	  
9	  That	  social	  norms	  have	  played	  a	  role	  specifically	  with	  the	  Axis	  II	  Personality	  
Disorders,	  one	  need	  look	  no	  further	  than	  the	  American	  Psychological	  Association’s	  
lamentable	  history	  with	  what	  was	  once	  an	  Axis	  II	  disorder,	  ‘Homosexual	  Personality	  
Disorder,’	  present	  until	  the	  DSM	  III	  R,	  when	  it	  was	  rightly	  excised	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
relentless	  social	  pressure	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s.	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  an	  on-­‐going	  
debate	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  include	  any	  Axis	  II	  personality	  disorder	  in	  the	  
forthcoming	  DSM	  V.	  	  I	  for	  one	  am	  not	  confident	  that	  personality	  disorders	  will	  be	  
removed.	  	  And	  so,	  there	  is	  a	  meta-­‐classification	  question	  lurking	  here	  that	  I	  cannot	  
treat	  properly	  in	  this	  paper,	  to	  wit.	  Why	  even	  classify	  the	  behavioral	  criteria	  
(symptoms)	  of	  ASPD	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  disorder	  at	  all?	  	  Why	  medicalize	  such	  morally-­‐
laden	  behaviors?	  	  This	  touches	  a	  much	  deeper	  history	  of	  the	  theoretical	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1.2	  Two	  accounts	  of	  psychopathy:	  value-­free	  and	  value-­laden	  
	  
	   In	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter	  I	  noted	  that	  philosophers	  assume	  that	  
psychopaths	  are	  completely	  morally	  blind	  and	  that	  they	  will	  inevitably	  remain	  so	  
impaired.	  	  I	  also	  suggested	  that	  this	  view	  arises,	  in	  part,	  from	  an	  underlying	  
assumption	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  a	  disease	  and	  that	  the	  disease	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  his	  
violent	  behavior	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  renders	  him	  not	  morally	  responsible.	  	  
Philosophers	  share	  this	  general	  view,	  though	  with	  some	  variation	  of	  how	  the	  
disease	  of	  psychopathy	  divorces	  those	  suffering	  from	  it,	  psychopaths,	  from	  
responsibility.10	  	  Since	  the	  disease	  view	  of	  psychopathy	  appears	  to	  prop	  up	  the	  view	  
that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  it	  warrants	  special	  analysis.	  	  As	  I	  shall	  
argue,	  since	  psychopathy	  (viz.	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder)	  is	  maintained	  with	  
explicitly	  moral	  terms	  it	  is,	  far	  from	  being	  a	  value-­‐free	  medical	  and	  empirical	  
concept,	  is	  rather	  a	  value-­‐laden	  concept	  in	  which	  moral	  norms	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  
out	  of	  the	  conceptual	  picture.	  	  As	  such,	  psychopathy	  is	  uniquely	  situated	  within	  a	  
larger	  and	  more	  comprehensive	  debate	  over	  the	  nature	  and	  concept	  of	  mental	  
illness	  and	  the	  status	  of	  values	  contained	  therein.	  	  Below,	  I	  briefly	  summarize	  that	  
debate	  and	  explain	  what	  bearing	  it	  has	  on	  questions	  about	  responsibility	  and	  mental	  
illness.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
development	  of	  all	  psychopathologies,	  but	  for	  a	  nice	  introduction	  to	  a	  set	  of	  related	  
concerns,	  see	  Elliot	  (2008).	  
10	  Wolf’s	  (1993)	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘deep	  self’	  whereas	  Fischer	  and	  Ravizza	  
(1998)	  focus	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘control.’	  	  Both	  accounts	  attribute	  the	  lack	  of	  these	  
desiderata	  for	  responsibility	  to	  the	  disease	  of	  psychopathy	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  
person	  with	  psychopathy	  is	  not	  responsible.	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There	  are	  roughly	  two	  competing	  theories	  of	  mental	  illness,	  the	  value-­‐free	  
model	  (also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘disease	  model’	  or	  the	  ‘medical	  model’)	  that	  purports	  
to	  define	  mental	  illness	  strictly	  in	  value-­‐free	  empirical	  terms	  (only	  after	  which,	  and	  
separately,	  come	  ethical	  concerns)	  and	  the	  value-­‐laden	  model	  that	  contends	  that	  the	  
concept	  of	  mental	  illness	  itself	  (including	  various	  diagnostic	  criteria)	  is	  permeated	  
with	  social,	  legal	  and	  ethical	  values.	  	  	  
I	  am	  not	  as	  concerned	  here	  with	  how	  values	  are	  smuggled	  into	  the	  concept	  of	  
mental	  illness,	  specifically	  with	  respect	  to	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder,	  so	  much	  
as	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  showing	  that	  values	  permeate	  the	  diagnostic	  criteria,	  and	  thus,	  
the	  very	  concept	  of	  psychopathy.	  	  (Later,	  in	  chapter	  3	  we	  will	  see	  how	  Levy	  
unwittingly	  smuggles	  values	  into	  his	  assessment	  of	  psychopaths’	  responses	  to	  
variations	  of	  the	  Trolley	  Problem.)	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  presences	  of	  values	  (moral	  values)	  in	  
the	  diagnostic	  criteria	  for	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder	  are	  far	  more	  centrally	  
infused	  than	  that	  of	  other	  mental	  illnesses.	  	  I	  do,	  however,	  want	  to	  say	  just	  a	  few	  
things	  about	  ‘how’	  values	  come	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  mental	  illness	  and	  
many	  of	  its	  diagnostic	  criteria.	  	  	  
Philosophers	  of	  psychiatry	  often	  speak	  of	  the	  ‘smuggling’	  of	  values	  into	  both	  
the	  core	  concept	  of	  mental	  illness	  and	  many	  of	  its	  diagnostic	  criteria.	  	  This,	  however,	  
may	  be	  subtly	  misleading	  by	  suggesting	  that	  those	  tasked	  with	  (re)defining	  various	  
experiences	  in	  living	  as	  psychological	  disorders,	  (APA	  committees;	  for	  instance,	  the	  
(re)defining	  of	  habitual	  violent	  behavior	  as	  a	  psychological	  disorder;	  or	  defining	  
various	  sexual	  experiences	  as	  pathological	  or	  not	  –	  we	  should	  remember	  that	  just	  
two	  decades	  ago	  homosexuality	  was	  a	  clinical	  psychological	  disorder;	  this	  error	  has	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since	  been	  rectified),	  are	  consciously	  intentional	  in	  installing	  values	  in	  the	  criteria.	  	  
This	  seems	  both	  unlikely	  and	  uncharitable.	  	  Rather,	  there	  may	  well	  be	  a	  conscious	  
effort	  to	  purge	  the	  concept	  of	  mental	  illness	  and	  many	  of	  its	  criteria	  of	  values	  that	  
has	  routinely	  failed	  and	  the	  fault	  lies	  in	  failing	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  values	  purge	  it	  
not	  possible.	  	  The	  unfortunate	  result	  then	  is	  that	  moral	  values	  become	  sublimated	  
into	  the	  diagnostic	  criteria	  leaving	  the	  false	  impression	  of	  a	  successful	  values	  purge.	  	  
So,	  rather	  than	  worrying	  about	  values	  being	  smuggled	  in,	  we	  should	  worry	  about	  
how	  values,	  specifically	  what	  we	  call	  moral	  values,	  remain	  sublimated.	  	  A	  better	  
option	  is	  to	  be	  open	  and	  transparent	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  values	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  
mental	  illness	  so	  that	  the	  debate	  we	  have	  is	  clearly	  a	  normative	  debate	  (say,	  about	  
our	  social	  policies	  for	  those	  with	  mental	  illnesses)	  that	  at	  its	  very	  core,	  is	  likewise	  
normative	  in	  content.	  	  	  
For	  our	  purposes,	  psychopathy,	  perhaps	  more	  than	  any	  other	  discrete	  mental	  
illness,	  shows	  this.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  showing	  this,	  I	  will	  also	  argue	  that	  rather	  than	  
allowing	  these	  moral	  values	  defining	  psychopathy	  to	  remain	  sublimated,	  thus	  
perpetuating	  the	  pretense	  of	  psychopathy	  as	  a	  disease,	  we	  should	  be	  explicit	  in	  our	  
discussion	  about	  the	  values	  used	  to	  define	  the	  very	  idea	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  a	  
disorder.	  	  Psychopathy	  is	  thus	  a	  deeply	  confused	  concept	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  erroneous	  
notion	  that	  these	  are	  persons	  wholly	  incapable	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  rather	  than	  
say,	  these	  are	  persons	  unusually	  efficient	  in	  failing	  to	  meet	  even	  basic	  moral	  
demands	  not	  to	  assault	  and	  kill	  others,	  for	  instance.	  	  Levy	  (2007,	  2010),	  like	  
psychiatrist	  Hervey	  Cleckley	  (1955),	  (the	  conceptual	  progenitor	  of	  ‘psychopathy),	  is	  
motivated	  to	  pathologize	  habitually	  violent	  behavior	  because	  they	  both	  see	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psychopaths	  as	  victims	  of	  a	  disease	  and	  that	  it	  follows	  from	  this	  that	  we	  should	  not	  
see	  them	  as	  moral	  agents	  worthy	  of	  responses	  that	  have	  moral	  content.	  	  	  
To	  see	  why	  this	  is	  a	  problem,	  let’s	  compare	  psychopathy	  again	  to	  
homosexuality.	  	  When	  in	  the	  mid	  1980’s,	  the	  APA	  dropped	  homosexuality	  
personality	  disorder	  from	  the	  DSM,	  thus	  removing	  homosexuality	  from	  the	  list	  of	  
mental	  illnesses,	  and	  thus,	  from	  being	  viewed	  (at	  least	  by	  clinicians,	  and	  perhaps	  to	  
much	  of	  the	  public)	  as	  a	  disease.	  	  It	  may	  be	  that	  homosexuality	  was	  first	  included	  in	  
the	  DSM	  from	  a	  compassionate	  motive	  to	  dissuade	  moral	  judgment	  (including	  
reactive	  attitudes).	  	  Regardless	  of	  how	  homosexuality	  came	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  
disease	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  social	  and	  moral	  progress	  that	  
occurred	  when	  it	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  list	  of	  mental	  illnesses.	  	  Of	  course	  this	  
means	  that	  homosexuals	  once	  again	  became	  targets	  of	  moral	  condemnation	  (as	  if	  
this	  ever	  ceased	  in	  the	  religious	  milieu,	  even	  during	  the	  period	  it	  featured	  in	  the	  
DSM	  III),	  for	  we	  are	  not	  supposed	  to	  blame	  the	  mentally	  ill	  (as	  the	  common	  view	  
holds).	  	  Odd	  as	  it	  may	  sound,	  freeing	  homosexuality	  from	  the	  list	  of	  mental	  illnesses	  
represents	  a	  restoration	  to	  potentially	  be	  morally	  judged	  and	  thus,	  progress	  from	  
viewing	  homosexuals	  as	  diseased	  agents	  in	  need	  of	  a	  cure.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  removing	  
mental	  illness	  as	  a	  reactive	  attitude	  blocker	  represents	  a	  restoration	  of	  agency	  to	  the	  
class	  of	  homosexual	  individuals.	  	  I	  myself	  find	  the	  moral	  judgment	  of	  homosexuality	  
indefensible.	  	  Nonetheless,	  I	  find	  the	  diseasing	  of	  homosexuality	  even	  worse.	  	  (There	  
obviously	  remains	  a	  need	  for	  further	  progress	  in	  reducing	  negative	  moral	  judgment	  
of	  homosexuals.	  	  We	  should	  have	  never	  included	  homosexuality	  in	  the	  DSM	  in	  the	  
first	  place	  and	  we	  should	  likewise	  exclude	  it	  as	  grounds	  for	  moral	  condemnation.	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And	  in	  many	  respects,	  religion	  and	  science	  alike	  have	  treated	  homosexuals	  with	  
similar	  indifference	  with	  respect	  their	  agency.	  	  So,	  I	  suppose	  ‘progress’	  here	  would	  
simply	  mean	  correcting	  one	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  error.)	  	  Now,	  I	  suggest	  we	  may	  be	  faced	  
with	  a	  similar	  decision	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  psychopath.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  should	  
acknowledge	  that	  this	  is	  a	  disorder	  that,	  like	  homosexuality,	  never	  belonged	  in	  the	  
first	  place	  and	  that	  individuals	  so	  labeled	  need	  to	  be,	  once	  again,	  viewed	  as	  moral	  
agents	  and	  with	  all	  the	  respect	  that	  this	  so	  accords,	  including	  unfavorable	  and	  even	  
unfair	  moral	  judgments.	  	  For,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  be	  morally	  condemned,	  harshly	  or	  even	  
inappropriately,	  than	  it	  is	  to	  be	  de-­‐humanized	  and	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  non-­‐agent	  
unworthy	  of	  inherently	  human	  responses.	  	  If	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  we	  should	  resent	  the	  
psychopath	  rather	  than	  see	  him	  as	  a	  non-­‐agent	  or	  worse,	  a	  beast.	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  
overestimate	  how	  important	  this	  distinction	  is	  when	  discussing	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
the	  psychopath	  and	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  him.	  	  So	  part	  of	  the	  disagreement	  
about	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths	  may	  then	  have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  an	  
underlying	  disagreement	  as	  to	  whether	  we	  find	  it	  better	  to	  pathologize	  persons	  
while	  refraining	  from	  moral	  assessment	  altogether	  or,	  alternatively,	  whether	  we	  
find	  it	  an	  improvement	  of	  some	  kind	  that	  we	  refrain	  from	  pathologizing	  persons	  
whilst	  then	  engaging	  in	  moral	  assessments	  of	  them.	  	  I	  think	  the	  clinical	  history	  of	  
homosexuality	  shows	  us	  the	  advantages	  of	  the	  former	  over	  the	  latter.11	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  This	  is	  precisely	  Morris’	  (1968)	  argument	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  right	  to	  punishment,	  
as	  punishment	  is	  generally	  and	  morally	  preferable	  to	  involuntary	  psychiatric	  
treatment.	  	  Deigh	  (1996)	  dissents	  from	  this	  view.	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Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  examine	  the	  actual	  diagnostic	  criteria	  for	  Antisocial	  
Personality	  Disorder	  where	  we	  will	  see	  one	  of	  the	  most	  overtly	  value-­‐laden	  mental	  
illnesses.	  	  	  
	  
1.3	  The	  empirical	  argument	  
	  
In	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  dissertation	  I	  claimed	  that	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  
or	  not	  to	  ‘hold’	  psychopaths	  responsible	  (including	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  might	  do	  
so)	  has	  been	  overly	  subordinated	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  psychopath	  
‘is	  responsible’	  for	  his	  actions,	  omissions,	  and	  the	  resulting	  consequences.	  	  Levy	  
(2007b)	  is	  explicit	  that	  when	  we	  take	  up	  the	  question	  of	  psychopath’s	  responsibility	  
that	  we	  are	  engaging	  in	  a	  factual	  inquiry	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  normative	  one)	  rather	  
than	  an	  ‘as	  if’	  inquiry:	  ‘[But]	  and	  agent’s	  moral	  responsibility,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  is	  not	  
something	  we	  can	  simply	  decide.	  	  We	  are	  not	  here	  concerned	  with	  whether	  it	  is	  
appropriate	  to	  act	  as	  if	  psychopaths	  were	  responsible.	  	  We	  are	  instead	  concerned	  
with	  a	  factual	  question:	  whether	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions,’	  (Levy,	  
2007a).12	  	  So,	  on	  Levy’s	  view,	  we	  can	  only	  provide	  an	  answer	  the	  ‘hold	  responsible’	  
question(s)	  (whether	  or	  not	  we	  should,	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  we	  should	  hold	  psychopaths	  
responsible),	  after	  settling	  on	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  (allegedly)	  factual	  question	  whether	  
or	  not	  the	  psychopath	  ‘is	  in	  fact’	  responsible.	  	  I	  am	  skeptical	  that	  our	  responses	  to	  
psychopaths	  are	  afforded	  the	  luxury	  of	  factually	  establishing	  the	  moral	  
responsibility	  of	  psychopaths	  beforehand.	  	  Below	  I	  engage	  the	  empirical	  data	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Levy	  (2007a)	  p.	  137,	  fn.	  2	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Levy	  uses	  to	  support	  the	  conclusion	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  responsible	  directly.	  	  
But	  before	  doing	  so,	  I	  wish	  to	  note	  two	  concerns	  with	  Levy’s	  approach.	  
First,	  Levy	  assumes	  that	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  an	  
empirical,	  non-­‐normative	  concept	  in	  which	  there	  appears	  very	  little,	  if	  any,	  middle	  
ground.	  	  Thus,	  psychopaths	  either	  are	  or	  are	  not	  responsible	  on	  his	  view.	  	  This,	  
however,	  is	  an	  overly	  bifurcated	  view	  of	  responsible	  agency.	  	  We	  are	  better	  served	  
(theoretically	  and	  practically)	  by	  assuming	  that	  responsible	  agency	  can	  be	  better	  
understood	  as	  falling	  along	  a	  continuum	  (the	  cases	  below/above	  provide	  some	  
intuitive	  content	  to	  show	  this).	  	  We	  want	  to	  know	  where	  psychopaths	  fall	  along	  the	  
continuum	  of	  responsible	  agency	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  destined	  to	  maintain	  
a	  fixed	  position	  along	  that	  continuum.	  	  Evidence	  suggests	  that	  psychopaths,	  slowly	  
but	  naturally,	  advance	  along	  the	  responsibility	  continuum	  (evidence	  that	  Levy	  
ignores).13	  	  (Later	  in	  the	  dissertation	  I	  return	  to	  discuss	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  reduction	  
of	  symptoms	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  an	  increase	  in	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  
can.)	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  very	  exercise	  of	  positioning	  various	  agents	  along	  the	  
responsibility	  continuum	  is	  a	  normative	  exercise.	  	  Granted	  it	  is	  an	  exercise	  that	  
should	  take	  empirical	  data	  into	  consideration	  –	  but	  only	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  
the	  evidence	  is	  provisional	  and	  that	  considering	  the	  evidence	  does	  not	  commit	  one	  
to	  a	  value-­‐free	  understanding	  of	  either	  responsibility	  or	  psychopathy.	  	  	  
This	  brings	  me	  to	  the	  second	  concern,	  that	  Levy’s	  view	  appears	  to	  commit	  us	  
to	  not	  develop	  a	  policy	  regarding	  how	  we	  should	  hold	  psychopaths	  responsible	  until	  
we	  have	  established	  the	  fact	  of	  psychopathic	  (non)responsibility.	  	  Scientific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  DSM	  IV	  TR	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reasoning	  remains	  in	  flux,	  as	  does	  the	  gathering	  of	  empirical	  facts.	  	  Otto	  Neurath	  
once	  described	  the	  process	  of	  gaining	  scientific	  knowledge	  akin	  to	  building	  a	  boat	  
while	  at	  sea	  without	  ever	  being	  able	  to	  dock.14	  	  So,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  neural	  
basis	  for	  moral	  responsibility,	  even	  if	  taken	  as	  a	  strictly	  empirical	  enterprise,	  is	  an	  
inherently	  speculative	  endeavor.	  	  Nor	  is	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  responsibility	  is	  
as	  thoroughgoingly	  empirical	  as	  Levy	  suggests.	  	  Thus,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  provide	  a	  
response	  to	  the	  normative	  question	  of	  how,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  should	  go	  about	  
holding	  psychopaths	  responsible	  absent	  any	  factual	  certainty	  regarding	  his	  
responsibility.	  	  Levy	  too	  is	  thereby	  committed	  to	  responding	  to	  the	  ‘hold	  
responsible’	  question	  with	  only	  a	  (weakly)	  suggestive	  gathering	  of	  evidence	  to	  the	  
allegedly	  established	  ‘fact’	  of	  psychopathic	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Before	  criticizing	  
what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  an	  inversion	  of	  appropriate	  normative	  responses	  to	  psychopathic	  
wrongdoing	  that	  Levy	  calls	  for	  (by	  default),	  I	  wish	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  
evidence	  he	  offers	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  psychopaths	  are,	  factually	  speaking,	  not	  
morally	  responsible.	  
	  
1.4	  No	  escaping	  values:	  criticism	  of	  the	  empirical	  argument	  	  
	  
I	  can	  only	  here	  provide	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  neuro-­‐empirical	  evidence	  
provided	  by	  Levy	  in	  support	  of	  the	  conclusion	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  morally	  
responsible,	  as	  a	  more	  in	  depth	  discussion	  would	  steer	  this	  dissertation	  too	  far	  into	  
the	  domain	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  (Although	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Cartwright,	  Cat,	  Fleck,	  Uebel	  (2008),	  p.	  89;	  Neurath	  (1932),	  ‘Protocol	  Statements’,	  
Erkenntnis	  3,	  p.	  204-­‐14.	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philosophy	  of	  psychiatry	  requires	  that	  we	  engage	  in	  philosophy	  of	  scientific	  
reasoning	  every	  bit	  as	  much	  as	  it	  requires	  we	  engage	  in	  moral	  and	  political	  
philosophy.)	  	  After	  summarizing	  Levy’s	  account	  of	  the	  empirical	  evidence,	  I	  raise	  
two	  main	  objections:	  first,	  that	  the	  evidence	  falls	  considerably	  shy	  of	  being	  
suggestive,	  and	  second,	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  that	  Levy’s	  own	  view	  is	  
inescapably	  evaluative	  and	  that	  he	  appears	  unaware	  that	  his	  view	  is	  so	  committed.	  
The	  basic	  empirical	  approach	  to	  explaining	  psychopathic	  (non)	  responsibility	  
includes	  brain	  scan	  imagery	  by	  fMRI	  of	  psychopathic	  subjects,	  while	  slightly	  more	  
complex	  approaches	  include	  imagery	  of	  psychopath’s	  brains	  while	  being	  asked	  
various	  moral	  thought	  experiments,	  (for	  instance,	  variations	  of	  the	  trolley	  problem).	  	  
Two	  regions	  of	  the	  brain	  have	  been	  identified	  as	  playing	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  our	  ability	  
to	  think	  and	  behave	  morally,	  the	  amygdala	  and	  the	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex.	  	  	  
Initial	  research	  (Blair,	  2005)	  suggests	  that	  the	  amygdala,	  the	  region	  of	  the	  brain	  
thought	  to	  regulate	  emotion,	  is	  impaired,	  or	  relatively	  smaller	  in	  psychopathic	  
brains	  than	  in	  the	  brain	  of	  non-­‐psychopaths.	  	  However,	  amygdala	  dysfunction	  is	  
believed	  to	  account	  for	  the	  reactive	  aggression	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  some	  
psychopaths	  but	  it	  does	  not	  account	  for	  instrumental	  aggression	  associated	  with	  
other	  psychopaths.	  	  Instrumental	  aggression	  is	  distinct	  from	  reactive	  aggression	  in	  
that	  the	  former	  lacks	  the	  loss	  of	  emotional	  control	  that	  defines	  the	  latter.	  	  
Instrumental	  aggression	  requires	  a	  cool	  head	  and	  an	  ability	  to	  put	  together	  a	  
complex	  plan	  of	  action	  leading	  to	  a	  specific	  desired	  result	  (often	  the	  assault	  or	  
killing	  of	  the	  target	  of	  the	  instrumental	  aggression).	  	  As	  noted	  by	  Levy	  (2007a),	  it	  is	  
the	  ‘deliberate	  use	  of	  instrumental	  violence	  that	  makes	  psychopaths	  so	  hard	  to	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forgive.’	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  level	  of	  agency	  required	  to	  deliberately	  engage	  in	  
instrumental	  violence	  belies	  the	  (Strawsonian)	  assumption	  that	  psychopaths	  
obviously	  lack	  agency.	  	  	  
	   An	  alternative	  neuro-­‐cognitive	  account	  places	  the	  seat	  of	  responsibility	  in	  the	  
ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (VM),	  as	  patients	  with	  VM	  damage	  tend	  to	  
(mis)behave	  similarly	  to	  psychopaths.,	  (Roskies,	  2003).	  	  (There	  is	  a	  corollary	  debate	  
whether	  or	  not	  VM	  patients	  are	  morally	  responsible	  that	  has	  some	  relevance	  to	  the	  
question	  of	  psychopathic	  responsibility	  but	  I	  will	  ignore	  that	  debate	  in	  this	  
dissertation.)	  	  The	  point	  of	  relevance	  here	  is	  that	  Levy,	  assuming	  VM	  patients	  are	  
like	  psychopaths,	  appeals	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  (and	  brain	  imagery	  of)	  VM	  patients	  
when	  asked	  about	  moral	  dilemmas	  like	  variations	  of	  the	  trolley	  problem	  as	  
providing	  empirical	  (hence,	  value-­‐free)	  evidence	  that	  VM	  patients	  are	  not	  morally	  
responsible.	  	  As	  Levy	  explains	  (2010,	  p.	  217),	  that	  VM	  patients	  ‘perform	  normally’	  
when	  asked	  to	  flip	  a	  switch	  that	  redirects	  the	  trolley	  to	  hit	  one	  worker	  instead	  of	  
five,	  but	  when	  asked	  whether	  to	  push	  a	  bystander	  in	  front	  of	  the	  trolley	  to	  redirect	  it	  
to	  hit	  one	  worker	  instead	  of	  five,	  VM	  patients	  ‘perform	  abnormally,’	  [emphasis	  
added].	  	  On	  Levy’s	  view,	  the	  VM	  patient	  does	  not	  answer	  wrongly,	  or	  even	  
controversially,	  he	  answers	  abnormally,	  because	  of	  his	  neural	  pathology.	  	  	  
Philosophers	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  trolley	  problem	  in	  part	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  
distinguishing	  utilitarian	  (welfare	  maximizing)	  approaches	  with	  deontological	  
approaches,	  and	  while	  we	  philosophers	  might	  have	  reasonable	  disagreement	  about	  
what	  to	  do	  in	  various	  trolley	  scenarios,	  what	  we	  do	  not	  do	  is	  dismiss	  the	  view	  of	  our	  
counterpart	  as	  abnormal	  or	  brain	  damaged,	  or	  otherwise	  pathological.	  	  Levy	  here	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appears	  to	  pathologize	  a	  specific	  moral	  judgment.15	  	  (Again,	  the	  abnormal	  judgment	  
here	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  neural	  damage;	  hence	  its	  abnormality	  is	  pathological.)	  In	  as	  
much	  as	  we	  might	  disagree	  with	  many	  utilitarian	  judgments	  (or	  the	  theory	  more	  
generally)	  we	  do	  not	  dismiss	  such	  judgments	  as	  evidence	  of	  pathological	  moral	  
incompetence.	  	  Fortunately,	  there	  is	  evidence	  (overlooked	  by	  Levy)	  to	  bolster	  my	  
point.	  	  The	  research	  of	  Cushman	  and	  Young	  (2009)	  provides	  evidence	  from	  non-­‐VM	  
damaged,	  non-­‐psychopathic	  ‘normal’	  individuals	  in	  which	  different	  brain	  regions	  
under	  fMRI	  reveal	  signal	  changes	  in	  the	  brain	  that	  correlate	  with	  different	  moral	  
theories	  held	  by	  those	  individuals.	  	  Briefly,	  the	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  
seems	  to	  be	  correlated	  with	  conforming	  to	  deontological	  rules,	  (the	  VM	  ‘illuminates’	  
on	  fMRI	  when	  deontologists	  say	  ‘no’	  to	  pushing	  the	  bystander	  onto	  the	  track)	  while	  
an	  idle	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (VM	  fails	  to	  illuminate)	  is	  correlated	  with	  
welfare	  maximizing	  decisions	  (pushing	  the	  bystander	  onto	  the	  track).	  	  Since	  two	  
distinct	  types	  of	  moral	  reasoning	  occur	  in	  two	  distinct	  regions	  of	  the	  brain,	  (only	  
one	  of	  which	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  region	  of	  the	  brain	  that	  Levy	  believes	  to	  be	  
involved	  in	  moral	  reasoning),	  what	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  this?	  	  Either	  we	  conclude	  that	  
localization	  theories	  about	  moral	  reasoning	  are	  too	  nascent	  in	  their	  development	  to	  
tell	  us	  very	  much	  about	  responsibility,	  or	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  utilitarians	  are	  
psychopaths.	  	  Since	  utilitarians	  are	  not	  psychopaths,	  (despite	  similarities	  of	  brain	  
structure	  when	  making	  moral	  judgments),	  then	  the	  state	  of	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Levy	  (2010);	  to	  fill	  out	  his	  argument	  here:	  VM	  patients	  –	  owing	  to	  neural	  damage	  
similar	  to	  psychopaths	  -­‐	  lack	  moral	  competence	  and	  are	  thus,	  not	  morally	  
responsible.	  	  And	  by	  extension,	  utilitarians	  likewise	  lack	  competence	  and	  
responsibility.	  	  This	  is	  of	  course,	  false.	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far	  from	  compelling,	  and	  is	  perhaps	  not	  even	  suggestive	  in	  the	  slightest.	  	  More	  
importantly,	  however,	  is	  that	  we	  note	  how	  Levy	  has	  pathologized	  one	  set	  of	  
responses	  based	  on	  fMRI	  ‘evidence’.	  	  	  
Hence,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  Levy’s	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  new	  empirical	  data	  
fails	  on	  two	  accounts.	  	  First,	  Levy’s	  insistence	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  itself	  is	  an	  
empirical	  matter	  (2007a,	  p.	  169)	  that	  can	  be	  established	  without	  doing	  moral	  
philosophy	  appears	  to	  be	  achievable	  only	  by	  simply	  redefining	  moral	  values	  
(especially	  bad	  values)	  as	  pathological	  values.	  	  We	  should	  reject	  this	  move	  on	  the	  
most	  basic	  Szaszean	  grounds	  that	  we	  should	  resist	  the	  ‘medicalization	  of	  morals.’	  	  
Second,	  we	  should	  likewise	  be	  weary	  of	  the	  smuggling,	  however	  overt,	  of	  values	  into	  
the	  concept	  of	  psychopathy	  itself.	  	  What	  Levy	  takes	  as	  neuro-­‐empirical	  evidence	  of	  
mad	  values	  appears	  to	  be	  little	  more	  than	  evidence	  of	  bad	  values,	  (assuming	  that	  we	  
reject	  utilitarian	  judgments	  on	  moral	  grounds	  and	  not	  on	  medical	  grounds).	  	  	  
We	  can	  agree	  with	  Levy	  that	  continued	  neuro-­‐empirical	  research	  (by	  fMRI)	  
of	  psychopaths	  is	  warranted	  but	  disagree	  with	  the	  implications	  this	  research	  will	  
ultimately	  yield.	  	  Levy	  appears	  to	  think	  that	  improved	  empirical	  research,	  (say,	  that	  
identifies	  with	  more	  explanatory	  authority	  the	  specific	  brain	  region	  that	  is	  faulty	  in	  
psychopaths),	  will	  show	  that	  we	  should	  exempt	  psychopaths	  from	  moral	  
responsibility.	  	  To	  the	  contrary,	  if	  we	  possess	  evidence	  with	  more	  explanatory	  
power,	  perhaps	  we	  should	  rather	  use	  this	  evidence	  as	  a	  contribution	  to	  
understanding	  how	  to	  help	  psychopaths	  meet	  even	  the	  most	  basic	  moral	  obligations	  
(thereby,	  morally	  improving).	  	  Better	  evidence	  need	  not	  imply	  a	  better	  case	  for	  
exemption.	  	  Rather,	  better	  evidence	  implies	  developing	  our	  approach	  to	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psychopaths	  qua	  potentially	  more	  fully	  responsible	  agents.	  	  (Here	  our	  research	  
might	  now	  ask,	  ‘can	  we	  bypass	  the	  VM	  in	  moral	  reasoning?’	  and,	  ‘how	  can	  we	  
increase	  range	  of	  emotional	  responses	  of	  psychopaths	  in	  light	  of	  VM	  data?’)	  	  	  
If	  in	  the	  future	  we	  discover	  the	  neural	  structure	  of	  moral	  responsibility,	  then	  
we	  still	  have	  a	  choice	  of	  what	  to	  do	  with	  this	  knowledge.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  we	  might	  
conclude	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  indeed	  exempt	  from	  responsibility	  and	  decide	  from	  
this	  premise	  (now	  a	  factual	  one,	  we	  are	  assuming)	  what	  to	  do	  with	  psychopaths.	  	  
Perhaps,	  following	  the	  common	  view,	  all	  offending	  psychopaths	  are	  to	  be	  detained	  
indefinitely,	  but	  are	  never	  to	  be	  blamed.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  develop	  a	  screening	  device	  
that	  allows	  us	  to	  preemptively	  round	  up	  and	  detain	  psychopaths	  even	  prior	  to	  their	  
offending,	  (justified	  by	  the	  statistical	  likelihood	  that	  they	  will	  assault	  or	  kill	  
someone),	  but	  we	  are	  never	  to	  blame	  them.	  	  At	  this	  point	  a	  dissonant	  intuition	  needs	  
to	  be	  identified,	  that	  something	  seems	  morally	  wrong	  with	  rounding	  up	  and	  jailing	  
psychopaths	  whom	  have	  never	  harmed	  anyone	  or	  otherwise	  offended.	  	  We	  would	  be	  
preemptively	  jailing	  the	  non-­‐offending	  psychopath	  based	  on	  a	  neural	  profile	  that	  
predicts	  the	  psychopath	  will	  inevitably	  assault	  or	  kill.	  	  I	  assume	  without	  argument	  
that	  it	  would	  of	  course	  be	  immoral	  and	  unjust	  to	  preemptively	  detain	  anyone,	  
including	  psychopaths.	  	  Perhaps	  this	  assumption	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  psychopaths	  
and	  we	  would	  want	  to	  know	  the	  predictive	  accuracy	  the	  neural	  profile	  provides,	  and	  
if	  it	  is	  high	  enough	  (say	  99%	  likelihood)	  then	  we	  might	  be	  justified	  in	  detaining	  all	  
psychopaths,	  even	  the	  1%	  for	  whom	  we	  are	  not	  certain	  will	  offend.	  	  But	  this	  would	  
be	  a	  justification	  that	  relies	  on	  utilitarianism,	  and	  thus,	  is	  not	  likely	  one	  Levy	  would	  
find	  sufficiently	  normal	  to	  support.	  	  If	  Levy,	  owing	  to	  his	  own	  deontological	  bent,	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would	  reject	  the	  preemptive	  detention	  approach,	  then	  he	  must	  admit	  that	  what	  still	  
matters	  the	  most	  (more	  than	  a	  neural	  profile)	  is	  what	  the	  psychopath	  in	  fact	  does.	  	  
And,	  to	  own	  the	  hidden	  premise	  here,	  I	  presume	  that	  if	  we	  are	  assuming	  a	  natural	  
kinds	  model	  of	  psychopathy	  in	  which	  the	  psychopath	  is	  defined	  by	  his	  uniquely	  
abnormal	  neural	  structure,	  (a	  view	  Levy	  appears	  steadfastly	  committed	  to),	  then	  we	  
can	  also	  assume	  that	  there	  are	  psychopaths	  who	  refrain	  from	  acting	  wrongly.	  	  In	  
fact,	  at	  least	  one	  such	  case	  has	  been	  documented,	  in	  which	  a	  neuroscientists	  
studying	  brain	  images	  of	  psychopaths	  learned	  after	  looking	  at	  his	  own	  brain	  that	  his	  
neural	  profile	  matched	  that	  of	  psychopaths.16	  	  Yet	  this	  man	  has	  no	  criminal	  record,	  
is	  involved	  in	  normal	  interpersonal	  relationships	  (is	  married	  with	  children,	  with	  
professional	  colleagues,	  etc.)	  and	  certainly	  does	  not	  engage	  in	  cool,	  calculated	  
instrumental	  aggression.	  	  Even	  if	  we	  assume	  there	  is	  a	  neural	  basis	  to	  psychopathy,	  
it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  all	  agents	  in	  the	  neural	  class	  will	  go	  on	  to	  aggressively	  harm	  
others.	  	  Of	  course,	  and	  this	  point	  cannot	  be	  under-­‐emphasized,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  
as	  a	  non-­offending	  psychopath.	  	  In	  order	  to	  ‘earn’	  the	  diagnosis,	  one	  has	  to	  have	  
actually	  exhibited	  a	  habit	  of	  harming	  others.	  	  So,	  psychopathy	  is	  not	  so	  much	  in	  one’s	  
neural	  structure	  as	  it	  is	  a	  pattern	  of	  behavior.	  	  Furthermore,	  possessing	  the	  identical	  
neural	  structure	  of	  psychopathy	  appears	  not	  to	  be	  as	  causally	  deterministic.	  
	   Taking	  stock	  of	  the	  dialectical	  situation	  at	  the	  close	  of	  this	  section,	  I	  have	  
argued	  that	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  cited	  by	  Levy	  that	  alleges	  to	  explain	  why	  
psychopaths	  are	  not	  responsible	  does	  not	  pass	  muster.	  	  In	  fact,	  Levy’s	  treatment	  of	  
the	  evidence	  reveals	  a	  crucial	  error	  that,	  swiftly	  and	  without	  argument,	  simply	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Hagerty	  (2010).	  The	  neuroscientists	  name	  is	  James	  Fallon.	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redefines	  controversial	  moral	  judgments	  (utilitarian	  judgments	  specifically)	  as	  
abnormal	  and	  pathological	  judgments.	  	  Put	  in	  the	  most	  simple	  of	  terms,	  Levy	  has	  
relabeled	  bad	  moral	  reasons	  as	  mad	  moral	  unreasons.	  	  Furthermore,	  from	  this	  
paradigmatic	  shift,	  it	  is	  then	  assumed	  that	  since	  mad	  reasons	  are	  caused	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  bad	  reasons	  are	  not,	  and	  since	  psychopaths	  can	  only	  have	  mad	  reasons,	  then	  
they	  do	  not	  possess	  the	  causal	  control	  over	  their	  reasons	  in	  a	  way	  that	  allegedly	  
grounds	  responsibility.	  	  But	  as	  we	  have	  just	  seen,	  once	  the	  bad	  to	  mad	  mistake	  made	  
by	  Levy	  is	  revealed,	  then	  the	  causal	  basis	  for	  psychopathic	  ‘reasons’	  for	  acting	  looses	  
its	  intuitive	  metaphysical	  punch.	  	  It	  also	  shows	  that	  we	  cannot	  simply	  dismiss	  the	  
reasons	  psychopaths	  offer	  for	  their	  behavior	  as	  causes	  and	  not	  reasons	  at	  all.	  	  We	  
must	  confront	  the	  reasons	  and	  however	  unreasonable	  they	  are	  we	  should	  confront	  
them	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  normative	  domain	  of	  reasons.	  	  Later	  in	  chapter	  4	  I	  defend	  
the	  targeting	  of	  reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  psychopath’s	  behavior.	  	  
	  
1.5	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder:	  value-­laden	  diagnostic	  criteria	  
	  
	   There	  are	  several	  criteria	  that	  one	  must	  meet	  to	  earn	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  
Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder.	  	  (It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  period	  of	  writing	  of	  this	  
dissertation	  straddles	  two	  versions	  of	  the	  DSM,	  the	  revised	  fourth	  edition	  and	  the	  
very	  recently	  published	  fifth	  edition.	  	  I	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  the	  fourth	  edition	  for	  
two	  main	  reasons.	  	  First,	  Levy	  provides	  the	  most	  cogent	  argument	  to	  excuse	  the	  
psychopath	  from	  responsibility	  and	  his	  essays	  were	  written	  and	  published	  during	  
the	  time	  of	  the	  fourth	  edition	  of	  the	  DSM,	  and	  second,	  because	  a	  lengthy	  discussion	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of	  the	  differences	  between	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder,	  minor	  as	  they	  are	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  values,	  would	  take	  the	  discussion	  too	  far	  adrift.	  	  I	  will	  say	  
only	  briefly	  that	  the	  DSM	  V	  represents	  an	  entrenchment	  in	  a	  value-­‐laden	  conception	  
of	  all	  so-­‐called	  Personality	  Disorders,	  including	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder.	  	  The	  
notable	  shift	  in	  language	  to	  emphasize	  ‘pathological	  personality’	  as	  the	  core	  concept	  
sadly	  ignores	  a	  debate	  previously	  discussed	  at	  length	  that	  ‘function’	  is	  not	  the	  value-­‐
free	  Holy	  Grail	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  to	  be	  (Boorse,	  Wakefield,	  Fulford).	  	  The	  DSM	  V	  
then,	  unfortunately,	  represents	  a	  steadfast	  entrenchment	  to	  an	  alleged	  value-­‐free	  
conception	  of,	  at	  least,	  the	  Personality	  Disorders.)	  	  	  
	   Criterion	  A	  and	  its	  seven	  sub-­‐specifications	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  our	  
analysis.	  	  (B,	  C	  and	  D	  are	  ‘differential	  diagnosis’	  criteria,	  which	  are	  designed	  to	  
distinguish	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder	  from	  other	  mental	  illnesses.)	  	  The	  task,	  
then,	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  values	  are	  present	  in	  these	  criteria,	  and	  if	  so,	  
what	  type	  of	  values	  are	  involved.	  	  By	  showing	  that	  specifically	  moral	  values	  are	  
involved	  in	  the	  criteria,	  and	  thus,	  conception	  of	  psychopathy,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  
task	  of	  diagnosing	  and	  identifying	  psychopaths	  is	  normative.	  	  And	  if	  psychopathy	  can	  
indeed	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  conceptually	  normative	  in	  content	  (that	  is,	  for	  diagnosis),	  
then	  the	  argument	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  a	  value-­‐free	  disease	  that	  independently	  
causes	  immoral	  actions,	  relies	  on	  an	  erroneous	  assumption	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  a	  
disease.	  	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  diagnostic	  criteria	  of	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder,	  
are	  not	  based	  on	  histology	  and	  require	  no	  identification	  based	  on	  physiology.	  	  This	  
observation	  is	  particularly	  pertinent	  to	  the	  forthcoming	  discussion	  of	  Levy’s	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speculation	  that	  the	  bad	  physiology	  of	  psychopaths	  explains	  their	  immoral,	  or	  
rather,	  pathological	  behavior.	  
	   	  	  The	  pertinent	  criteria	  for	  diagnosing	  psychopathy	  lie	  in	  the	  seven	  patterns	  
of	  behavior,	  of	  which	  only	  three	  need	  to	  be	  exhibited	  to	  earn	  the	  diagnosis.	  	  The	  
identification	  and	  diagnosis	  of	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  
following	  (from	  DSM-­‐IV,	  1994):	  
Criterion	  A:	  	  There	  is	  a	  pervasive	  pattern	  of	  disregard	  for	  and	  violation	  of	  the	  rights	  
of	  others	  occurring	  since	  age	  15	  years,	  as	  indicated	  by	  three	  (or	  more)	  of	  the	  
following:	  having	  hurt,	  mistreated,	  or	  stolen	  from	  another.	  	  	  
1. Failure	  to	  conform	  to	  social	  norms	  with	  respect	  to	  lawful	  behaviors	  as	  
indicated	  by	  repeatedly	  performing	  acts	  that	  are	  grounds	  for	  arrest.	  
2. Deceitfulness,	  as	  indicated	  by	  repeated	  lying,	  use	  of	  aliases	  or	  conning	  
others	  for	  personal	  profit	  or	  pleasure.	  
3. Impulsivity	  or	  failure	  to	  plan	  ahead.	  
4. Irritability	  and	  aggressiveness,	  as	  indicated	  by	  repeated	  physical	  fights	  or	  
assaults.	  
5. Reckless	  disregard	  for	  safety	  of	  self	  or	  others.	  
6. Consistent	  irresponsibility,	  as	  indicated	  by	  repeated	  failure	  to	  sustain	  
consistent	  work	  behavior	  or	  honor	  financial	  obligations.	  
7. Lack	  of	  remorse,	  as	  indicated	  by	  being	  indifferent	  to	  or	  rationalizing.	  
	  
Notice	  the	  absence	  of	  etiology	  as	  a	  diagnostic	  requirement.	  	  The	  DSM	  (any	  
edition)	  does	  not	  require	  any	  identification	  –	  or	  even	  speculation	  -­‐	  of	  the	  cause	  of	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psychopathy	  in	  the	  diagnosing	  the	  disorder.	  	  Others	  however,	  particularly	  Levy,	  
have	  much	  to	  say	  about	  potential	  causes	  of	  psychopathy,	  including	  how	  etiology	  
informs	  the	  question	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths.	  	  The	  DSM	  does	  not	  say	  
why	  or	  how	  this	  behavior	  is	  brought	  about	  in	  such	  individuals.	  	  It	  only	  requires	  that	  
such	  patterned	  behavior	  be	  evident	  for	  the	  diagnosis	  to	  be	  met.	  	  	  	  
Although	  reference	  to	  social	  and	  legal	  norms	  is	  explicit	  in	  criteria	  1	  and	  6,	  the	  
DSM	  does	  not	  directly	  address	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Moral	  concepts	  are	  of	  course	  
deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  language	  above,	  specifically	  in	  criteria	  2,	  4,	  5	  and	  7.	  	  The	  
meta-­‐criterion,	  a	  ‘persistent	  pattern	  of	  disregard	  for	  and	  violation	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  
others’,	  is	  a	  phrase	  issued	  in	  moral	  language	  that	  is	  particularly	  noteworthy.	  	  Since	  
‘rights’	  as	  used	  here	  (in	  meta-­‐criterion	  A)	  is	  not	  parsed	  along	  social,	  political,	  and	  
moral	  lines,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  moral	  rights	  are	  excluded.	  	  Rather,	  there	  seems	  no	  
reason	  not	  to	  assume	  that	  moral	  rights	  are	  included,	  despite	  the	  rather	  wide	  sense	  
in	  which	  ‘rights’	  is	  used	  here.	  	  Thus,	  the	  diagnosis	  and	  concept	  of	  psychopathy	  
cannot	  purge	  moral	  concepts	  from	  its	  content.	  	  	  
This	  requires	  that	  we	  acknowledge	  that	  any	  view	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
psychopaths	  cannot	  simply	  operate	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  a	  
medical	  concept	  that	  seeks	  to	  be,	  if	  not	  value-­‐free,	  as	  value-­‐purged	  as	  is	  possible.	  	  
However,	  as	  we	  see	  throughout	  the	  diagnostic	  criteria,	  psychopathy	  is	  saturated	  
with	  values.	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  even	  imagine	  what	  would	  remain,	  and	  in	  strictly	  medical	  
terms,	  if	  all	  values	  were	  indeed	  purged	  from	  the	  criteria	  for	  and	  concept	  of	  
psychopathy.	  	  The	  source	  of	  tension	  (and	  dispute)	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  responsibility	  
of	  psychopaths	  stems	  from	  our	  commitment	  to	  either	  the	  notion	  that	  psychopathy	  is	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a	  medical	  concept	  or,	  alternatively,	  a	  moral	  concept.	  	  Must	  we	  resolve	  this	  dispute	  
before	  reaching	  a	  conclusion	  about	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths?	  	  
Perhaps	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  resolve	  this	  issue	  (that	  is	  too	  much	  to	  ask)	  but	  neither	  
can	  we	  ignore	  it.	  	  We	  should	  resist	  the	  impulse	  to	  excuse	  or	  exempt	  others	  from	  
responsibility	  simply	  because	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  medical	  disorder.	  	  Of	  course,	  as	  
the	  criteria	  above	  show,	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  think	  of	  psychopathy	  as	  a	  medical	  disorder.	  	  
The	  tendency	  to	  sharply	  divide	  medical	  disorders	  as	  inappropriate	  targets	  of	  
reactive	  attitudes	  like	  blame	  and	  resentment	  from	  non-­‐medical	  problems	  in	  living	  
as,	  somehow,	  appropriate	  targets	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  leaves	  us	  with	  two	  
equally	  stark	  options	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths.	  	  If	  we	  see	  
psychopathy	  in	  purely	  medical	  concept,	  then	  he	  is	  not	  responsible	  at	  all.	  	  
Alternatively,	  if	  we	  see	  psychopathy	  as	  a	  value-­‐laden	  concept,	  then	  he	  is	  at	  least	  
somewhat	  morally	  responsible.	  	  Additionally,	  we	  might	  wonder	  why	  psychopathy	  as	  
a	  medical	  concept	  was	  ever	  conceived	  to	  begin	  with.	  	  Rather	  than	  categorizing	  
psychopathy	  as	  a	  medical	  disorder	  that	  alleges	  to	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  moral	  capacity,	  
perhaps	  psychopaths	  are	  more	  like	  racists	  and	  misogynists	  in	  which	  the	  lack	  of	  
moral	  capacity	  is	  does	  viewed	  as	  a	  medical	  ailment	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  moral	  
judgment	  of	  others.	  	  Psychopathy	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  what	  Szasz	  
(1974)	  called	  the	  ‘medicalization	  of	  morals.’	  	  	  
My	  main	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  undermine	  two	  incorrect	  assumptions	  (held	  by	  the	  
common	  view)	  that	  work	  in	  tandem.	  	  First,	  I	  have	  objected	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  
psychopathy	  as	  a	  medical	  disorder,	  and	  second,	  that	  this	  alleged	  medical	  disorders	  
(even	  a	  disorder	  that	  ‘targets’	  a	  persons	  moral	  responsibility)	  causes	  its	  victims	  to	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be	  not	  responsible,	  thus	  making	  it	  inappropriate	  to	  hold	  them	  responsible	  for	  their	  
wrongdoing.	  	  This	  view	  of	  the	  psychopath,	  (what	  I	  call	  for	  brevity	  the	  ‘common	  
view’),	  is	  implicitly	  held	  by	  Strawson	  and	  explicitly	  argued	  for	  by	  Levy.	  	  	  
Can	  we	  infer	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  medical	  disorder	  from	  observing	  behavior	  that	  
routinely	  deviates	  from	  social	  norms?	  	  A	  key	  source	  of	  confusion	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  
the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  paradigmatic	  psychopathic	  
behavior	  is	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  paradigmatically	  immoral	  behavior.	  	  Since	  
psychopaths	  routinely	  engage	  in	  these	  behaviors	  (that	  are,	  at	  once,	  immoral	  and	  
psychopathic)	  then	  we	  are	  left	  to	  infer	  one	  of	  two	  things	  regarding	  their	  
responsibility:	  either	  psychopaths	  are	  the	  most	  immoral	  among	  humans,	  or	  
psychopaths	  are	  the	  least	  immoral	  among	  humans.	  	  These	  are	  two	  rather	  stark	  and	  
polarized	  options.	  
The	  psychopath	  apologist	  appears	  to	  assume	  that	  from	  the	  unusual	  
regularity	  of	  immoral	  behavior	  that	  we	  can	  infer	  moral	  blindness.	  	  This	  of	  course	  
does	  not	  follow.	  	  We	  might	  just	  as	  well	  infer	  that	  persons	  whom	  are	  so	  routinely	  
engaging	  in	  immoral	  behavior	  are	  not	  morally	  blind	  but	  rather	  place	  no	  weight	  on	  
many	  of	  the	  basic	  moral	  commitments	  made	  by	  others.	  	  So,	  rather	  than	  inferring	  
that	  psychopaths	  are	  morally	  blind,	  as	  is	  commonplace	  among	  philosophers,	  we	  
might	  alternatively	  infer	  that	  they	  willfully	  dismiss	  the	  basic	  moral	  demands	  (say,	  
refraining	  from	  assault,	  murder	  and	  rape).	  	  Here	  then	  we	  have	  a	  ‘seeing	  as’	  problem.	  	  
The	  psychopath	  apologist	  sees	  that	  psychopaths	  cannot	  see	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  
others	  should	  factor	  into	  his	  behavior,	  whereas	  others	  see	  that	  psychopaths	  simply	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do	  not	  consider	  the	  interests	  of	  others.	  	  The	  difficulty	  in	  providing	  an	  account	  for	  
either	  case	  is	  that	  the	  inferences	  we	  make	  are	  based	  on	  behavior.	  	  	  
If	  psychopaths	  are	  indeed	  responsible,	  then,	  owing	  to	  the	  severity	  and	  
regularity	  of	  their	  morally	  offensive	  behavior,	  then	  they	  are	  the	  most	  blameworthy	  
among	  moral	  wrongdoers.	  	  Psychopaths	  are	  serial	  wrongdoers	  whose	  wrongdoing	  
includes	  violence	  and	  psychological	  and	  emotional	  manipulation	  of	  their	  victims.	  	  
But,	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  the	  common	  view	  encourages	  us	  to	  reject.	  	  The	  
psychopathy	  itself	  is	  alleged	  by	  the	  common	  view	  to	  cause	  psychopaths	  behavior	  in	  
a	  way	  that	  exempts	  him	  from	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  So,	  according	  to	  the	  common	  
view,	  to	  call	  psychopaths	  ‘serial	  wrongdoers’	  is	  a	  misnomer	  or	  is	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  
question	  begging.	  	  I	  hasten	  to	  emphasize,	  again,	  that	  the	  criteria	  required	  to	  
diagnose	  a	  psychopath	  are	  written	  in	  behavioral	  terms	  that	  include	  negative	  
evaluations:	  ‘persistent	  disregard,’	  ‘reckless	  disregard’	  ‘consistent	  irresponsibility,’	  ‘	  
mistreat[ing],’	  and	  ‘indifference’	  to	  wrongdoing.	  	  A	  diagnosis	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  nor	  
refer	  to	  causal	  explanations;	  and	  certainly	  does	  not	  include	  any	  histological	  claims.	  	  
So,	  the	  absence	  of	  moral	  capacities	  exhibited	  by	  psychopaths	  may	  be	  more	  like	  those	  
of	  the	  racist	  and	  misogynist	  than	  like	  that	  of	  an	  animal	  or	  winter	  storm.	  
Suppose	  for	  a	  moment	  the	  common	  view	  is	  correct	  and	  that	  psychopaths,	  
owing	  to	  the	  disease	  over	  which	  they	  have	  neither	  control	  nor	  responsibility	  in	  
contracting,	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  ‘wrongdoing.’	  	  If	  so,	  then	  what	  
about	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  individuals	  who	  fall	  just	  short	  of	  the	  clinical	  threshold	  for	  
psychopathy?	  	  Would	  these	  then	  be	  the	  most	  blameworthy	  of	  moral	  wrongdoers	  
(albeit	  with	  slightly	  less	  persistent	  wrongdoing	  than	  the	  psychopath)?	  	  Call	  these	  the	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‘subclinical	  psychopaths’.	  	  How	  might	  we	  morally	  respond	  to	  these	  folks?	  	  Now,	  
further	  imagine	  that	  a	  person	  comes	  to	  learn	  that	  their	  behavior	  falls	  just	  shy	  of	  
clinical	  psychopathy.	  	  Should	  subclinical	  psychopaths	  intentionally	  add	  more	  
regularity	  to	  their	  wrongdoing	  to	  meet	  the	  clinical	  threshold	  that	  they	  ipso	  facto	  
become	  unblameworthy?	  	  This	  seems	  odd.	  	  	  
Discussions	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths	  frequently	  ignore	  the	  fact	  
that	  psychopaths	  are	  defined	  by	  behavioral	  traits	  and	  also	  overlook	  the	  fact	  that	  
moral	  conduct	  requires	  a	  kind	  of	  skill	  development	  (part	  social,	  part	  cognitive	  and	  
part	  emotional).	  	  Apparently,	  psychopaths	  did	  not	  learn	  these	  skills.	  	  But	  can	  they	  be	  
taught	  the	  skills?	  	  We	  don’t	  know	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  because	  we	  (as	  an	  
intellectual	  community)	  haven’t	  invested	  very	  much	  at	  all	  in	  the	  way	  of	  resources	  
towards	  a	  better-­‐informed	  answer.	  	  And	  so	  we	  need	  not	  preempt	  the	  question	  of	  
engaging	  the	  psychopath	  with	  a	  posture	  toward	  his	  moral	  improvement.17	  
We	  are	  happy	  to	  teach	  our	  children	  to	  develop	  moral	  skills.	  	  In	  fact,	  much	  of	  
parenting	  is	  devoted	  to	  this	  very	  task.	  	  But	  for	  some	  reason	  we	  think	  that	  only	  
children	  are	  worthy	  of	  such	  investment	  and	  that	  by	  the	  time	  one	  reaches	  adulthood	  
one	  has	  aged	  out	  of	  such	  development.	  	  What	  this	  translates	  into	  for	  adult	  
psychopaths	  is	  something	  like	  the	  view	  that	  ‘its	  just	  too	  late’	  to	  teach	  them	  morally.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  A	  related	  set	  of	  moral	  questions	  arises	  in	  this	  context	  that	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  
in	  this	  dissertation	  –	  perhaps	  only	  in	  the	  conclusion	  –	  include:	  should	  moral	  skill	  
development	  be	  the	  domain	  of	  clinicians	  and	  therapists?	  	  If	  so,	  this	  marks	  a	  
paradigmatic	  shift	  in	  the	  place	  of	  moral	  values	  in	  the	  therapeutic	  milieu.	  	  Also,	  
beyond	  talk	  therapy,	  what	  other	  specific	  interventions	  are	  morally	  justified?	  	  Last,	  
what	  interventions	  are	  justified	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  psychopaths	  will	  not	  
voluntarily	  consent	  to	  treatment?	  	  How	  may	  we	  morally	  justify	  manipulating	  
psychopaths	  into	  treatment	  designed	  to	  produce	  moral	  improvement?	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This	  is	  a	  key	  assumption	  of	  the	  common	  view	  and	  a	  major	  problem	  in	  our	  discussion	  
of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths,	  including	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  them.	  	  I	  
suspect	  that	  if	  we	  can	  move	  beyond	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  a	  developmental	  terminus	  
with	  respect	  to	  age	  and	  moral	  development,	  that	  we	  can	  make	  space	  for	  the	  idea	  
that	  psychopaths,	  however	  delayed	  they	  are	  morally,	  can	  learn	  to	  behave	  with	  
increasingly	  moral	  consideration.	  	  If	  this	  is	  plausible,	  and	  I	  think	  it	  is,	  then	  we	  may	  
be	  obligated	  to	  respond	  to	  psychopaths	  with	  consideration	  for	  their	  moral	  
development.	  	  But	  here	  we	  meet	  another	  problem	  and	  that	  is	  the	  assumption,	  held	  
in	  the	  common	  view,	  that	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  do	  not	  work	  that	  way.	  	  The	  reactive	  
attitudes,	  we	  are	  told,	  are	  supposed	  to	  align	  with	  a	  clear	  answer	  in	  mind	  to	  the	  
offending	  agent	  whom	  either	  is	  or	  is	  not	  obviously	  a	  moral	  agent.	  	  As	  we	  have	  
previously	  discussed	  in	  the	  cases	  above,	  unlike	  many	  other	  severe	  mental	  illnesses,	  
psychopaths	  yield	  a	  strong	  intuition	  that	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  an	  agent	  ensconced	  in	  
reality	  (unlike	  the	  cases	  of	  Harold	  or	  Lori	  discussed	  below).	  	  Strawson	  believes	  that	  
it	  is	  so	  intuitively	  obvious	  that	  psychopaths	  lack	  moral	  agency	  (and	  that	  we	  should	  
adjust	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  accordingly)	  that	  stipulating	  the	  ‘moral	  idiot’	  as	  beyond	  
any	  and	  all	  moral	  understanding	  comes	  without	  question.	  	  While	  I	  generally	  agree	  
with	  Strawson	  that	  we	  need	  to	  attune	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  psychopaths,	  I	  
disagree	  with	  Strawson	  as	  to	  why	  and	  how	  we	  should	  tailor	  our	  moral	  responses	  to	  
wrongdoing	  psychopaths.	  
This	  leads	  to	  an	  important	  epidemiological	  observation	  about	  psychopaths.	  	  
As	  with	  many	  of	  the	  other	  personality	  disorders	  identified	  in	  the	  DSM,	  individuals	  
diagnosed	  with	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder	  experience	  a	  pronounced	  decrease	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in	  symptoms	  beginning	  around	  age	  40.18	  	  We	  don’t	  know	  why	  this	  occurs	  but	  
epidemiological	  data	  bears	  out	  this	  observation.	  	  This	  is	  a	  key	  observation	  in	  our	  
assessment	  not	  only	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths,	  but	  in	  formulating	  
responses	  to	  their	  wrongdoing,	  including	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  should	  hold	  them	  
responsible	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  we	  should	  hold	  them	  responsible.	  	  	  
At	  this	  point	  we	  need	  not	  assent	  to	  the	  claim	  that,	  since	  we	  will	  never	  gain	  
the	  quality	  of	  response	  from	  the	  psychopath	  that	  we	  desire	  and	  often	  receive	  from	  
wrongdoing	  non-­‐psychopaths,	  this	  is	  somehow	  evidence	  that	  psychopaths	  will	  never	  
be	  able	  to	  increase	  moral	  responsibility	  by	  better	  meeting	  basic	  moral	  expectations.	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  moral	  responsiveness	  so	  regularly	  displayed	  by	  the	  psychopath	  need	  not	  
be	  confused	  with	  an	  incorrigible	  lack	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Psychopaths	  are	  
notoriously	  difficult	  to	  clinically	  ‘treat’,	  however,	  and	  our	  collective	  lack	  of	  success	  
leads	  many	  to	  the	  erroneous	  conclusion	  that	  they	  are	  incorrigibly	  and	  fully	  morally	  
blind.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  success	  in	  ‘treating’	  psychopathy,	  however,	  could	  just	  as	  well	  be	  a	  
commentary	  on	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  art	  rather	  than	  evidence	  of	  psychopathic	  
incorrigibility.	  
	  
1.6	  Cases	  	  
	  
To	  chart	  intuitions	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  mental	  illness	  and	  
moral	  responsibility,	  I	  offer	  several	  cases	  (some	  inspired	  by	  real	  people	  and	  some	  
imagined)	  meant	  to	  test	  our	  intuitions	  about	  responsibility	  and	  mental	  illness.	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Examining	  a	  variety	  of	  cases	  allows	  us	  too	  situate	  the	  psychopath	  among	  some	  other	  
mental	  illnesses	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  particular	  difficulty	  involved	  in	  assessing	  
the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  psychopath.	  	  I	  first	  present	  the	  cases	  in	  a	  bunch	  and	  then	  
follow	  with	  discussion	  of	  each	  case	  as	  well	  as	  the	  collective	  cases.	  	  	  
	  
Harold	  in	  the	  waiting	  room	  	  
While	  awaiting	  an	  appointment	  with	  his	  psychiatrist,	  Harold	  suffers	  from	  a	  
psychotic	  episode	  that	  includes	  visual	  hallucinations	  of	  being	  attacked	  by	  flying	  
body	  parts.	  	  In	  an	  effort	  of	  self-­‐defense	  he	  throws	  furniture	  at	  the	  non-­‐existent	  
assailants,	  leaving	  the	  waiting	  room	  in	  wreckage.	  	  Fortunately,	  others	  seated	  in	  the	  
waiting	  room	  were	  able	  to	  escape	  with	  only	  minor	  injuries.	  	  	  
	  
Lori	  	  
Cousin	  Lori	  has	  severe	  cognitive	  impairment	  (an	  IQ	  of	  50)	  that	  leaves	  her	  unable	  to	  
communicate	  verbally,	  with	  very	  limited	  sign	  language	  ability.	  	  Lori	  is	  physically	  
strong	  and	  she	  appears	  to	  enjoy	  physical	  embrace	  with	  people	  she	  recognizes	  as	  
familiar.	  	  There	  are	  times	  when	  Lori’s	  endearing	  embrace	  of	  a	  child	  she	  recognizes	  
results	  in	  physical	  harm	  including	  scratches	  and	  bruising.	  
	  
Pedophilic	  Disorder	  
Imagine	  an	  abstract	  agent	  diagnosed	  with	  Pedophilic	  Disorder.	  	  He	  was	  sexually	  
abused	  as	  a	  child	  and	  as	  an	  adult	  he	  repeats	  the	  offense.	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Robert	  Harris	  	  
The	  case	  of	  Robert	  Harris	  has	  received	  attention	  from	  philosophers	  following	  Gary	  
Watson’s	  (1993)	  introduction	  of	  him.	  	  Harris	  was	  a	  young	  man	  with	  a	  violent	  and	  
criminal	  history	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  murder	  of	  two	  teenage	  boys,	  a	  crime	  for	  
which	  he	  is	  eventually	  executed.	  	  Harris	  had	  previously	  beaten	  another	  person	  to	  
death	  but	  was	  not	  punished	  (for	  reasons	  unclear).	  	  Harris,	  we	  also	  learn,	  suffered	  a	  
childhood	  filled	  with	  profound	  physical	  and	  emotional	  abuse.	  	  As	  his	  execution	  drew	  
near,	  Harris	  confessed	  that,	  “[he]	  had	  the	  chance	  and	  took	  the	  road	  to	  hell	  and	  
there’s	  nothing	  more	  to	  say,”	  (Watson,	  1993,	  fn.	  22).	  
	  
Tom	  
Tom	  has	  an	  extensive	  garden-­‐variety	  criminal	  history	  that	  includes,	  notably,	  theft,	  
extortion	  and	  numerous	  instances	  of	  physical	  assault,	  (with	  women	  as	  his	  
predominant	  target)	  and	  sexual	  assault,	  (primarily	  of	  men	  and	  young	  men,	  offenses	  
for	  which	  he	  was	  legally	  charged	  but	  which	  he	  voluntarily	  revealed	  nonetheless).	  	  
Tom	  is	  boastful	  of	  his	  criminal	  past	  and	  appears	  to	  take	  particular	  pride	  in	  boasting	  
about	  his	  pugilistic	  skill,	  which	  he	  credits	  alongside	  his	  ‘street	  smarts’	  for	  making	  his	  
way	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Tom	  is	  highly	  verbal	  and	  has	  a	  slightly	  higher	  than	  average	  I.Q.	  	  
Owing	  to	  Tom’s	  convincing	  and	  sincere	  performances	  before	  parole	  boards,	  
previous	  sentences	  have	  been	  reduced	  when,	  swayed	  by	  his	  optimistic	  future	  plans	  
and	  his	  own	  moral	  rebirth	  he	  is	  released	  early	  from	  prison.	  	  Tom	  is	  serving	  a	  second	  
life	  sentence	  for	  beating	  his	  most	  recent	  wife	  to	  death.	  	  When	  asked	  what	  led	  to	  the	  
beating	  Tom	  replies,	  ‘she	  said	  I	  was	  fat	  and	  she	  had	  to	  be	  taught	  a	  lesson.’	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Ella	  the	  Empath	  	  
Ella	  is	  the	  antithesis	  to	  the	  psychopath.	  	  Rather	  than	  having	  no	  moral	  sense	  at	  all,	  
Ella	  has	  too	  much.	  	  Ella	  has	  been	  diagnosed	  as	  an	  Empath	  (according	  to	  the	  future	  
DSM	  VI),	  which	  is	  a	  disorder	  of	  personality	  marked	  by	  overwhelming	  moral	  
sentiment	  toward	  others	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  affects	  her	  social	  and	  occupational	  
functioning	  and	  is,	  hence,	  pathological.	  	  	  
	  
1.7	  Discussion	  of	  Cases	  
	  
	   In	  this	  section	  I	  provide	  a	  general	  discussion	  and	  canvassing	  of	  intuitive	  
responses	  to	  each	  case	  with	  these	  questions	  in	  mind:	  What	  bearing	  does	  the	  mental	  
illness	  involved	  in	  each	  case	  have	  on	  the	  responsibility	  status	  of	  the	  individual?	  	  Are	  
some	  of	  these	  individuals	  more	  responsible	  than	  others?	  	  If	  so,	  does	  the	  specific	  
mental	  illness	  involved	  make	  an	  intuitive	  difference	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  of	  
these	  individuals?	  	  Later	  in	  the	  dissertation	  I	  discuss	  how	  these	  questions	  inform	  
our	  moral	  response	  to	  these	  individuals,	  with	  detailed	  focus	  on	  the	  psychopath.	  
	   	  
Harold	  in	  the	  waiting	  room	  [Active	  psychotic	  phase]	  
	   Harold	  has	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  a	  psychotic	  disorder.	  	  Given	  that	  Harold	  is	  
hallucinating	  and	  that	  his	  aggressive	  furniture	  throwing	  is	  directed	  at	  objects	  that	  
do	  not	  exist	  (at	  least	  not	  to	  anyone	  else),	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  intuition	  that	  the	  minor	  
injuries	  that	  he	  causes	  others	  are	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  not	  intentional.	  	  (We	  must	  also	  be	  
careful	  here	  to	  distinguish	  hallucinations	  from	  delusions;	  while	  both	  are	  symptoms	  
of	  psychosis,	  the	  former	  are	  far	  more	  severe	  and	  rare	  occurrences	  than	  the	  latter.)	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Since	  Harold	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  harm	  anyone,	  and	  only	  intends	  to	  immediately	  
defend	  himself	  from	  perceived	  attack,	  many	  will	  find	  that	  he	  is	  not	  responsible	  for	  
the	  harm	  he	  causes.	  	  Here,	  assessing	  Harold’s	  responsibility	  focuses	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  
his	  intentions	  and	  how	  they	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  hallucinations	  he	  experiences.	  	  The	  
absence	  of	  the	  intention	  to	  harm	  (since	  its	  hard	  to	  tell	  if	  Harold	  is	  even	  aware	  of	  the	  
presence	  of	  others)	  intuitively	  diminishes	  the	  impulse	  to	  hold	  him	  responsible,	  say	  
by	  verbally	  blaming	  him	  for	  committing	  a	  moral	  offense.	  	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  
intention	  to	  harm,	  is	  Harold	  nonetheless	  responsible	  for	  the	  consequences	  of	  his	  
actions?	  	  Harold’s	  actions	  do	  result	  in	  (albeit	  minor)	  harm	  to	  others	  and,	  in	  some	  
sense,	  he	  causes	  the	  harm	  as	  well	  as	  destruction	  of	  physical	  property,	  but	  it	  is	  
inaccurate	  to	  say	  that	  he	  intended	  to	  bring	  about	  these	  consequences.	  	  His	  
intentions	  contained	  no	  calculation	  of	  consequences.	  	  We	  might,	  however,	  ask	  
Harold	  to	  apologize	  to	  the	  harmed	  bystanders	  even	  though	  we	  recognize	  that	  he	  did	  
not	  intend	  to	  harm	  anyone.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  should	  stick	  Harold	  with	  a	  bill	  for	  damages.	  	  
But	  placing	  a	  financial	  debt	  on	  Harold	  may	  be	  overly	  censorious	  and	  harsh,	  
especially	  if	  he	  is	  without	  financial	  resources	  to	  pay.	  	  If,	  however,	  we	  place	  a	  moral	  
psychological	  debt	  on	  Harold,	  say,	  by	  asking	  him	  to	  apologize,	  are	  we	  likewise	  
asking	  him	  to	  pay	  a	  moral	  debt	  even	  if	  he	  does	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  pay?	  	  If	  so,	  
we	  would	  be	  putting	  Harold	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  moral	  debtors	  prison	  and	  this	  is	  not	  a	  
conclusion	  we	  should	  find	  satisfactory.	  	  	  
	   We	  should	  also	  recognize	  that	  when	  Harold	  emerges	  from	  the	  active	  phase	  of	  
his	  psychosis	  and	  recognizes	  that	  he	  caused	  damage	  and	  harm,	  even	  though	  he	  was	  
unaware	  of	  doing	  so	  at	  the	  time,	  that	  he	  may	  very	  well	  reach	  the	  conclusion,	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unprompted	  by	  a	  third	  party,	  to	  apologize	  for	  the	  damage	  and	  harm.	  	  Later,	  we	  will	  
see	  that	  Harold’s	  case	  aligns	  with	  what	  I	  call	  Strawson’s	  type	  2a	  case,	  in	  which	  our	  
reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  an	  agent	  is	  temporarily	  suspended	  and	  this	  temporary	  
suspension	  aligns	  with	  Harold’s	  temporary	  suspension	  of	  agency	  (a	  suspension	  of	  
agency	  that	  is	  defined	  in	  part	  by	  an	  ‘innocence’	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  his	  actions).	  	  
What	  does	  not	  follow	  in	  Harold’s	  case	  is	  that	  we	  suspend	  reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  
him	  for	  all	  time,	  because	  his	  agency	  is	  not	  suspended	  for	  all	  time.	  	  Thus,	  we	  tailor	  our	  
moral	  demands,	  including	  our	  holding	  him	  responsible,	  around	  the	  ebb	  and	  flow	  of	  
his	  agency	  that	  is,	  of	  course,	  affected	  by	  the	  tides	  of	  his	  psychosis.	  	  	  
We	  need	  not	  determine	  a	  more	  specific	  response	  to	  Harold	  here.	  	  What	  is	  
more	  immediately	  pertinent	  to	  our	  discussion	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  hallucinations	  
and	  his	  mental	  illness	  erode	  the	  intention	  to	  harm	  others	  and	  the	  impact	  this	  has	  on	  
our	  understanding	  of	  his	  responsibility.	  	  Since	  Harold’s	  actions	  are	  a	  response	  to	  
hallucinations	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  his	  disorientation	  is	  global,	  that	  is,	  he	  is	  not	  
oriented	  to	  circumstance	  (this	  phrase	  is	  less	  vague	  than	  say,	  ‘not	  living	  in	  reality’),	  
including	  not	  being	  oriented	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  people	  in	  the	  room.	  	  Lacking	  
orientation	  to	  circumstance	  and	  place	  (perhaps	  even	  lacking	  orientation	  to	  time	  and	  
person)	  suggests	  that	  his	  mental	  status	  is	  comprehensively	  diminished.	  	  Whether	  
the	  hallucinations	  arose	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  from	  a	  toxic	  cocktail	  of	  psychotropic	  
medicine	  or	  perhaps	  arose	  directly	  from	  his	  psychosis	  (though,	  unlike	  delusions,	  
psychosis	  induced	  hallucinations	  are	  very	  rare)	  the	  role	  they	  play	  in	  his	  actions,	  
rather	  his	  reactions	  to	  them,	  diminish	  the	  intent	  of	  his	  behavior	  so	  globally	  that	  
moral	  intent	  washes	  out	  alongside	  all	  other	  intent,	  aside	  from	  his	  basic	  intention	  to	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defend	  himself.	  	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  this	  vulnerability	  of	  Harold’s	  condition	  that	  diminishes	  
reactive	  attitudes	  that	  we	  might	  otherwise	  hold	  or	  direct	  toward	  him.	  
Even	  though	  Harold	  has	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  a	  psychotic	  disorder	  and	  he	  is	  
in	  the	  throes	  of	  its	  active	  phase,	  we	  need	  not	  reach	  the	  conclusion	  that	  he	  is	  fully	  
exempt	  from	  moral	  responsibility	  such	  that	  we	  disengage	  from	  him.	  	  Rather,	  an	  
informed	  response	  to	  Harold	  following	  the	  waiting	  room	  fiasco	  is	  to	  attend	  to	  his	  
agency,	  including	  his	  moral	  agency,	  with	  diachronic	  considerations.	  	  We	  might	  find	  
that	  in	  time	  we	  discourage	  Harold	  from	  continuing	  to	  feel	  remorseful	  for	  the	  waiting	  
room	  fiasco.	  	  In	  doing	  so	  we	  would	  be	  discouraging	  him	  from	  lingering	  on	  a	  self-­‐
related	  reactive	  attitude	  of	  blame.	  	  Compassion	  for	  Harold	  leads	  us	  to	  diminish	  third	  
party	  blame	  and	  even	  to	  encourage	  a	  reduction	  in	  his	  own	  self-­‐blaming.	  	  	  
We	  cannot,	  however,	  generalize	  from	  this	  conclusion	  that	  there	  are	  no	  cases	  
involving	  mental	  illness	  in	  which	  holding	  the	  person	  responsible	  (including	  
expressing	  blame)	  is	  not	  likewise	  motivated	  from	  compassion.	  	  As	  we	  will	  see	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  psychopath	  shows	  this.	  	  	  
	  
Lori	  [Severe	  to	  Profound	  Cognitive	  Impairment,	  formerly	  termed	  Mental	  
Retardation]	  
	   Lori	  has	  Down’s	  syndrome	  and	  an	  IQ	  of	  50	  which	  she	  has	  maintained	  
throughout	  her	  adult	  life,	  hence	  her	  diagnosis	  of	  Severe	  Cognitive	  Impairment.	  	  
(Revisions	  to	  the	  DSM	  V	  entitle	  the	  diagnosis	  as	  an	  Intellectual	  Developmental	  
Disability	  or	  simple,	  Intellectual	  Disability).	  	  So,	  unlike	  Harold,	  Lori	  has	  no	  
fluctuation	  of	  agency.	  	  Despite	  the	  efforts	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  her	  life	  (teaching	  her	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adaptive	  skills	  and	  sign	  language	  with	  some	  success)	  her	  cognitive	  development	  is	  
static	  and	  has	  long	  since	  reached	  maximum	  threshold.	  	  Owing	  to	  her	  reduced	  
cognitive	  state,	  Lori	  is	  situated,	  if	  not	  at	  the	  far	  ends	  of	  the	  Not	  Responsible	  
continuum,	  then	  very	  near	  the	  far	  end.	  	  Lori’s	  placement	  at	  this	  end	  of	  the	  
continuum	  results	  from	  a	  global	  and	  comprehensive	  cognitive	  deficiency.	  	  
	   How	  should	  we	  respond	  to	  Lori	  when	  she	  scratches	  her	  cousins	  while	  
embracing	  them?	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  scratching	  embrace	  she	  appears	  to	  others	  as	  
having	  no	  insight	  or	  awareness	  that	  she	  is	  causing	  harm.	  	  There	  is	  no	  malice	  of	  
intent	  involved	  and	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  her	  embrace	  appears	  gives	  the	  distinct	  
impression	  that	  she	  enjoys	  it.	  	  After	  all,	  she	  initiates	  the	  embrace.	  	  But	  she	  appears	  
unaware	  of	  the	  harm	  she	  is	  causing.	  	  Her	  reduced	  cognitive	  state	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  
we	  cannot	  increase	  her	  awareness	  that	  she	  scratches	  when	  she	  embraces	  and,	  in	  
turn,	  reduce	  the	  occurrence	  of	  scratching.	  	  If	  we	  can	  in	  fact	  alter	  her	  behavior,	  we	  
should.	  	  Furthermore,	  we	  should	  diligently	  seek	  out	  any	  technique	  or	  intervention	  to	  
bring	  about	  this	  result.	  	  Now,	  to	  put	  squarely	  in	  our	  focus	  the	  question	  of	  holding	  
Lori	  morally	  responsible,	  should	  expressions	  of	  blame	  or	  resentment	  be	  included	  
among	  these	  interventions?	  	  	  
Given	  that	  we	  have	  already	  tied	  her	  comprehensive	  cognitive	  deficiency	  as	  
good	  reason	  to	  place	  her	  on	  the	  Not	  Responsible	  end	  of	  the	  responsibility	  
continuum,	  then	  it	  seems	  to	  just	  follow	  that	  holding	  Lori	  morally	  responsible	  is	  
pointless	  at	  best,	  and	  at	  worst,	  grotesque.	  	  Why	  is	  this?	  	  And	  just	  what	  would	  it	  mean	  
to	  hold	  Lori	  morally	  responsible?	  	  Our	  intuitions	  regarding	  the	  hold	  responsible	  
question	  with	  respect	  to	  Lori	  remain	  dormant,	  preempted	  by	  our	  negative	  response	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to	  the	  ‘is	  responsible’	  question.	  	  Since	  she	  is	  not	  responsible,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  we	  
should	  not	  hold	  her	  responsible.	  	  Although	  the	  ordering	  of	  these	  two	  considerations	  
(the	  ‘is	  responsible’	  and	  the	  ‘hold	  responsible’)	  seems	  accurate	  in	  Lori’s	  case,	  this	  
pattern	  need	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  standard	  by	  which	  we	  should	  consider	  all	  other	  
mental	  illnesses	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  question	  of	  responsibility.	  	  	  
The	  question	  I	  asked	  above	  seems	  additionally	  confusing	  by	  asking	  if	  (maybe	  
even	  presupposing)	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  their	  verbal	  expression	  (what	  we	  
typically	  take	  to	  mean	  ‘holding	  responsible’)	  are	  properly	  conceived	  as	  ‘techniques’	  
or	  ‘interventions.’	  	  One	  might	  object	  that	  the	  language	  of	  ‘intervention’	  is	  inherently	  
clinical	  and	  that	  to	  hold	  someone	  morally	  responsible	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  
behavioral	  modification.	  	  But	  I	  think	  this	  objection	  is	  misguided,	  for	  there	  do	  seem	  
to	  be	  appropriate	  circumstances	  in	  which	  our	  holding	  someone	  responsible	  contains	  
the	  goal	  of	  behavioral	  modification	  by	  way	  of	  moral	  instruction.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  
Lori,	  the	  behavioral	  instruction	  we	  provide	  need	  not	  be	  inherently	  moral	  in	  its	  
content	  (in	  fact,	  I’m	  not	  even	  clear	  what	  the	  phrase	  ‘inherent	  moral	  content’	  means).	  	  
But	  the	  behavioral	  modification	  we	  seek	  may	  very	  well	  have	  the	  morally	  worthy	  
motive	  of	  seeking	  ways	  to	  keep	  Lori	  in	  touch	  (physically	  and	  psychologically)	  with	  
other	  humans.	  	  What	  is	  it	  then,	  in	  this	  response	  to	  Lori,	  that	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  
moral	  equation?	  	  It	  seems,	  only	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  moral	  inherency	  (a	  
commitment	  whose	  time	  has	  perhaps	  passed)	  and	  the	  confounding	  confusion	  
created	  by	  assuming	  that	  an	  attitude	  of	  resentment	  (expressed	  by	  verbal	  shaming)	  
somehow	  provides	  evidence	  of	  this	  moral	  inherency.	  	  Lori	  is	  better	  served	  if	  we	  hold	  
her	  responsible	  by	  way	  of	  placing	  behavioral	  expectations	  on	  her	  and	  providing	  her	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with	  the	  instructional	  support	  and	  resources	  to	  meet	  those	  expectations.	  	  Perhaps	  
we	  simply	  take	  more	  caution	  that	  her	  fingernails	  are	  clipped	  and	  maintained	  at	  a	  
length	  that	  prevents	  scratching	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  superior	  and	  
more	  humane	  response	  than	  say,	  isolating	  her	  and	  forbidding	  her	  to	  embrace	  
others.	  	  	  
Even	  Lori’s	  case,	  and	  like	  persons	  with	  severe	  cognitive	  impairment,	  for	  
whom	  there	  is	  likely	  widespread	  consensus	  that	  she	  is	  not	  morally	  responsible,	  
shows	  that	  there	  exists	  asymmetry	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  is	  responsible	  question	  and	  
the	  hold	  responsible	  question.	  	  Our	  response	  to	  Lori’s	  scratching	  behavior	  includes	  
behavioral	  demands	  and	  expectations,	  and	  at	  least	  in	  some	  sense,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  
important	  sense	  because	  it	  decreases	  her	  social	  isolation	  and	  rather	  seeks	  to	  
maintain	  human	  contact	  with	  her,	  these	  demands	  are	  a	  manner	  of	  holding	  her	  
responsible.	  	  	  
Many	  will	  find	  this	  notion	  of	  holding	  responsible	  a	  diluted	  notion,	  devoid	  of	  
specifically	  moral	  content,	  and	  that	  modifying	  Lori’s	  behavior	  (including	  placing	  
behavioral	  expectations	  on	  her)	  is	  not	  what	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  holding	  
person’s	  morally	  responsible.	  	  I	  can	  only	  respond	  to	  this	  worry	  briefly	  here	  but	  will	  
discuss	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  an	  overly	  coarse	  distinction	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  2	  
when	  discussing	  the	  Strawsonian	  framework	  of	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  
view.	  	  The	  short	  reply	  is	  that	  even	  a	  thoroughgoing,	  or	  ‘pure’	  notion	  of	  holding	  
someone	  specifically	  morally	  responsible	  cannot	  eliminate	  the	  underlying	  call	  for	  
behavioral	  modification	  of	  the	  wrongdoer.	  	  Furthermore,	  should	  one	  person	  morally	  
blame	  another	  (the	  ‘personal	  reactive	  attitudes’	  in	  Strawson’s	  terms)	  for	  her	  actions,	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omissions,	  etc.,	  without	  an	  underlying	  call	  for	  behavioral	  modification,	  that	  such	  a	  
version	  of	  blaming	  is	  no	  ideal	  to	  celebrate	  and	  perhaps	  even	  a	  practice	  we	  should	  
forego.	  	  	  
	  
Pedophilic	  Disorder	  
	   The	  short	  of	  the	  pedophile’s	  story	  is	  that	  he	  is	  a	  serial	  child	  rapist	  and	  has	  
been	  diagnosed	  with	  Pedophilic	  Disorder.	  	  We	  might	  imagine	  the	  journey	  of	  
intuitions	  about	  the	  pedophile’s	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  run	  as	  follows.	  	  Upon	  
hearing	  that	  a	  given	  pedophile	  is	  a	  serial	  child	  rapist	  our	  initial	  attitude	  toward	  him	  
is,	  to	  condense	  into	  one	  phrase,	  one	  of	  moral	  disgust.	  	  Rape	  is	  morally	  deplorable,	  
even	  more	  so	  when	  children	  are	  the	  victims.	  	  But	  this	  initial	  presenting	  attitude	  may	  
well	  be	  mitigated	  for	  some	  upon	  learning	  two	  things:	  first,	  Pedophilia	  is	  a	  
diagnosable	  mental	  illness,	  and	  second,	  that	  pedophiles	  themselves	  are	  often	  
sexually	  abused	  as	  children.	  	  Call	  this	  a	  post-­‐initial	  attitude.	  	  Others	  may	  maintain	  
the	  initial	  attitude	  of	  moral	  disgust	  even	  after	  learning	  this	  new	  information	  about	  
the	  pedophile’s	  condition	  and	  history.	  	  The	  divergence	  of	  post-­‐initial	  attitudes	  
renders	  the	  pedophile’s	  case	  different	  from	  that	  of	  Harold	  and	  Lori,	  where	  no	  such	  
divergence	  arises.	  	  Why	  the	  divergence	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pedophiles?	  	  	  
	   One	  reason	  there	  is	  no	  intuitive	  divergence	  in	  either	  the	  case	  of	  Harold	  or	  
Lori	  is	  that	  the	  harm	  to	  others	  is	  so	  minimal	  that	  it	  is	  s	  stretch	  to	  say	  that	  anyone	  
was	  victimized.	  	  Victimization	  affects	  our	  moral	  intuitions.	  	  It	  stokes	  them,	  in	  fact,	  
and	  to	  many,	  the	  victimization	  that	  occurs	  in	  the	  pedophile’s	  case	  eclipses	  what	  
would	  otherwise	  be	  offsetting	  information	  upon	  learning	  of	  his	  disorder	  and	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unfortunate	  history.	  	  Now,	  must	  our	  intuitions	  yield	  only	  two	  options	  here	  that	  the	  
pedophile	  either	  is	  or	  is	  not	  morally	  responsible?	  	  I	  think	  not.	  	  One	  might	  possess	  
competing	  intuitions,	  one	  that	  feels	  compassion	  and	  even	  moral	  sadness	  for	  the	  
pedophile	  and	  his	  lost	  childhood	  whilst	  simultaneously	  feeling	  morally	  disgusted	  
with	  him	  for	  the	  damage	  he	  is	  visiting	  on	  others.	  	  (I	  also	  suspect	  that	  philosophers	  
who	  avail	  themselves	  of	  mental	  illness	  as	  a	  tool	  designed	  to	  show	  how	  cleanly	  we	  
can	  divide	  morally	  responsible	  agents	  from	  the	  non-­‐responsible	  ones	  avoid	  the	  
example	  of	  pedophilia	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  tension	  of	  intuitions	  that	  it	  yields.)	  	  
The	  source	  of	  intuitive	  tension	  in	  the	  pedophile’s	  case	  (should	  there	  exist	  any)	  
shows	  that,	  despite	  the	  intuition	  that	  mental	  illness	  often	  serves	  as	  a	  responsibility	  
blocker,	  this	  intuition	  can	  be	  offset	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  victimization.	  	  Furthermore,	  
we	  can	  consider	  both	  competing	  intuitions	  about	  the	  pedophile’s	  responsibility	  in	  
forming	  our	  response	  to	  him.	  	  	  
	   It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  psychopaths,	  for	  all	  their	  alleged	  moral	  blindness,	  
express	  outrage	  toward	  pedophiles.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  psychopaths	  appear	  to	  be	  
expressing	  a	  moral	  attitude,	  specifically,	  what	  Strawson	  calls	  ‘vicarious	  reactive	  
attitudes’	  that	  third	  parties	  feel	  on	  behalf	  of	  victims.	  	  This	  feature	  of	  a	  psychopath’s	  
moral	  psychology	  presents	  a	  powerful	  counterexample	  to	  the	  insistence	  that	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Psychopath	  cases	  	  
Robert	  Harris	  and	  Tom	  
This	  section	  combines	  discussion	  of	  both	  cases	  of	  Robert	  Harris	  and	  Tom.	  	  
Watson	  (1993)	  introduced	  the	  case	  of	  Robert	  Harris	  to	  discussions	  of	  moral	  
responsibility	  and	  its	  limits	  (never	  mind	  Watson’s	  argument	  for	  the	  time	  being).	  	  
The	  case	  of	  Tom	  is	  adapted	  from	  Hervey	  Cleckley’s	  influential	  book	  on	  psychopathy,	  
The	  Mask	  of	  Sanity	  (1955),	  in	  which	  Tom	  is	  one	  of	  many	  case	  studies.	  
Beginning	  with	  Harris,	  the	  flow	  of	  our	  intuitions	  might	  begin	  with	  an	  initial	  
sense	  of	  horror	  and	  outrage	  when	  hearing	  about	  the	  particularly	  cold	  blooded,	  
execution	  style	  murder	  of	  two	  teenage	  boys	  immediately	  after	  which	  he	  helped	  
himself	  to	  the	  lunches	  of	  the	  victims	  as	  he	  laughed	  about	  his	  deed.	  	  If	  this	  is	  all	  we	  
know	  of	  Harris’	  story	  we	  may	  well	  entrench	  this	  initial	  attitude	  of	  moral	  outrage	  
toward	  Harris	  the	  adult.	  	  Upon	  learning	  about	  Harris’	  abusive	  childhood	  our	  moral	  
intuitions	  divide.	  	  For	  some,	  the	  extent	  of	  abuse	  he	  experienced	  as	  a	  child	  serves	  to	  
mitigate	  the	  initial	  attitude	  of	  outrage	  (‘antipathy’	  in	  Watson’s	  terms)	  to	  one	  of	  
compassion	  (‘sympathy’	  in	  Watson’s	  terms).	  	  But	  this	  mitigation	  of	  initial	  intuitions	  
fails	  to	  achieve	  purchase	  on	  many	  others.	  	  Alternative	  responses	  range	  from	  a	  
steadfast	  maintenance	  of	  outrage,	  (for	  those	  unmoved	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  horrible	  
childhood	  translates	  into	  a	  moral	  free	  pass	  even	  when	  that	  child	  becomes	  an	  adult),	  
to	  perhaps	  a	  blend	  of	  outrage	  and	  compassion	  in	  which	  neither	  attitude	  ascends	  to	  
primacy,	  and	  if	  so,	  does	  not	  remain	  for	  long.	  	  	  
Regardless	  of	  where	  in	  this	  range	  our	  intuitions	  about	  Harris	  fall,	  his	  case	  is	  
markedly	  different	  from	  that	  of	  Harold	  and	  Lori	  where	  we	  see	  an	  enduring	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consensus	  of	  intuitions	  about	  their	  responsibility	  status.	  	  Furthermore,	  if	  we	  
imagine	  ourselves	  as	  immediate	  witnesses	  of	  any	  of	  these	  cases	  our	  intuitions	  about	  
the	  agency	  of	  each	  person,	  intuitions	  about	  their	  responsibility	  notwithstanding,	  
then	  we	  too	  find	  some	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  cases.	  	  Harold	  throwing	  
furniture	  whilst	  ducking	  and	  screaming	  colloquial	  terms	  for	  genitalia	  yields,	  I	  think	  
uncontroversially,	  the	  intuition	  that	  Harold	  does	  not	  currently	  share	  reality	  with	  
other	  folks	  in	  the	  waiting	  room.	  	  Harold	  does	  not	  have	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  custody	  
over	  his	  agency.	  	  Our	  intuitions	  about	  Lori’s	  agency	  are	  similarly	  uncontroversial.	  	  
Lori’s	  impairment	  is	  immediately	  obvious,	  even	  to	  the	  clinically	  untrained	  eye.	  	  This	  
is,	  however,	  not	  at	  all	  true	  with	  respect	  to	  Harris,	  Tom	  and	  other	  psychopaths.	  	  	  
As	  we	  shall	  see	  later	  in	  discussing	  Strawson,	  the	  intuition	  that	  psychopaths	  
are	  not	  responsible	  for	  their	  behavior	  extends	  from	  what	  Strawson	  appears	  to	  
assume	  is	  an	  uncontroversial	  intuition	  that	  the	  psychopaths	  lacks	  agency.	  	  If	  indeed	  
Tom	  lacks	  agency,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  his	  lacking	  is	  not	  at	  all	  obvious	  to	  the	  casual	  
observer	  or	  even	  members	  of	  a	  parole	  board.	  	  Tom’s	  ability	  to	  effectively	  
communicate,	  including	  giving	  reasons	  for	  his	  acting	  (poor	  as	  they	  may	  seem	  to	  the	  
rest	  of	  us),	  even	  his	  ability	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  religious	  sensitivities	  of	  others,	  not	  to	  
mention	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  can	  speak	  his	  own	  name,	  belies	  the	  notion	  that	  Tom’s	  (and	  
other	  psychopaths)	  absence	  of	  agency	  is	  anything	  remotely	  like	  that	  of	  either	  Harold	  
or	  Lori.	  	  Tom’s	  positioning	  on	  the	  responsibility	  continuum	  (or	  ‘capacity	  for	  morally	  
responsible	  agency’)	  must	  then	  be	  positioned	  far	  closer	  to	  full	  agency	  than	  that	  of	  
Harold	  or	  Lori.	  	  	  
	   50	  
A	  special	  case	  must	  be	  made	  then	  in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  
completely,	  or	  even	  partially,	  lacking	  in	  moral	  sensitivity	  (or	  in	  the	  capacity	  for	  
moral	  responsibility).	  	  A	  brief	  summary	  of	  that	  case	  runs	  as	  follows.	  	  Psychopaths,	  
owing	  to	  their	  specific	  mental	  illness,	  lack	  a	  very	  specific	  and	  discrete	  incapacity,	  
namely,	  that	  of	  moral	  sensitivity.	  	  All	  other	  capacities	  remain	  intact.	  	  The	  onset	  of	  
psychopathy	  (whether	  via	  developmental	  trauma	  or	  damaged	  brains,	  or	  both)	  is	  of	  
no	  fault	  by	  those	  so	  inflicted,	  and	  so,	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  at	  fault	  for	  their	  actions.	  	  
Psychopaths,	  it	  seems,	  suffer	  from	  a	  moral	  pathology.	  	  	  
	  
Ella	  the	  Empath	  
	   If	  we	  follow	  the	  same	  line	  of	  reasoning	  with	  Ella	  that	  many	  philosophers	  
apply	  to	  psychopaths	  (to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  responsible	  or	  
blameworthy	  owing	  to	  their	  disease	  of	  moral	  insensitivity),	  then	  we	  must	  conclude	  
that	  Ella	  is	  never	  praiseworthy	  for	  her	  atypical	  pattern	  of	  generous	  behavior.	  	  Why?	  	  
Because,	  as	  the	  argument	  goes,	  her	  abnormal	  pattern	  of	  generous	  behavior	  is	  
alleged	  to	  emanate	  (spring	  from?)	  her	  alleged	  disorder,	  over	  which	  she	  has	  no	  
responsibility	  for	  having,	  or	  for	  bringing	  the	  disorder	  about	  (she	  played	  no	  
contributing	  etiological	  role).19	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Even	  the	  preponderance	  of	  moral	  feeling	  is	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  consider	  Ella’s	  
actions	  as	  morally	  worthy	  in	  a	  robustly	  Kantian	  sense.	  	  Ella	  cannot	  rationally	  will	  a	  
maxim	  (perhaps	  not	  even	  a	  subjective	  maxim)	  but	  can	  only	  merely	  act	  from	  her	  
sentiments.	  	  Yet,	  however	  short	  of	  moral	  autonomy	  Ella	  may	  fall,	  it	  is	  another	  
proposition	  entirely	  that	  we	  pathologize	  her	  condition.	  	  It	  is	  this	  latter	  since	  to	  
which	  I	  object.	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   But	  it	  seems	  odd	  to	  suggest	  that	  we	  would	  be	  doing	  something	  inappropriate	  
in	  expressing	  gratitude,	  or	  holding	  any	  related	  positive	  reactive	  attitudes	  for	  that	  
matter,	  toward	  Ella	  when	  she	  does	  something	  generous.	  	  Perhaps	  this	  intuitive	  
oddness	  Ella	  presents	  is	  because	  philosophers	  are	  far	  less	  concerned	  about	  
inappropriate	  expressions	  of	  gratitude,	  that	  is,	  there	  is	  little	  worry	  about	  whether	  
expressed	  gratitude	  is	  epistemically	  and	  morally	  justified	  or	  appropriate.	  	  But	  if	  
holding	  persons	  responsible	  means	  to	  treat	  persons	  as	  moral	  agents,	  then	  we	  would	  
be	  holding	  Ella	  responsible	  in	  expressing	  gratitude	  to	  her	  inaccurately.	  	  Though	  I	  
can	  only	  here	  speculate,	  I	  think	  this	  means	  that	  the	  asymmetry	  with	  respect	  to	  
demanding	  judicious	  expressions	  of	  blame	  related	  attitudes	  must	  be	  about	  
something	  more	  than	  a	  concern	  for	  epistemic	  accuracy.	  	  (I	  am	  unclear	  what	  more	  
this	  concern	  is	  in	  fact	  about.)	  	  Let’s	  assume	  that	  it	  the	  arising	  concerns	  are	  moral	  and	  
humanitarian.	  	  Among	  other	  asymmetries	  revealed	  by	  Ella’s	  case,	  it	  shows	  that	  we	  
should	  embrace	  the	  general	  practice	  of	  dispensing	  gratitude	  far	  less	  judiciously	  than	  
we	  do	  resentment,	  which	  should	  be	  curtailed.	  	  But,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  this	  general	  
practice	  is	  not	  the	  foundational	  claim	  used	  by	  philosophers	  to	  excuse	  (and	  exempt)	  
the	  psychopath	  from	  responsibility.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  psychopathy	  the	  disorder	  that	  
forms	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  excusing	  argument.	  	  (This	  is	  why	  this	  dissertation	  pays	  
close	  attention	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  psychopathy	  as	  a	  crucial	  component	  to	  
understanding	  his	  responsibility	  and	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  his	  wrongdoing.)	  
	   Ella’s	  case	  also	  shows	  that	  our	  commitment	  to	  identifying	  more	  and	  more	  
discrete	  psychological	  ailments	  has	  limits.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  should	  exclude	  psychopathy	  
from	  the	  list	  of	  mental	  illnesses	  altogether.	  	  Regardless,	  we	  would	  never	  pathologize	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generosity	  or	  empathy.	  	  Furthermore,	  Ella’s	  case	  shows	  that	  we	  forego	  consistency	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  demand	  that	  we	  should	  only	  hold	  persons	  responsible	  in	  so	  far	  
as	  our	  responses	  symmetrically	  match	  one’s	  position	  on	  the	  responsibility	  
continuum	  and	  that	  our	  responses	  can	  only	  be	  determined	  after	  one	  is	  accordingly	  
positioned	  on	  that	  continuum.	  	  We	  need	  not	  form	  symmetrical	  responses	  and	  we	  
need	  not,	  perhaps	  we	  cannot	  first	  settle	  (in	  advance	  to	  responding)	  one’s	  position	  
on	  the	  responsibility	  continuum.	  	  	  Our	  moral	  practices,	  with	  respect	  to	  holding	  
others	  responsible,	  are	  permeated	  with	  asymmetry	  and	  this	  need	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  
problem.	  
	  
Conclusion	  of	  Cases	  
	   The	  upshot	  of	  case	  discussion	  is	  that	  while	  many	  mental	  illnesses	  do	  yield	  the	  
intuition	  that	  those	  suffering	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  at	  least	  some	  of	  their	  
behaviors,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  (as	  the	  pedophile	  and	  the	  psychopath	  cases	  show)	  that	  
all	  mental	  illnesses	  yield	  the	  intuition	  to	  excuse	  or	  exempt	  the	  person	  from	  
responsibility.	  	  Furthermore,	  pedophilia	  and	  psychopathy,	  unlike	  many	  other	  
mental	  illnesses	  (psychotic	  disorders,	  cognitive	  impairment,	  dementia,	  etc.),	  are	  not	  
defined	  by	  behaviors	  that	  are	  directly	  harmful	  to	  others.	  	  So,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  
draw	  the	  general	  conclusion	  that	  mental	  illness	  excuse	  and/or	  exempt	  persons	  from	  
moral	  responsibility	  altogether.	  	  Alternatively,	  we	  might	  see	  some	  mental	  illnesses,	  
more	  than	  others,	  as	  mitigating	  the	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  of	  its	  sufferer.	  	  Surely	  
there	  is	  something	  desirable	  about	  the	  idea	  that	  responsibility	  comes	  in	  degrees	  and	  
that	  we	  should	  likewise	  tailor	  our	  responses	  to	  moral	  wrongdoing	  accordingly.	  	  But	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it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  a	  person’s	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  be	  met	  with	  a	  perfectly	  
symmetrical	  degree	  of	  moral	  response.	  	  Sometimes	  we	  do	  issue	  moral	  responses	  
that,	  in	  effect,	  demand	  that	  the	  agent	  extend	  their	  degree	  (or	  fulfillment)	  of	  
responsibility	  beyond	  one’s	  current	  performance	  in	  meeting	  basic	  moral	  demands.	  	  
	   Mental	  illness	  appears	  to	  affect	  our	  intuitions	  about	  agency	  and	  
responsibility	  differently	  than	  does	  physical	  illness.	  	  In	  cases	  of	  physical	  illness	  we	  
tend	  to	  separate	  the	  illness	  from	  the	  agent,	  or	  at	  least	  we	  do	  not	  tend	  to	  conflate	  the	  
person	  with	  the	  illness.	  	  But	  in	  cases	  of	  mental	  illness	  we	  tend	  to	  define	  the	  agent	  
herself	  with	  the	  given	  mental	  illness.	  	  The	  agent	  is	  no	  longer	  ‘Mary	  who	  has	  been	  
diagnosed	  with	  schizophrenia,’	  she	  simply	  becomes	  ‘Mary	  the	  schizophrenic,’	  or	  
‘Robert	  the	  psychopath’.	  	  We	  will	  see	  this	  very	  view	  in	  Strawson	  as	  he	  too	  takes	  for	  
granted	  that	  mental	  illnesses	  replace,	  or	  eclipse,	  a	  person’s	  proper	  agency	  with	  an	  ill	  
agency.	  	  We	  also	  see	  this	  view	  from	  Levy,	  as	  his	  argument	  is	  essentially	  that	  
psychopaths	  do	  not	  cause	  themselves	  in	  a	  manner	  necessary	  for	  moral	  
responsibility.	  	  Now	  it	  does	  seem	  plausible	  to	  hold	  that	  physical	  illness	  can	  change	  a	  
person’s	  agency.	  	  That	  idea	  is	  not	  controversial.	  	  But	  we	  don’t	  believe	  that	  a	  person’s	  
agency	  is	  what	  has	  cancer.	  	  Rather,	  some	  organ	  or	  network	  of	  organs	  has	  the	  cancer.	  	  
By	  contrast,	  there	  is	  no	  organ	  or	  network	  of	  organs	  by	  which	  a	  person	  has	  
psychopathy.	  	  Rather,	  we	  see	  psychopathy	  (along	  with	  many	  other	  mental	  illnesses)	  
as	  enmeshed	  with,	  and	  not	  distinct	  from,	  a	  person’s	  agency.	  	  Herein	  lies	  the	  source	  
of	  our	  divided	  views	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths.	  	  If	  we	  understand	  
psychopaths	  as	  diseased	  agents,	  specifically	  morally	  diseased	  agents,	  we	  tend	  not	  to	  
find	  them	  morally	  responsible	  (since	  they	  are	  not	  responsible	  for	  acquiring	  the	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disease,	  they	  are	  not	  responsible	  due	  to	  the	  diseased	  source	  of	  their	  behaviors).	  	  By	  
contrast,	  if	  we	  understand	  psychopathy	  as	  describing	  a	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  rather	  
than	  describing	  an	  agent,	  then	  there	  remains	  room	  for	  responsibility.	  	  Why?	  	  Briefly,	  
because	  we	  believe	  that	  behaviors	  can	  be	  modified	  whereas	  we	  tend	  to	  believe	  
agency	  to	  be	  fixed	  and	  static,	  especially	  in	  adults	  (this	  is	  why	  we	  tend	  to	  view	  ‘self-­‐
forming	  actions’	  as	  those	  occurring	  earlier	  in	  our	  psychological	  development	  only,	  
whereas	  our	  adult	  psychologies	  by	  contrast	  are	  somehow	  incapable	  of	  any	  further	  
‘self-­‐forming’),	  and	  more	  so,	  we	  believe	  diseased	  agency	  to	  be	  ultra	  fixed	  and	  extra	  
unchangeable.	  	  
I	  began	  this	  chapter	  by	  asking:	  ‘what	  is	  a	  psychopath?’	  and	  found	  the	  answer	  
to	  be	  something	  distinct	  from	  what	  philosophers	  frequently	  stipulate.	  	  I	  also	  argued	  
that	  psychopathy	  is	  a	  moral	  concept	  and	  that	  it	  is	  identified	  and	  diagnosed	  on	  
specifically	  behavioral	  grounds	  and	  that	  this	  presents	  good	  reason	  to	  reject	  the	  idea	  
that	  psychopathy	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  medical	  illness	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  
empirical,	  value-­‐free	  terms.	  	  This	  undermines	  the	  notion	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  a	  
disease	  that	  operates	  independently	  of	  its	  owner	  causing	  his	  moral	  badness.	  	  Rather,	  
it	  is	  his	  moral	  badness	  that	  defines	  his	  sickness.	  	  	  
	  
1.8	  Conclusion	  	  
	  
We	  began	  with	  some	  cases	  to	  show	  how	  psychopaths,	  unlike	  individuals	  
more	  globally	  incapacitated	  by	  other	  mental	  illnesses	  (e.g.,	  psychotic	  disorders,	  
severe	  cognitive	  impairment),	  do	  not	  invite	  the	  pair	  of	  intuitions	  that	  they	  lack	  
	   55	  
agency	  and	  because	  of	  this	  they	  are	  not	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions.	  	  Psychopaths	  
are	  cognitively	  intact,	  fully	  oriented	  to	  reality	  and	  are	  capable	  of	  verbally	  
communicating	  reasons	  for	  a	  given	  action	  and	  behave	  with	  a	  custody	  over	  their	  
intentions	  that	  is	  no	  different	  than	  non-­‐psychopaths,	  (aside	  from	  the	  intent	  to	  
harm).	  	  Not	  only	  is	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  clinicians	  to	  identify	  and	  diagnose	  individuals	  
with	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder	  (especially	  without	  a	  criminal	  record	  on	  hand),	  
it	  is	  even	  more	  difficult	  for	  a	  random	  member	  of	  society	  to	  know	  whether	  she	  is	  
being	  assaulted	  by	  a	  psychopath	  or	  non-­‐psychopath.	  	  There	  is	  simply	  no	  agency	  and	  
responsibility	  cancelling	  intuition	  with	  the	  offending	  psychopath	  unlike	  the	  cases	  of	  
Harold	  and	  Lori,	  for	  instance.	  	  Beyond	  these	  intuitive	  observations	  I	  provided	  a	  
provisional	  argument	  that	  the	  capacity	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  that	  Harold	  
(temporarily)	  and	  Lori	  (permanently)	  lack	  is	  a	  result	  of	  a	  more	  global	  lack	  of	  
capacity.	  	  Harold	  and	  Lori’s	  lack	  of	  orientation	  is	  global	  and	  their	  moral	  orientation	  
washes	  out	  with	  a	  wider	  disorientation.	  	  This	  is	  not	  so	  for	  the	  psychopath	  who	  is	  
alleged	  to	  suffer	  only	  from	  the	  discrete	  incapacity	  of	  moral	  orientation.	  	  	  
I	  then	  moved	  on	  to	  examine	  the	  concept	  of	  psychopathy	  within	  the	  context	  of	  
a	  broader	  debate	  over	  the	  value-­‐free	  or	  value-­‐laden	  nature	  of	  mental	  illness.	  	  I	  
argued	  that	  moral	  values	  are	  a	  core	  feature	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  psychopathy	  and	  its	  
diagnostic	  criteria.	  	  Once	  we	  acknowledge	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  defined	  on	  morally	  
normative	  grounds	  several	  concerns	  emerge,	  including	  some	  doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  
psychopathy	  should	  be	  conceived	  as	  a	  disease	  at	  all	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  
pathologizing	  thoroughgoing	  immoral	  behavior	  represents	  advancement	  in	  our	  
social	  and	  moral	  policies.	  	  Comparing	  Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder	  to	  the	  former	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Homosexual	  Personality	  Disorder,	  I	  argued	  that	  pathologizing	  behavior	  falling	  
outside	  conventional	  moral	  norms	  does	  represent	  moral	  progress.	  	  As	  odd	  or	  
paradoxical	  as	  it	  may	  seem,	  the	  removal	  of	  Homosexual	  Personality	  Disorder	  from	  
the	  lexicon	  of	  mental	  illnesses,	  thus	  rendering	  homosexuality	  once	  again	  fair	  game	  
for	  moral	  assessment,	  does	  represent	  moral	  progress.	  	  For,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  morally	  
judge	  homosexuality	  (one	  way	  or	  the	  other)	  than	  it	  is	  to	  pathologize	  it.	  	  The	  same	  
holds	  for	  psychopathy.	  	  There	  are,	  however,	  alternative	  conceptions	  available	  in	  the	  
space	  between	  moral	  judgment	  and	  pathologization.	  	  Exploring	  notions	  of	  ‘holding	  
responsible’	  that	  lies	  within	  that	  space	  is	  a	  central	  theme	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  
I	  briefly	  want	  to	  suggest	  reply	  to	  the	  question,	  what	  is	  a	  psychopath?	  	  
Psychopaths	  are	  severe	  and	  persistent	  serial	  wrongdoers	  most	  of	  whom	  age	  out	  of	  
their	  ‘symptoms.’	  	  We	  know	  that	  they	  intentionally	  wrong	  people.	  	  We	  do	  not	  know	  
why	  they	  consistently	  do	  so.	  	  We	  simply	  do	  not	  have	  a	  causal-­‐etiological	  explanation	  
for	  psychopathy.	  	  While	  we	  might	  point	  to	  various	  sociological,	  formative	  
psychological	  and	  biological	  factors	  involved	  in	  the	  etiology	  of	  psychopathy,	  we	  
need	  to	  take	  care	  not	  to	  presume	  that	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  medical	  disease.	  	  We	  
also	  need	  to	  recognize	  that	  our	  moral	  gaze	  with	  respect	  to	  psychopaths	  needs	  to	  
turn	  from	  historical	  considerations	  to	  include	  the	  future	  considerations	  in	  
considering	  how	  we	  are	  to	  respond	  to	  current	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  Despite	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  behavioral	  traits	  of	  the	  psychopath	  remain	  fairly	  entrenched	  deep	  
into	  his	  adult	  life	  we	  must	  acknowledge	  that	  his	  symptoms	  dissipate.	  	  From	  this	  
observation	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  formulate	  moral	  responses	  to	  the	  psychopath	  that	  are	  
diachronic	  in	  nature.	  	  This	  means	  that	  we	  need	  to	  re-­‐examine	  the	  question	  of	  how	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should	  we	  respond	  to	  wrongdoing	  psychopaths	  and	  revise	  the	  response	  that	  the	  
common	  view	  has	  heretofore	  instructed.	  	  	  
Some	  readers	  may	  not	  be	  ready	  to	  sign	  on	  to	  my	  suggestion	  that	  it	  is	  a	  
mistake	  to	  view	  psychopathy	  as	  a	  medical	  disease,	  nor	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  psychopaths	  
possess	  sufficient	  agency	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  I	  agree	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  very	  
undeveloped	  morally	  but	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  this	  poor	  state	  should	  dictate	  our	  
response	  to	  wrong	  doing	  psychopaths	  in	  the	  manner	  suggested	  by	  the	  common	  
view.	  	  Also,	  what	  the	  cases	  show	  is	  that	  psychopaths	  possess	  far	  more	  agency	  than	  
many	  other	  forms	  of	  mental	  illness,	  including	  the	  first	  two	  cases	  of	  Harold	  and	  Lori.	  	  
This	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  not	  quick	  route	  to	  exemption	  for	  the	  psychopath	  from	  our	  
responses	  to	  moral	  wrongdoing.	  	  What	  makes	  the	  case	  of	  the	  psychopath	  so	  
controversial	  is,	  in	  part,	  that	  our	  intuitions	  divide	  along	  two	  lines:	  our	  conceptions	  
of	  the	  kind	  of	  intending	  that	  warrants	  responses	  ‘with	  moral	  content’,	  (and	  whether	  
or	  not	  psychopaths	  intend	  in	  certain	  ways),	  and	  the	  tacit	  and	  accompanying	  
intuition	  of	  how	  we	  are	  to	  respond	  to	  psychopaths.	  	  There	  is	  more	  to	  the	  intuitive	  
picture	  regarding	  psychopathic	  responsibility	  than	  the	  metaphysical	  intuitions	  we	  
have	  about	  psychopaths	  but	  also	  intuitions	  (and	  assumptions)	  about	  what	  it	  means	  
to	  hold	  others	  responsible.	  	  It	  is	  this	  latter	  concept	  to	  which	  I	  now	  turn	  my	  focus.	  	  If	  
we	  assume	  a	  narrow	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  normally	  hold	  others	  morally	  
responsible,	  (to	  warrant	  affectively	  charged	  negative	  reactive	  attitudes	  of	  which	  
blame	  and	  resentment	  are	  the	  paradigm),	  then	  I	  suppose	  we	  should	  not	  expose	  the	  
psychopath	  to	  such	  responses.	  	  But	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  we	  should	  do	  so	  as	  part	  of	  our	  
regular	  normal	  practices	  at	  all.	  	  What	  we	  will	  find	  is	  that	  sorting	  out	  morally	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permissible	  responses	  in	  the	  abnormal	  case	  of	  the	  psychopath	  reveals	  options	  of	  
‘holding	  responsible’	  that	  may	  well	  serve	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  our	  normal	  practices	  which	  
themselves	  may	  be	  in	  need	  of	  revising.	  	  	  
In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  Strawsonian	  framework	  of	  moral	  responses	  
that	  include	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  After	  briefly	  describing	  
Strawson’s	  framework	  and	  his	  comments	  on	  psychopaths	  (and	  other	  ‘type	  2	  
agents’),	  I	  offer	  some	  objections	  to	  what	  I	  consider	  an	  overly	  coarse-­‐grained	  
distinction	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  This	  analysis	  will	  
point	  us	  to	  another	  pair	  of	  coarse-­‐grained	  distinctions.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  the	  
distinction	  between	  agents	  and	  non-­‐agent	  that	  is	  drawn	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  mental	  
health	  and	  mental	  illness.	  	  The	  second	  of	  these	  is	  the	  overly	  coarse	  distinction	  
between	  moral	  responses	  and	  ‘treatment.’	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  more	  practical	  
and	  moral	  wisdom	  to	  be	  had	  by	  including	  behavioral	  and	  instrumental	  
considerations	  in	  our	  responses	  to	  any	  moral	  wrongdoing,	  including	  psychopathic	  
wrongdoing.	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Chapter	  2:	  Strawson’s	  framework	  
2.1	  Introduction	  
	  
	   We	  have	  now	  examined	  the	  concept	  of	  psychopathy	  and	  reached	  two	  
provisional	  conclusions	  that	  first,	  objects	  to	  a	  value-­‐free	  disease	  model	  
understanding	  of	  psychopathy,	  and	  second,	  that	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  
psychopath	  ‘is’	  responsible	  or	  not	  yields	  a	  strong	  intuition	  in	  the	  affirmative.	  	  The	  
custody	  he	  holds	  over	  his	  cognitively	  intact	  agency	  is	  without	  question,	  especially	  
when	  compared	  to	  some	  other	  severe	  mental	  illnesses.	  	  The	  burden	  is	  thus	  very	  high	  
on	  those	  arguing	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible,	  and	  furthermore,	  
that	  we	  should	  not	  hold	  them	  responsible.	  	  So	  now	  we	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  
examining	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  holding	  responsible	  and	  what	  our	  understanding	  of	  this	  
practice	  means	  for	  our	  responses	  to	  psychopaths.	  	  	  
To	  structure	  the	  discussion,	  I	  begin	  with	  a	  general	  summary	  of	  Strawson’s	  
(1993)	  framework	  and	  how	  it	  is	  alleged	  to	  inform	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  our	  
responses	  to	  moral	  wrongdoing,	  including	  to	  wrongs	  done	  by	  psychopaths.20	  	  I	  am	  
not	  interested	  here	  in	  arguing	  either	  for	  or	  against	  Strawson’s	  general	  theory	  of	  
moral	  responsibility	  but	  am	  rather	  more	  interested	  in	  his	  framework	  and	  in	  
amending	  an	  error	  of	  his	  account	  that	  yields	  the	  wrong	  verdict	  on	  the	  responsibility	  
of	  psychopaths.	  	  I	  focus	  in	  particular	  on	  distinctions	  drawn	  by	  Strawson	  between	  
agents	  and	  non-­‐agents	  and	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  I	  
then	  argue	  that	  both	  sets	  of	  distinctions	  are	  overly	  coarse	  and	  after	  examining	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  All	  references	  to	  Strawson	  in	  this	  dissertation	  refer	  to	  his	  seminal	  essay	  
(1962/1993)	  “Freedom	  and	  Resentment.”	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space	  in	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view	  we	  find	  viable	  
options	  for	  holding	  psychopaths	  responsible.	  	  While	  psychopaths	  do	  indeed	  present	  
a	  special	  case	  that	  forces	  us	  to	  tailor	  our	  responses	  to	  his	  wrongdoing,	  his	  case	  is	  not	  
so	  special	  so	  as	  to	  excuse	  or	  exempt	  him	  from	  responsibility.	  
	  
2.2	  Strawson’s	  framework	  
	  
Strawson	  contrasts	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  (blame,	  resentment,	  gratitude,	  etc.)	  
with	  the	  objective	  view	  largely	  defined	  by	  a	  detachment	  from,	  lack	  of,	  or	  natural	  
suspension	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  This	  distinction	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  
psychological	  response	  to	  human	  behavior	  is	  also	  alleged	  to	  track	  moral	  
responsibility.	  	  Strawson	  himself	  was	  of	  course	  much	  more	  concerned	  with	  a	  larger	  
debate	  and	  in	  showing	  that	  the	  thesis	  of	  determinism,	  should	  it	  be	  rationally	  and	  
doxastically	  accepted,	  would	  do	  very	  little	  by	  way	  of	  altering	  our	  natural	  reactive	  
attitudes	  to	  others	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  we	  are	  treated	  by	  them.	  	  I	  am	  not	  interested	  
here	  in	  weighing	  in	  on	  this	  global	  debate	  over	  moral	  responsibility	  or	  assessing	  the	  
merits	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘psychological	  thesis’	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  (attributed	  to	  
Hume	  as	  well	  as	  Strawson).21	  	  What	  is	  more	  interesting	  for	  my	  purposes	  is	  
Strawson’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  case	  of	  the	  psychopath	  –	  along	  reference	  to	  other	  mental	  
illnesses	  –	  to	  mark	  a	  distinction	  between	  agents	  who	  are	  or	  are	  not	  morally	  
responsible.	  	  This	  distinction	  is	  alleged	  by	  Strawson	  to	  be	  so	  naturally	  obvious	  that,	  
unlike	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  general	  thesis	  of	  determinism	  (in	  which	  case	  nobody	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Pereboom	  (2001)	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responsible),	  it	  can	  in	  fact	  alter	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  which	  in	  turn	  excuse	  or	  
exempt	  some	  persons	  from	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Thus,	  the	  generally	  interesting	  
tension	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view	  noted	  by	  Strawson	  is	  a	  
tension	  that	  appears	  not	  to	  occur	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  mentally	  ill.	  	  	  
Within	  the	  Strawsonian	  framework,	  the	  more	  natural	  and	  uninhibited	  our	  
reactive	  attitudes	  are	  the	  more	  we	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  dealing	  with	  a	  morally	  
responsible	  agent,	  an	  apt	  target	  of	  our	  expressed	  attitudes.	  	  (We	  maintain	  the	  
intuitive	  attitudes	  unless	  an	  excuse	  or	  exemption	  applies.	  	  Excuses	  and	  exemptions	  
are	  also	  alleged	  by	  Strawson	  to	  be,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  intuitively	  obvious.	  	  I	  discuss	  
excuses	  and	  exemptions	  in	  more	  detail	  below.)	  	  Alternatively,	  the	  more	  we	  find	  
ourselves	  naturally	  taking	  up	  the	  objective	  view	  the	  more	  we	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  
dealing	  with	  either	  a	  diminished	  agent	  or	  a	  non-­‐agent	  altogether.	  	  Since	  mental	  
illness,	  including	  psychopathy,	  features	  so	  importantly	  for	  Strawson	  in	  sorting	  the	  
responsible	  from	  the	  non-­‐responsible,	  we	  should	  note	  that	  his	  ‘psychological	  thesis’	  
relies	  significantly	  on	  a	  ‘psychopathological	  thesis’	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  It	  is	  this	  
paradigmatic	  shift	  in	  viewing	  the	  psychopath	  (and	  other	  mentally	  ill	  folks)	  as	  ‘mad’	  
rather	  than	  ‘bad’	  that	  is	  alleged,	  to	  represent	  a	  development	  in	  our	  ethical	  thinking.	  	  
Yet	  this	  development	  is	  too	  ungainly	  to	  remain	  unexamined	  and	  it	  is	  not	  be	  a	  
development	  that	  we	  should	  lightly	  accept.	  	  Why?	  Because	  viewing	  and	  treating	  
others	  as	  an	  object	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  subject	  exacts	  as	  much	  morally	  as	  it	  is	  alleged	  to	  
provide.	  	  
In	  the	  following	  section	  I	  provide	  a	  slightly	  more	  detailed	  sketch	  of	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	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objective	  view.	  	  To	  aid	  in	  describing	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  reactive	  and	  
objective	  attitudes,	  Strawson	  relies	  on	  the	  (allegedly)	  intuitive	  distinction	  between	  
agents	  and	  non-­‐agents	  as	  revealed	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  mental	  illness.	  	  (Later	  in	  the	  
dissertation	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  Strawson’s	  distinctions	  are	  too	  coarse	  and,	  like	  Levy,	  
commit	  us	  to	  an	  overly	  narrow	  sense	  of	  ‘holding	  responsible.’)	  	  The	  pair	  of	  
distinctions	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view,	  and	  between	  
agents	  and	  non-­‐agents	  works	  in	  tandem.	  	  That	  is,	  they	  mutually	  inform	  each	  other.	  	  I	  
begin	  with	  the	  general	  structure	  of	  the	  interpersonal	  reactive	  attitudes	  before	  
moving	  on	  to	  discuss	  how	  it	  is	  that	  intuitions	  about	  agency	  are	  alleged	  by	  Strawson	  
to	  bring	  us	  to	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  	  
	  
2.2.1	  Structure	  of	  the	  interpersonal	  reactive	  attitudes	   	  
	  
Strawson	  organizes	  the	  interpersonal	  exchange	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  as	  
follows:	  	  
We	  demand:	  
1. Of	  others	  towards	  oneself	  [these	  are	  the	  ‘personal	  reactive	  attitudes’]	  
2. Of	  oneself	  towards	  others	  [these	  are	  ‘self	  reactive	  attitudes’]	  
3. Of	  others	  towards	  others	  [these	  are	  the	  ‘vicarious	  reactive	  attitudes’]	  
	  
Strawson	  describes	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  as	  ‘inherently	  human’	  
interpersonal	  reactions	  to	  how	  we	  are	  treated	  by	  others.	  	  The	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  
displayed	  in	  both	  actions	  and	  attitudes,	  (e.g.,	  resentment,	  indignation,	  gratitude,	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guilt,	  shame,	  forgiveness,	  etc.),	  and	  arise	  when	  we	  perceive	  that	  the	  basic	  demand	  
for	  interpersonal	  regard	  has	  been	  violated.	  	  In	  Strawson’s	  words,	  “the	  basic	  demand	  
is	  a	  moral	  demand;	  a	  demand	  for	  reasonable	  regard;	  a	  demand	  addressed	  to	  a	  moral	  
agent;	  to	  one	  who	  is	  capable	  of	  understanding	  the	  demand.”22	  	  	  
When	  others	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  basic	  demand	  and	  treat	  us	  without	  regard,	  we	  feel	  
and	  express	  the	  personal	  reactive	  attitudes,	  say,	  of	  resentment	  and	  blame.23	  	  When	  
others	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  basic	  demand	  and	  treat	  others	  without	  regard,	  as	  a	  third	  
party	  one	  feels	  (by	  way	  of	  empathy	  and	  sympathy)	  and	  expresses	  (from	  solidarity)	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes	  vicariously.	  	  When	  someone	  holds	  a	  reactive	  attitude	  toward	  
me	  because	  I	  have	  been	  perceived	  to	  violate	  their	  basic	  demand	  for	  regard,	  
(perhaps),	  I	  feel	  shame	  or	  guilt,	  and	  maybe	  offer	  an	  excuse	  or	  even	  seek	  forgiveness.	  	  
These	  are	  the	  self-­‐reactive	  attitudes	  that	  are	  (typically)	  felt	  by	  an	  offender.	  	  To	  
Strawson,	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  a	  ‘commonplace	  truth’	  and	  are	  of	  ‘central	  
importance’	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  humans.	  	  “The	  generalized	  and	  non-­‐generalized	  forms	  of	  
demand,	  and	  the	  vicarious	  and	  personal	  reactive	  attitudes	  which	  rest	  upon,	  and	  
reflect,	  them	  are	  connected	  not	  merely	  logically.	  	  They	  are	  connected	  humanly;	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  A	  key	  phrase	  is	  contained	  herein,	  that	  one	  may	  demand	  the	  basic	  demand	  ONLY	  from	  an	  agent	  
capable	  of	  understanding	  that	  demand	  qua	  moral	  demand.	  	  I’m	  not	  sure	  that	  this	  is	  right	  –	  nor	  am	  I	  
sure	  that	  Strawson	  is	  operating	  under	  a	  narrow	  sense	  of	  ‘understand’	  here.	  	  Levy	  (2007,	  etc.)	  seems	  
to	  think	  that	  the	  knowledge	  condition	  for	  responsibility	  be	  very	  stringent.	  	  Later	  [?]	  I	  challenge	  such	  a	  
stringent	  epistemic	  condition.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section	  on	  Strawson	  I	  hope	  to	  show	  that	  a	  
stringent	  knowledge	  condition,	  whilst	  helping	  to	  fore	  the	  RA/OV	  distinction	  for	  Strawson,	  is	  
subordinate	  to,	  and	  not	  prior,	  to	  the	  ‘appropriateness’	  judgment.	  	  	  
23	  In	  chapter	  4	  I	  take	  up	  distinctions	  between	  holding,	  expressing	  the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  with	  the	  
strongest	  form	  of	  expression	  as	  contained	  in	  bringing	  sanctions	  such	  as	  punishment.	  	  There	  I	  engage	  
Levy’s	  call	  to	  inhibit	  our	  internal	  ‘holding’	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  too	  stringent	  (revealing	  an	  
internal	  inconsistency	  in	  his	  argument).	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not	  merely	  with	  each	  other.”24	  	  Such	  feelings	  and	  attitudes	  arising	  from	  
interpersonal	  relationships	  are	  part	  of	  the	  fabric	  of	  our	  being	  and,	  for	  Strawson,	  
serve	  to	  inform	  our	  understanding	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  	  
Strawson	  also	  identifies	  three	  questions	  revolving	  around	  the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  
detailing	  the	  third.	  	  A	  brief	  summary	  will	  aid	  in	  understanding	  the	  shift	  from	  holding	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes	  to	  taking	  up	  the	  objective	  view,	  as	  envisioned	  by	  Strawson.	  	  
These	  three	  questions	  are:	  
	   	  
1. General	  causes	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  (something	  like	  the	  flavor	  of	  the	  will,	  
the	  attitudes	  and	  intentions,	  involved	  in	  the	  act)	  
2. The	  variations	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  particular	  conditions	  in	  which	  
they	  do	  or	  do	  not	  seem	  natural	  or	  reasonable	  or	  appropriate	  
3. What	  would	  it	  be	  like,	  what	  it	  is	  like,	  to	  not	  suffer	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
	  
Strawson	  is	  particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  second	  and	  third	  questions.	  
	  
2.2.2	  Commentary	  on	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
	  
As	  stated,	  question	  1	  appears	  to	  assume	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  to	  be	  
unidirectional,	  where	  the	  causal	  onus	  of	  the	  offended	  person’s	  reactive	  attitude	  
rests	  entirely	  within	  the	  psychological	  features	  of	  the	  offending	  person.	  	  By	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Strawson	  (1993,	  p.	  48),	  	  “The	  central	  commonplace	  that	  I	  want	  to	  insist	  on	  is	  the	  very	  great	  
importance	  that	  we	  attach	  to	  the	  attitudes	  and	  intentions	  towards	  us	  of	  other	  human	  beings,	  and	  the	  
great	  extent	  to	  which	  our	  personal	  feelings	  and	  reactions	  depend	  upon,	  or	  involve,	  our	  beliefs	  about	  
these	  attitudes	  and	  intentions.	  	  I	  can	  give	  no	  simple	  description	  of	  the	  field	  of	  phenomena	  at	  the	  
centre	  of	  which	  stands	  this	  commonplace	  truth;	  for	  the	  field	  is	  too	  complex.”	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emphasizing	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  psychological	  state	  of	  the	  offending	  person	  Strawson	  
may	  be	  overlooking	  the	  bilateral	  nature	  (which	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  full	  interpersonal	  
nature)	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  with	  it,	  the	  psychological	  features	  
of	  the	  offended	  person.	  	  Sometimes	  we	  overreact	  even	  when	  a	  person	  has	  indeed	  
morally	  offended	  us.	  	  And	  sometimes	  we	  overreact	  and	  insist	  someone	  has	  morally	  
wronged	  us	  even	  when	  they	  have	  not.	  	  Overreactions	  happen	  on	  occasions	  (perhaps	  
something	  for	  which	  we	  are	  all	  guilty	  of	  succumbing	  to	  at	  some	  time	  or	  another)	  but	  
some	  folks	  habitually	  overreact.	  	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  we	  find	  
ourselves	  taking	  up	  are	  not	  always	  the	  best	  guide	  to	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  the	  
offending	  person.	  	  Questions	  2	  and	  3	  make	  some	  progress	  toward	  informing	  1,	  but	  
there	  is	  more	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  causal	  power	  involved	  in	  1	  as	  parasitic	  on	  the	  
‘offendability’	  of	  the	  person	  believing	  she	  has	  been	  wronged	  (some	  folks	  are	  easily	  
affected	  and	  others	  more	  ‘thick	  skinned’).	  	  For	  example,	  I	  might	  overreact	  when	  a	  
person,	  deep	  within	  a	  digital	  coma	  gazing	  into	  her	  personal	  device,	  runs	  into	  me,	  or	  
worse,	  merges	  her	  car	  into	  mine.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  hashed	  out	  the	  norm	  for	  
the	  appropriate	  response	  to	  such	  behavior.	  	  But	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  
the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths	  we	  are	  not	  talking	  about	  behavior	  that	  resides	  in	  
the	  disputed	  grey	  area	  of	  potential	  moral	  offensiveness.	  	  Psychopaths	  violently	  
assault	  and	  murder	  people.	  	  I	  take	  it	  as	  uncontroversial	  that	  assault	  and	  murder	  are	  
generally	  (maybe	  even	  always)	  morally	  wrong.	  	  What	  I	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  is	  the	  
notion	  that	  when	  a	  psychopath	  assaults	  and	  murders	  that	  he	  has	  not	  committed	  a	  
moral	  wrong.	  	  Nor	  can	  I	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  frequency	  and	  recurrence	  of	  
his	  behavior	  is	  makes	  this	  behavior	  less,	  and	  not	  more,	  morally	  wrong.	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I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  Strawson	  would	  disagree	  with	  these	  general	  observations	  
regarding	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  Question	  2	  clearly	  addresses	  the	  
question	  of	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  attitudes.	  	  The	  specific	  concern	  I	  raise	  here	  is	  
that	  the	  norms	  we	  are	  attempting	  to	  establish	  in	  question	  2,	  as	  informed	  in	  part	  by	  
our	  response	  to	  question	  1,	  cannot	  be	  fully	  explained,	  causally	  or	  meaningfully,	  
without	  consideration	  of	  the	  intrapsychological	  state	  of	  the	  offended	  person	  as	  it	  too	  
plays	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  the	  formation,	  intensity	  and	  duration	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  
and	  by	  extension,	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  (I	  also	  suspect	  that	  
in	  cases	  of	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  and	  assessing	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  are	  appropriate	  is	  additionally	  informed	  by	  the	  doxastic	  attitude	  of	  the	  
offended	  person,	  specifically	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  disease	  model	  
of	  psychopathy.	  	  If	  the	  background	  assumption	  in	  the	  disease	  model	  already	  has	  
doxastic	  purchase	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  offended,	  then	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  may	  not	  
even	  get	  out	  of	  the	  intuitive,	  emotional	  gates.)	  
The	  degree	  to	  which	  we	  can,	  or	  should,	  exercise	  control	  over	  our	  reactive	  
attitudes	  is	  not	  obvious.	  	  Strawson	  is	  not	  explicit	  on	  this	  question	  in	  general	  terms	  
but	  he	  does	  seem	  to	  believe	  that	  suspending	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  
psychopaths	  (and	  other	  mentally	  ill	  folks)	  is	  autonomic,	  ‘at	  least	  among	  the	  
civilized,’	  as	  he	  says.	  	  Two	  questions	  arise	  from	  this	  observation.	  	  First,	  can	  we	  train	  
ourselves	  to	  not	  take	  up	  the	  reactive	  attitudes?	  	  Perhaps	  we	  cannot	  eliminate	  them	  
altogether	  but	  we	  can	  learn	  to	  mitigate	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  these	  are	  expressed	  
and	  maybe	  even	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  we	  feel	  them.	  	  (I	  take	  this	  as	  a	  derivative	  of	  
Strawson’s	  third	  question	  above.)	  	  As	  Strawson	  notes,	  even	  if	  we	  could	  chose	  to	  do	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so,	  we	  might	  reject	  living	  regularly	  in	  only	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  Second,	  if	  we	  can	  
revise	  reactive	  attitudes	  out	  on	  occasions	  when	  they	  seem	  inappropriate,	  then	  we	  
might	  also	  be	  able	  to	  revise	  them	  in	  on	  occasions	  when	  they	  seem	  appropriate	  and	  
we	  have	  failed	  to	  naturally	  take	  them	  up.	  	  By	  extension,	  if	  I	  naturally	  take	  up	  the	  
objective	  view	  towards	  the	  psychopath,	  and	  that	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  the	  morally	  wrong	  
thing	  to	  do,	  then	  I	  might	  need	  to	  train	  myself	  to	  take	  up	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
toward	  him.	  	  (What	  we	  don’t	  yet	  know	  is	  which	  attitudes	  we	  should	  take	  up	  and,	  
more	  importantly,	  how	  or	  even	  if,	  we	  should	  express	  them	  to	  the	  psychopath.)	  
	  
2.3	  On	  the	  reactive	  attitude/objective	  view	  distinction	  
	  
	   In	  this	  section	  I	  take	  up	  Strawson’s	  distinction	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
and	  the	  objective	  view,	  including	  the	  standards	  of	  special	  considerations	  by	  which	  
this	  distinction	  is	  alleged	  to	  be	  drawn.	  	  I	  previously	  noted	  that	  I	  find	  the	  distinction	  
between	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view	  overly	  stark	  as	  portrayed	  by	  
Strawson	  specifically	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  role	  mental	  illness	  in	  making	  this	  
distinction.	  	  To	  be	  fair	  to	  Strawson	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  he	  displays	  sensitivity	  to	  
the	  general	  tension	  between	  the	  reactive	  and	  objective	  views	  and	  recognizes	  that	  
some	  kinds	  of	  agents,	  like	  children	  and	  ‘neurotics,’	  bring	  out	  this	  tension.25	  	  
Strawson	  yet	  remains	  committed	  that	  ‘the	  objective	  attitudes	  are	  appropriate	  
toward	  neurotic	  behavior.’26	  	  The	  following	  summary	  and	  analysis	  should	  be	  viewed	  
then	  as	  equal	  parts	  challenge	  to	  Strawson’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  mentally	  ill	  in	  attempting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Strawson	  p.	  61	  
26	  Ibid	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to	  distinguish	  determined	  from	  non-­‐determined	  behavior,	  and	  by	  extension,	  the	  
appropriate	  type	  of	  attitude	  we	  should	  take	  up,	  and	  in	  part	  an	  addendum	  to	  his	  self-­‐
admitted	  ‘speculative’	  and	  ‘uncertain’	  thoughts	  involving	  the	  mentally	  ill,	  including	  
the	  ‘moral	  idiot.’	  	  (I	  will	  be	  arguing,	  in	  part,	  that	  Strawson	  -­‐	  as	  well	  as	  other	  
proponents	  of	  the	  common	  view	  -­‐	  define	  moral	  responsibility	  in	  an	  overly	  narrow	  
sense	  as	  the	  appropriate	  purview	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  My	  aim	  then	  is,	  in	  part,	  
to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  hold	  persons	  responsible	  without	  overly	  
relying	  on	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.)	  	  	  
Strawson	  claims	  that	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  is	  informed	  by	  
the	  absence	  of	  ‘special	  considerations.’	  	  Normal	  occasions	  for	  the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  
absent	  special	  considerations,	  are	  “situations	  in	  which	  one	  person	  is	  offended	  or	  
injured	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  another	  and	  in	  which	  –	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  special	  
considerations	  –	  the	  offended	  person	  might	  naturally	  or	  normally	  be	  expected	  to	  
feel	  resentment.”27	  	  Special	  considerations	  thus	  figure	  centrally	  in	  assessing	  the	  
appropriateness	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  	  Strawson	  explains	  that	  ‘special	  
considerations’	  naturally	  inhibit	  (to	  ‘modify	  or	  mollify	  or	  remove	  altogether’)	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes	  and	  can	  be	  roughly	  divided	  into	  two	  kinds:	  knowledge	  related	  
expressions	  and	  volition-­‐related	  expressions.	  	  (Not	  incidentally,	  these	  two	  
conditions	  correspond	  to	  Aristotle’s	  two	  conditions	  for	  moral	  responsibility.)	  
	  
1. Knowledge-­‐related	  considerations:	  ‘He	  didn’t	  mean	  to’,	  ‘He	  hadn’t	  realized,’	  
‘He	  didn’t	  know’	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  1993,	  p.	  50	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2. Volition-­‐related	  consideration:	  ‘He	  couldn’t	  help	  it’,	  ‘He	  was	  pushed’,	  ‘He	  had	  
to	  do	  it’,	  ‘He	  had	  no	  alternative’	  
	  
Generic	  volition-­‐related	  considerations	  are	  sub-­‐divided	  into	  situation-­‐related	  
conditions	  and	  agency-­‐related	  conditions	  where	  in	  the	  former	  case	  agency	  appears	  
to	  be	  temporarily	  suspended	  whereas	  it	  is	  alleged	  to	  be	  absent	  in	  the	  latter.	  	  	  
	  
a. Situational	  conditions:	  ‘He	  wasn’t	  himself	  recently’,	  ‘He	  has	  been	  
under	  great	  strain	  recently’,	  ‘He	  was	  acting	  under	  post-­‐hypnotic	  
suggestion’	  
b. Agency	  conditions:	  ‘He’s	  only	  a	  child’,	  ‘He’s	  a	  hopeless	  schizophrenic’	  
[Why	  ‘hopeless’?],	  ‘That’s	  purely	  compulsive	  behavior’,	  ‘His	  mind	  has	  
been	  systematically	  perverted’28	  
	  
Special	  considerations	  of	  the	  kind	  in	  2b	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  our	  
discussion	  as	  the	  phrases	  cited	  here	  by	  Strawson	  figure	  centrally	  in	  the	  common	  
view,	  where	  the	  presence	  of	  mental	  illness	  is	  routinely	  treated	  as	  automatic	  intuitive	  
grounds	  for	  dismissal	  from	  moral	  responsibility;	  three	  of	  his	  four	  examples	  in	  2b	  
pertain	  to	  mental	  illness,	  and	  he	  lists	  more	  specific	  disorders,	  the	  most	  important	  of	  
which	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  psychopath,	  ‘someone	  wholly	  lacking,	  as	  we	  say,	  in	  moral	  
sense’.29	  	  On	  Strawson’s	  view	  it	  is	  patently	  inappropriate	  to	  hold	  mentally	  ill	  agents	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Strawson	  1993,	  p.	  50-­‐1	  
29	  Strawson	  1993,	  p.	  58	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responsible.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  inappropriate	  to	  hold	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  2b	  type	  
agents	  if	  the	  attitudes	  have	  not	  already	  been	  intuitively	  disinhibited.	  	  Cases	  involved	  
in	  2b,	  according	  to	  Strawson,	  ‘invite	  us	  to	  suspend	  our	  ordinary	  reactive	  attitudes	  
towards	  the	  agent,	  either	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  action	  of	  for	  all	  time,’	  [emphasis	  added].30	  	  
However,	  as	  we	  noted	  in	  chapter	  1,	  psychopathy	  is	  not	  plainly	  identifiable	  as	  say,	  
Harold	  in	  the	  throes	  of	  hallucinations	  or	  Lori’s	  profound	  mental	  retardation.	  	  
Psychopathic	  behavior	  does	  not	  invite	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  as	  
Strawson	  seems	  to	  believe	  given	  his	  inclusion	  of	  the	  ‘moral	  idiot’	  in	  his	  examples	  of	  
2b	  type	  agents.	  	  While	  the	  presence	  of	  moral	  idiocy	  may	  be	  plainly	  present	  in	  the	  
world	  what	  is	  not	  obvious	  is	  when	  morally	  idiotic	  behavior	  is	  committed	  by	  ‘normal’	  
people	  as	  opposed	  to	  being	  done	  by	  psychopaths.	  	  Nor	  is	  it	  clear	  when	  we	  should	  
excuse	  morally	  idiotic	  behavior	  and	  when	  we	  should	  exempt	  those	  who	  appear	  fully	  
committed	  to	  moral	  idiocy.	  	  Psychopaths,	  if	  they	  indeed	  exist,	  might	  not	  be	  the	  only	  
humans	  committed	  to	  moral	  idiocy;	  moral	  idiocy	  is	  perhaps	  a	  far	  more	  widespread	  
than	  we	  care	  to	  admit.	  	  	  
A	  description	  of	  the	  Strawsonian	  account	  is	  still	  incomplete.	  	  We	  can	  
complete	  it	  by	  connecting	  Strawson’s	  two	  kinds	  of	  ‘special	  considerations’	  with	  Gary	  
Watson’s	  (1993)	  two	  types	  of	  corresponding	  excuses.	  	  	  
	   Watson	  distinguishes	  type	  1	  pleas	  (excuses)	  from	  type	  2	  pleas	  (exemptions).	  	  
Type	  1	  pleas	  invite	  us	  to	  view	  the	  injury	  as	  something	  for	  which	  the	  agent	  was	  not	  
fully	  responsible.	  	  In	  Strawson’s	  words,	  (the	  generic	  volition-­‐related	  expression	  is	  
the	  Strawsonian	  corollary	  to	  Watson’s	  type	  1	  plea),	  such	  injuries	  ‘do	  not	  invite	  us	  to	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view	  the	  agent	  as	  other	  than	  a	  fully	  responsible	  agent,’	  but	  merely	  invite	  us	  to	  view	  
the	  agent’s	  injurious	  action	  as	  unintentional	  (or	  not	  intentional	  in	  the	  way	  required	  
for	  moral	  responsibility).	  	  Special	  considerations	  of	  the	  generic	  volitional	  variety,	  or	  
type	  1	  pleas,	  attach	  to	  actions	  and	  injuries	  and	  do	  no	  invite	  us	  to	  question	  the	  agency	  
of	  the	  offender	  (or	  the	  accidental	  offender).	  	  	  
	   Type	  2	  pleas	  by	  contrast,	  (cf.	  special	  consideration	  2b),	  attach	  to	  agents	  
where	  agency	  is	  called	  into	  doubt;	  type	  2	  pleas	  in	  this	  sense	  would	  rather	  attach	  to	  
the	  absence	  of	  agency.	  	  In	  Strawson’s	  words	  (again),	  occasions	  of	  2b,	  ‘invite	  us	  to	  
suspend	  our	  ordinary	  reactive	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  agent,	  either	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  
action	  or	  for	  all	  time.	  	  It	  is	  at	  this	  point	  when	  the	  impulse	  of	  taking	  up	  the	  objective	  
view	  enters	  the	  scene	  for	  Strawson.	  	  But	  there	  is	  psychological	  (as	  well	  as	  
conceptual	  and	  logical)	  space	  between	  (actively	  or	  passively)	  suspending	  or	  
inhibiting	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  then	  either	  actively	  or	  passively	  taking	  up	  the	  
objective	  view.	  	  For	  example,	  on	  a	  given	  occasion,	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  may	  be	  so	  
disinhibited	  within	  me	  so	  as	  to	  never	  impinge	  on	  my	  awareness.	  	  This	  inhibition	  is	  
more	  thoroughgoing	  in	  its	  absence	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  that	  if	  I	  initially	  have	  the	  
reaction	  which	  I	  then	  suspend.	  	  In	  the	  first	  sense	  I	  never	  really	  had	  the	  reactive	  
attitude	  but	  in	  the	  second	  sense	  I	  had	  the	  attitude	  and	  then,	  actively,	  put	  it	  on	  hold	  –	  
emotionally	  and	  psychologically.	  	  (Maybe	  there	  is	  a	  deeper	  problem	  of	  moral	  qualia,	  
even	  agency	  qualia,	  that	  is	  fueling	  disagreement	  here.)	  
Strawson	  portrays	  the	  psychological	  transition	  involved	  in	  these	  special	  
considerations	  as	  rather	  seamless	  and	  intuitive,	  (though	  elsewhere,	  as	  noted,	  he	  
tacitly	  recognizes	  the	  tension	  in	  us	  regarding	  this	  transition).	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“They	  do	  not	  invite	  us	  to	  see	  the	  agent’s	  action	  in	  a	  way	  consistent	  with	  the	  
full	  retention	  or	  ordinary	  inter-­‐personal	  attitudes	  and	  merely	  inconsistent	  
with	  one	  particular	  attitude.	  	  They	  invite	  us	  to	  view	  the	  agent	  himself	  in	  a	  
different	  light	  from	  the	  light	  in	  which	  we	  should	  normally	  view	  one	  who	  has	  
acted	  as	  he	  has	  acted.”31	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  such	  special	  considerations	  are	  alleged	  to	  naturally,	  
intuitively	  and	  perhaps	  uniformly	  (among	  all	  potential	  reactors)	  yield	  the	  verdict	  
that	  no	  normal	  person	  would	  act	  in	  such	  a	  manner.32	  	  And	  when	  a	  person’s	  
psychological	  normalcy	  is	  called	  into	  question,	  we	  detach	  from	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
and	  adopting	  the	  objective	  view	  from	  whence,	  ‘individuals	  are	  not	  resented	  or	  
esteemed,	  but	  are	  treated	  as	  one	  to	  be	  controlled	  managed,	  manipulated,	  etc.’.	  	  For	  
Strawson,	  members	  of	  a	  civilized	  society	  respond	  to	  such	  ‘agents’	  by	  detaching	  from	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  But	  what	  is	  not	  clear	  in	  this	  picture,	  given	  the	  alleged	  
intuitive	  invitation	  to	  suspend	  our	  reactive	  attitudes,	  is	  whether	  we	  as	  reactors	  can	  
revise	  this	  ‘invitation’	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Nor	  is	  it	  obviously	  appropriate	  to	  adopt	  a	  
disposition	  toward	  the	  psychologically	  ill	  as	  someone	  only	  to	  be	  ‘controlled,	  
managed,	  and	  manipulated.’	  	  In	  fact,	  one	  might	  experience	  a	  Strawsonian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Strawson	  1993,	  p.	  58	  
32	  There	  may	  be	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  ‘Not	  a	  normal	  person!’	  intuition	  and	  the	  
‘Is	  mentally	  sick!’	  intuition.	  	  Which	  of	  these	  two	  intuitions	  one	  might	  have	  when	  
being	  assaulted	  by	  an	  individual	  may	  be	  distinct	  on	  a	  given	  occasion	  –	  and	  much	  of	  
such	  intuitions	  will	  be	  filled	  by	  context	  and	  the	  seeming	  connection	  of	  the	  offending	  
individual	  to	  reality.	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involuntary	  reactive	  attitude	  of	  disgust	  at	  taking	  the	  very	  disposition	  toward	  the	  
mentally	  ill	  that	  is	  entailed	  by	  taking	  up	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  Why?	  	  Briefly,	  the	  
objective	  dispositions	  as	  so	  described	  are	  deeply	  disrespectful	  to	  persons	  and	  it	  is	  
not	  obvious	  that	  the	  mentally	  ill	  lack	  personhood	  or	  agency	  in	  the	  manner	  portrayed	  
by	  the	  Strawsonian	  tradition.	  	  The	  ready	  common	  view	  reply	  here	  of	  course	  is	  that	  
respect	  is	  reserved	  for	  persons	  and	  the	  individuals	  as	  described	  in	  2b	  are	  neither	  
agents	  nor	  persons	  in	  the	  full	  sense,	  and	  so,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  ‘person’	  there	  is	  no	  
disrespect	  when	  manipulating.	  	  Or,	  if	  you	  prefer,	  respect	  is	  reserved	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  agency	  is	  fulfilled	  (or	  not).	  	  But	  this	  moral	  inference	  does	  not	  follow,	  as	  the	  
relationship	  between	  agency	  and	  moral	  respect	  is	  neither	  straightforward	  nor	  
symmetrical.	  	  Those	  who	  fall	  short	  of	  full	  agency,	  even	  those	  mostly	  lacking	  agency,	  
should	  nonetheless	  be	  respected	  morally.	  	  So,	  the	  common	  view	  suggestion	  that	  we	  
best	  respect	  non-­‐agents	  by	  treating	  them	  as	  non-­‐agents	  is	  not	  the	  right	  moral	  
response.	  	  	  
Furthermore,	  as	  a	  dialectical	  objection,	  2b	  appears	  to	  beg	  the	  agency	  
question	  out	  of	  the	  scenario	  from	  the	  outset.	  	  The	  absence	  of	  agency	  is	  not	  obvious	  
with	  psychopaths,	  which	  suggests	  that	  a	  natural	  inhibition	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
may	  not	  be	  signaled	  to	  us	  in	  a	  way	  that	  occurs	  in	  other	  type	  2	  cases	  (e.g.,	  as	  with	  
Harold	  or	  Lori).	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  the	  instrumental	  aggression	  exhibited	  by	  the	  
psychopath	  that	  undermines	  the	  suggestion	  that	  his	  agency	  is	  obviously	  absent.	  	  The	  
psychopaths’	  capacity	  to	  manipulate	  others	  belies	  the	  suggestion	  that	  he	  lacks	  
agency.	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What	  we	  have	  before	  us	  now	  are	  questions	  relating	  to	  the	  relationship	  
between	  agency,	  mental	  illness	  and	  what	  the	  objective	  view	  licenses	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  
interactions	  with	  people	  represented	  in	  2b	  cases.	  	  It	  is	  also	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes,	  as	  Strawson	  suggests,	  are	  less	  appropriate	  than	  taking	  up	  the	  
potentially	  disrespectful	  objective	  view	  toward	  the	  psychopath.	  	  It	  is	  also	  not	  clear	  
that	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  themselves	  do	  not	  carry,	  at	  least	  tacitly,	  an	  instrumental	  
goal	  to	  manipulate	  or	  modify	  behavior.	  	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  deep,	  almost	  
inescapable	  instrumental	  component	  involved	  in	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  this	  
exposes	  a	  weakness	  in	  one	  manner	  alleged	  to	  distinguish	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  from	  
the	  objective	  view.	  	  The	  tension	  of	  which	  type	  of	  attitude	  we	  should	  adopt	  in	  2b	  type	  
cases	  reveal	  questions	  about	  the	  general	  propriety	  of	  both	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  
the	  objective	  view	  that,	  when	  addressed,	  will	  in	  turn	  help	  to	  resolve	  the	  RA/OV	  
tension.	  	  Nonetheless,	  since	  much	  hinges	  on	  the	  role	  of	  mental	  illness	  as	  agency	  
undermining,	  and	  thus,	  informing	  the	  appropriateness	  the	  type	  of	  attitude	  we	  are	  to	  
take	  toward	  up	  must	  be	  examined	  cautiously	  so	  as	  not	  to	  beg	  the	  question	  of	  agency	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  In	  fact,	  I	  worry	  that	  once	  we	  engage	  the	  question	  begging	  of	  agency	  problem	  that	  
we	  can’t	  resolve	  it	  –	  and	  so,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  adopt	  an	  as	  if	  approach	  to	  cases	  
involving	  2b,	  accept	  that	  the	  question	  has	  been	  begged	  (‘agency	  in’)	  and	  show	  that	  
this	  is	  superior	  to	  the	  alternative,	  ‘agency-­‐out’	  question	  begging.	  	  The	  question-­‐
begging	  cycle	  has	  to	  be	  broken	  somehow,	  and	  owing	  it	  is	  one	  way	  –	  though	  this	  is	  
entirely	  unfashionable	  for	  philosophers.	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2.4	  Concerns	  with	  Strawson’s	  account	  
	  
	   Two	  sets	  of	  concerns	  with	  the	  Strawsonian	  view	  emerge	  from	  the	  preceding	  
discussion.	  	  The	  first	  set	  pertains	  to	  questions	  regarding	  how	  we	  are	  to	  identify	  
cases	  in	  which	  it	  is	  ‘appropriate’	  to	  inhibit	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  instead	  take	  up	  
the	  objective	  view.	  	  This	  task	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  requirement	  that	  we	  correctly,	  
and	  rather	  immediately,	  identify	  the	  types	  of	  2b	  agents	  listed	  by	  Strawson,	  including	  
psychopaths.	  	  How	  well	  we	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  identify	  them	  and	  how	  voluntary	  our	  
ensuing	  attitudes,	  or	  inhibition	  of	  them,	  is	  not	  as	  immediately	  apparent	  as	  Strawson	  
presents.	  	  (Antisocial	  Personality	  Disorder,	  along	  with	  all	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Personality	  
Disorders,	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  for	  clinicians	  to	  catch	  in	  assessment	  and	  
evaluation.	  	  Simply	  put,	  we	  are	  rarely	  aware	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  psychopath	  even	  
when	  we	  are	  in	  the	  same	  room	  with	  one.)	  	  Psychopathic	  behavior	  in	  particular	  is	  not	  
the	  kind	  that	  invites	  a	  simple	  inhibition	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes;	  in	  fact	  just	  the	  
opposite	  occurs,	  and	  for	  many	  of	  us,	  even	  when	  we	  learn	  the	  offender	  is	  a	  
psychopath.34	  	  The	  second	  set	  of	  questions	  relates	  more	  directly	  to	  the	  general	  
appropriateness	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  of	  the	  objective	  view,	  aside	  from	  
special	  consideration	  of	  the	  psychopath.	  	  The	  alleged	  special	  connection	  between	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  that	  is	  assumed	  to	  not	  to	  hold	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  The	  ‘how’	  question	  arises	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Strawsonian	  assumption	  that	  the	  
inhibition	  of	  a	  reactive	  attitude	  is	  intuitive,	  is	  immediately	  phenomenally	  impinging	  
(my	  term).	  	  But	  2b	  cases	  do	  not	  produce	  such	  ready-­‐made	  inhibitions.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  
more	  likely	  that	  our	  intuitions	  are	  informed	  by	  a	  tacit	  model	  (in	  this	  case,	  a	  model	  of	  
psychopathology	  as	  automatically	  entailing	  involuntariness),	  by	  a	  theory	  dependent	  
intuition,	  if	  you	  will.	  	  Just	  as	  we	  are	  inculcated	  to	  hold	  and	  express	  certain	  reactive	  
attitudes,	  we	  are	  inculcated	  by	  theoretical	  paradigms	  –	  a	  few	  have	  a	  stronger	  grip	  on	  
our	  consciousness	  than	  does	  the	  disease	  model	  of	  mental	  illness	  (viz.,	  the	  very	  idea	  
that	  a	  person	  can	  have,	  let	  alone	  be	  born	  with,	  a	  diseased	  personality).	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between	  the	  objective	  attitudes	  and	  responsibility	  is	  a	  bifurcation	  that	  we	  need	  to	  
overcome.	  	  The	  reactive	  attitudes	  have	  cornered	  the	  market	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  
for	  too	  long,	  and	  the	  purpose	  (even	  the	  value)	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  is	  not	  beyond	  
evaluation	  and	  revision.	  	  We	  might	  also	  ask	  related	  questions	  regarding	  the	  value	  of	  
the	  objective	  view.	  	  What	  is	  it	  that	  makes	  the	  objective	  view	  a	  morally	  superior	  
option	  in,	  for	  instance,	  2b	  type	  cases?	  	  It	  might	  not	  be.	  	  What	  we	  often	  find	  is	  that	  the	  
objective	  view	  is	  a	  resource	  that	  can	  be	  put,	  even	  unconsciously,	  to	  pernicious	  use.	  	  
Ideally,	  what	  we	  want	  are	  responses	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  that	  make	  use	  of	  
the	  best	  resources	  that	  both	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  objective	  view	  have	  to	  offer.	  	  	  
	  
2.4.1	  Agency	  recognition	  and	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  
the	  objective	  view	  
	  
How	  are	  the	  offended	  to	  recognize	  when	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  
appropriate	  or,	  alternatively,	  when	  the	  objective	  view	  is	  appropriate?	  	  As	  Strawson	  
describes,	  special	  considerations	  initiate	  this	  shift	  in	  us	  from	  the	  default	  position	  of	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes	  to	  the	  objective	  view,	  and	  our	  recognition	  of	  agency	  is	  central	  
in	  steering	  this	  shift.	  This	  phenomenological	  shift	  that	  moves	  us	  from	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  to	  the	  objective	  view	  appears	  to	  be	  twofold.	  	  First,	  the	  recognition	  of	  
agency,	  or	  more	  importantly,	  recognizing	  the	  absence	  of	  agency,	  is	  alleged	  by	  
Strawson	  to	  just	  be	  apparent.	  	  But	  the	  absence	  of	  agency	  is	  not	  so	  apparent	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  psychopath,	  especially	  not	  on	  first	  glance	  (and	  maybe	  not	  on	  second	  
glance	  either).	  	  Second,	  the	  recognition	  of	  agency	  is	  then	  supposed	  to	  steer	  our	  
reactions	  and	  attitudes	  accordingly.	  	  Now,	  since	  Strawson	  holds	  firmly	  that	  the	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reactive	  attitudes	  neither	  permit	  nor	  require	  rational	  justification,	  (perhaps	  because	  
they	  are	  inherently	  emotional	  -­‐	  a	  term	  Strawson	  seems	  loathe	  to	  use),	  and	  the	  
presence	  or	  absence	  of	  agency	  is	  supposed	  to	  just	  be	  apparent	  to	  us,	  then	  it	  is	  very	  
unclear	  how	  voluntary	  or	  conscious	  our	  attitudes	  towards	  others	  actually	  are.	  	  So,	  
the	  appropriate	  formation	  of	  our	  attitudes	  relies	  heavily	  on	  our	  getting	  the	  agency	  
assessment	  correct.	  	  And	  since	  our	  interpretation	  of	  behavior	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  
our	  often	  quick,	  if	  not	  hasty,	  assessments	  of	  agency,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  get	  both	  
agency	  assessments	  and	  the	  appropriate	  set	  of	  attitudes	  right.	  	  (For	  the	  time	  being	  I	  
set	  the	  agency	  and	  behavior	  relationship	  to	  the	  side	  but	  will	  return	  to	  argue	  that	  our	  
reactive	  attitudes	  might	  be	  better	  directed	  by	  separating	  two	  distinct	  reactans	  in	  
behavior	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  agency	  on	  the	  other.)	  	  Given	  these	  difficulties,	  the	  
amount	  or	  degree	  of	  active	  control	  one	  can	  have	  over	  suspending	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  and	  the	  related	  degree	  of	  active	  control	  one	  can	  have	  in	  taking	  up	  the	  
objective	  view	  is	  unclear.	  	  This	  seems,	  on	  pain	  of	  parity,	  to	  require	  that	  ensuing	  
assessments	  of	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  attitudes	  actually	  taken	  up	  also	  take	  the	  
interpretive	  and	  intrapsychological	  complexities	  that	  inform	  our	  attitudes	  into	  
account.	  	  	  
This	  highlights	  a	  false	  structural	  assumption	  that	  psychiatric	  ethics	  is	  done	  
much	  like	  medical	  ethics	  in	  which	  we	  assume	  we	  are	  first,	  dealing	  with	  clearly	  
descriptive,	  factual,	  medical	  domain	  in	  psychiatric	  concepts	  as	  we	  are	  with	  non-­‐
psychiatric	  illness	  to	  which	  we	  then	  formulate	  normative	  responses.	  	  But	  this	  
analogous	  ethical	  approach	  is	  false.	  	  It	  is	  false	  because,	  as	  we	  see	  in	  chapter	  1,	  when	  
it	  comes	  to	  psychopathy	  (and	  psychiatric	  concepts	  in	  general)	  we	  are	  not	  dealing	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with	  a	  descriptive-­‐medical	  concept,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  morally	  normative	  
concept	  to	  which	  we	  then	  must	  formulate	  normative	  responses.	  	  	  
Since	  Strawson	  is	  working	  from	  a	  standard	  of	  attitudes	  taken	  up	  in	  ‘normal’	  
relationships	  between	  two	  ‘normal’	  adults	  that	  he	  argues	  do	  not	  to	  apply	  in	  cases	  in	  
which	  one	  agent	  is	  abnormal,	  then	  it	  is	  important	  to	  take	  a	  moment	  to	  discuss	  this	  
standard.	  	  After	  which	  we	  can	  then	  assess	  the	  general	  value	  of	  this	  standard	  as	  well	  
as	  its	  import	  to	  responding	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  We	  may	  find	  that	  our	  
responses	  to	  psychopaths,	  contrary	  to	  the	  common	  view,	  need	  to	  be	  more	  like	  
normal	  responses	  and	  include	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  Alternatively,	  our	  heretofore-­‐
normal	  responses	  to	  each	  other	  should	  (and	  do!)	  include	  more	  objective	  attitudes.	  	  
Perhaps	  the	  abnormal	  standards	  and	  the	  objective	  view	  should	  be	  applied	  more	  
generally	  in	  our	  moral	  practices.	  
	  
	  
2.4.2	  On	  the	  general	  propriety	  of	  reactive	  attitudes	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  question	  what	  is	  alleged	  to	  be	  special	  about	  the	  content	  of	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes	  specifically	  with	  respect	  to	  why	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  reserved	  
for	  only	  a	  certain	  class	  of	  agents.	  	  (This	  class	  of	  fully	  responsible	  agents,	  for	  whom	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  to	  be	  reserved,	  may	  be	  much	  smaller	  than	  we	  care	  to	  
admit.)	  	  I	  also	  examine	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  instrumental	  
and	  not	  merely	  a	  reflection	  of	  our	  inherent	  human	  nature.	  	  If	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
(irreducibly)	  contain	  an	  instrumental	  function,	  as	  I	  argue	  they	  do,	  then	  this	  
instrumental	  feature	  of	  this	  set	  of	  attitudes	  shares	  a	  key	  feature	  with	  the	  objective	  
	   79	  
view,	  thus	  rendering	  the	  distinction	  less	  clear	  than	  portrayed	  by	  Strawson.	  	  (This	  
also	  requires	  clarification	  of	  the	  ‘detachment’	  that	  is	  alleged	  to	  occur	  in	  moving	  from	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes	  to	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  I	  take	  up	  the	  concept	  of	  detachment	  and	  
its	  involvement	  in	  the	  attitude	  distinction	  briefly	  below	  and	  more	  directly	  in	  chapter	  
4.)	  
	   On	  the	  Strawsonian	  tradition,	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  appropriately	  
reserved	  for	  full	  members	  of	  the	  moral	  community,	  (provided	  an	  offending	  member	  
does	  not	  have	  a	  type	  1	  excuse	  available).35	  	  Put	  another	  way,	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
are	  reserved	  for	  agents	  whom	  we	  have	  not	  ‘come	  to	  see	  in	  a	  different	  light.’	  	  Recall	  
that,	  on	  Strawson’s	  account,	  we	  come	  to	  see	  psychopathological	  agents	  ‘in	  a	  
different	  light,’	  whom	  we	  ‘set	  apart	  from	  normal	  participant	  reactive	  attitudes,’	  and	  
toward	  whom	  it	  is	  ‘civilized’	  to	  take	  up	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  Though	  we	  will	  visit	  
Strawson’s	  conception	  of	  agency	  in	  2b	  cases	  in	  more	  detail	  below,	  for	  the	  time	  being	  
we	  can	  roughly	  distinguish	  appropriate	  targets	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  as	  ‘normal’	  
individuals,	  for	  whom	  none	  of	  the	  special	  considerations	  apply.	  	  One	  must	  hold	  some	  
agential	  privilege	  to	  be	  appropriately	  subjected	  to	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  
agential	  status	  is	  alleged	  to	  precede,	  and	  thus	  steer,	  the	  formation	  of	  our	  attitudes.	  	  
Suppose	  then	  that	  we	  momentarily	  set	  aside	  special	  considerations	  concerning	  
agency	  and	  imagine	  an	  appropriate	  interpersonal	  exchange	  involving	  the	  reactive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  	  Strawson	  1993,	  p.	  58.	  Such	  ‘free’	  agents	  are	  described	  by	  Strawson	  as	  “nothing	  
but	  the	  absence	  of	  certain	  conditions	  the	  presence	  of	  which	  would	  make	  moral	  
condemnation	  or	  punishment	  inappropriate….	  …conditions	  like	  compulsion	  by	  
another,	  or	  innate	  incapacity,	  or	  insanity,	  or	  less	  extreme	  forms	  of	  psychological	  
disorder,	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  making	  of	  any	  other	  choice	  
would	  be	  morally	  inadmissible	  or	  would	  be	  too	  much	  to	  expect	  of	  any	  man.”	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attitudes.	  	  What	  is	  it	  that	  these	  inescapably	  human,	  non-­‐detached	  interpersonal	  
attitudes	  do?	  	  Put	  another	  way,	  one	  might	  ask,	  ‘what	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes?’	  	  (I	  take	  this	  question	  to	  be	  distinct	  from	  the	  three	  questions	  raised	  by	  
Strawson,	  outlined	  above,	  section	  2.2.1.	  	  In	  taking	  up	  the	  question	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  one	  might	  additionally	  make	  some	  headway	  on	  the	  first	  and	  
second	  questions.)	  
	   To	  Strawson’s	  ears	  the	  very	  question,	  ‘what	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes’	  may	  seem	  question-­‐begging	  and	  misguided	  from	  the	  outset,	  as	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  inherently	  human	  such	  that	  they	  are	  rendered	  
unrevisable.36	  	  Question	  begging	  notwithstanding,	  then,	  it	  does	  seem	  fair	  to	  raise	  the	  
question	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  contain	  an	  instrumental	  component	  
because	  this	  component	  is	  alleged	  to	  partly	  inform	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  
inherent	  nature	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  as	  contrast	  with	  the	  social	  utility	  of	  the	  
objective	  view.	  	  If	  there	  is	  such	  a	  component	  to	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  then	  one	  
manner	  of	  distinguishing	  the	  contrasting	  sets	  of	  attitudes	  is	  lost	  and,	  perhaps,	  along	  
with	  it,	  how	  we	  divide	  responsible	  from	  non-­‐responsible	  agents.	  
In	  what	  ways	  then	  might	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  include	  in	  them	  some	  
instrumental	  purpose?	  	  Perhaps	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  have	  served	  an	  evolutionary	  
purpose	  for	  humans.	  	  Levy	  (2010)	  provides	  a	  compelling	  bio-­‐psychological	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Strawson;	  the	  passage	  straddling	  pages	  60-­‐1	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  this	  
discussion	  where	  Strawson	  entrenches	  in	  the	  contrast	  of	  attitudes	  by	  strictly	  
limiting	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  to	  a	  ‘pure	  and	  unqualified	  form.’	  	  What	  this	  means,	  
operationally,	  in	  describing	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  is	  left	  so	  under-­‐described	  by	  
Strawson	  that	  it	  comes	  across	  as	  a	  purely	  rhetorical	  phrase.	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evolutionary	  account	  of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.37	  	  Perhaps	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  (in	  all	  forms,	  personal,	  self	  and	  vicarious)	  have	  aided	  humans	  as	  a	  species.	  	  
Perhaps	  the	  execution	  of	  any	  of	  the	  individual	  forms	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
present	  an	  adaptive	  advantage	  to	  individual	  members	  of	  our	  species.	  	  Perhaps	  
human	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  utterances	  or	  cries	  of	  other	  non-­‐human	  
animals.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Marmots	  seem	  particularly	  adept	  at	  raising	  alarm	  for	  the	  
betterment	  of	  the	  Marmot	  community	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  grieving	  Pilot	  Whales	  
seem	  to	  be	  at	  an	  evolutionary	  disadvantage,	  as	  they	  tend	  to	  beach	  and	  die.	  	  If	  there	  is	  
such	  an	  evolutionary	  explanatory	  account	  of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  human	  reactive	  
attitudes,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  bearing	  this	  has	  on	  our	  assessment	  of	  the	  normative	  
value	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  We	  may	  be	  hardwired	  to	  have	  reactive	  attitudes	  but	  
we	  are	  also	  hardwired	  to	  eat	  sweet,	  salty	  and	  fat	  foods	  yet	  we	  revise	  our	  nutritional	  
intake,	  at	  least	  those	  of	  us	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  afford	  to	  do	  so.	  	  So,	  whatever	  
evolutionary	  account	  there	  is	  to	  be	  given	  here,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  dictate	  our	  ability	  
to	  revise	  something	  about	  the	  practice	  of	  expressing	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  Whether	  
or	  not	  we	  can	  revise	  feeling	  or	  holding	  these	  attitudes	  is	  a	  separate	  matter.	  	  There	  
may	  be	  a	  boundary	  of	  voluntariness	  that	  separates	  our	  ability	  to	  revise	  how	  we	  
express	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  as	  distinct	  from	  our	  ability	  to	  hold	  them	  internally.	  	  
Recall,	  however,	  that	  in	  Strawson’s	  picture,	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  One	  might	  wonder	  what,	  if	  any,	  adaptive	  advantage	  of	  psychopaths,	  and	  a	  fortiori,	  
an	  absence	  of	  the	  self-­‐reactive	  attitudes.	  	  IF	  we	  take	  psychopaths	  to	  be	  a	  natural	  
kind	  (taxon)	  –	  though	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  reject	  this	  view	  –	  we	  might	  take	  
their	  continued	  existence	  to	  reveal	  that	  the	  self-­‐reactive	  attitudes	  aren’t	  necessary	  
for	  propagation.	  	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  it	  is	  that	  an	  evolutionary	  account	  of	  
our	  moral	  life	  means	  for	  the	  normative	  practices	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  Here	  I	  
think	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  Strawson	  would	  reply,	  ‘none.’	  	  On	  this	  issue,	  I	  agree.	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commonplace	  truth,	  are	  inherent	  in	  us	  and	  are	  robust	  enough	  to	  carry	  on	  in	  our	  
interpersonal	  practices,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  (potentially)	  true	  thesis	  of	  
determinism.38	  	  While	  these	  observations	  may	  well	  provide	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  
bolsters	  Strawson’s	  claim	  that	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  inherently	  human,	  this	  is	  
not	  precisely	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  instrumental	  component	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  
which	  I	  suspect	  obtain.	  
	   There	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  least	  two	  additional	  senses	  in	  which	  there	  is	  
instrumental	  purpose	  to	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  (for	  now,	  the	  ‘self’	  
reactive	  attitudes).	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  as	  catharsis,	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  the	  offended	  to	  emote,	  or	  discharge	  intrapsychological	  tension	  that	  
accompanies	  one’s	  sense	  of	  being	  offended.	  	  The	  second	  is	  that	  the	  (self)	  reactive	  
attitudes	  are	  a	  demand	  for	  behavioral	  and	  attitude	  modification	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
offender	  (we	  might	  alternatively	  synonymously	  call	  this	  an	  educative	  function,	  but	  
my	  emphasis	  on	  behavior	  will	  become	  increasingly	  apparent).	  	  Put	  another	  way,	  the	  
self-­‐reactive	  attitudes	  demand	  that	  the	  ill	  will	  revealed	  by	  a	  wrongdoer	  in	  her	  
wrongdoing	  be	  revised.	  	  Apologies	  and	  forgiveness,	  if	  genuinely	  willed	  and	  
expressed,	  put	  on	  display	  a	  will	  that	  is,	  or	  appears,	  sensitive	  once	  again,	  to	  the	  basic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  What	  this	  means	  for	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  isn’t	  clear,	  but	  does	  
not	  appear	  to	  bode	  well.	  	  If	  the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  and	  our	  alleged	  necessity	  for	  them,	  
are	  impervious	  to	  reasons	  (say,	  as	  might	  be	  offered	  in	  propositional	  form	  in	  the	  
thesis	  of	  determinism),	  then	  ought	  we	  as	  hyper-­‐rational	  philosophers	  be	  
categorically	  skeptical	  about	  the	  value	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes?	  	  Besides,	  is	  not	  the	  
history	  of	  philosophy	  replete	  with	  reinforcement	  that	  we	  be	  more	  rational	  than	  we	  
frequently	  are?	  	  It	  is.	  	  Nonetheless,	  there	  seems	  to	  remain	  a	  lingering	  concern	  about	  
the	  voluntary	  nature	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  whether	  we	  can	  revise	  them	  in	  
their	  variation	  and	  expression,	  or	  more,	  whether	  we	  can	  (let	  alone	  whether	  we	  
would	  choose	  to	  if	  we	  could)	  revise	  them	  out	  of	  our	  practices	  altogether.	  	  
Paraphrasing	  Augustine:	  ‘Lord,	  delivery	  me	  from	  resentment…	  only	  not	  just	  yet.’	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demand	  for	  interpersonal	  regard.	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  reactive	  attitudes	  seek	  in	  the	  
offending	  party	  behavioral	  change	  and	  only	  ideally,	  a	  ‘deeper’	  corresponding	  
attitude	  modification	  to	  match.	  	  I	  now	  take	  up	  these	  two	  instrumental	  purposes	  of	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes	  in	  more	  detail.	  
	   The	  emotive	  content	  contained	  within	  a	  reactive	  attitude,	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  
its	  expression	  might	  simply	  be	  a	  cathartic	  discharge	  of	  psychological	  tension.	  	  The	  
instrumental	  purpose	  here	  in	  only	  about	  the	  offended	  party.	  	  But,	  reactive	  attitudes	  
are	  impulses	  that	  can	  endure	  as,	  frequently	  and	  unfortunately,	  seems	  to	  occur	  
particularly	  so	  with	  the	  paradigmatic	  attitude	  of	  resentment.39	  	  Enduring	  
resentment	  is	  poisonous,	  however,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  practically	  rational	  for	  the	  
offended,	  when	  offended,	  to	  cathart	  and	  without	  delay	  so	  as	  to	  rid	  the	  toxin.	  	  (If	  only	  
this	  actually	  worked	  for	  this	  purpose.)	  	  The	  psychological	  release	  involved	  in	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes	  may	  justify	  the	  offended	  party	  in	  expressing	  her	  reactive	  attitudes	  
simply	  for	  this	  reason	  even	  if	  it	  harms	  the	  offending	  party.	  	  But	  this	  may	  not	  be	  
justified.	  	  If	  the	  upshot	  of	  expressed	  resentment	  is	  to	  exact	  an	  emotional	  cost	  and	  to	  
achieve	  (or	  restore)	  an	  interpersonal	  emotional	  balance	  it	  may	  not	  obviously	  be	  
appropriate,	  particularly	  if	  this	  emerges	  from	  an	  attitude	  of	  revenge.	  	  It	  is	  not	  true	  
however	  that	  we	  must,	  or	  even	  should,	  requite	  a	  moral	  offense	  with	  emotional	  
harm.	  	  Buddha,	  Jesus	  and	  Nietzsche	  all	  speak	  against	  this	  tendency.	  	  So,	  whilst	  
Strawson	  finds	  it	  generally	  acceptable	  (absent	  special	  considerations)	  to	  express	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Nietzsche	  has	  a	  lot	  to	  say	  about	  resentment	  and	  revenge,	  most	  of	  which	  is	  to	  
lament	  its	  role	  in	  the	  history	  of	  human	  values.	  	  Resentment	  in	  his	  eyes	  occurs	  only	  
among	  the	  weak	  spirited	  with	  low	  tolerance	  for	  psychological	  tension	  coupled	  with	  
a	  strong	  impulse	  to	  punish.	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reactive	  attitudes	  to	  others	  when	  failing	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  basic	  demand	  for	  
interpersonal	  regard,	  it	  does	  not	  simply	  follow	  that	  reciprocating	  emotional	  harm	  
(by	  blaming	  and	  resenting)	  is	  appropriate,	  even	  among	  the	  mentally	  healthy.	  	  An	  
expression	  of	  blame	  or	  resentment	  may	  itself	  occur	  without	  regard	  for	  the	  basic	  
demand.	  	  And	  if	  such	  practices	  are	  to	  be	  reserved	  only	  for	  meriting	  members	  of	  the	  
‘moral	  community’	  then	  one	  might	  rationally	  decline	  membership	  in	  a	  community	  
defined,	  in	  part,	  by	  the	  impulse	  to	  maintain	  an	  interpersonal	  emotional	  account	  that	  
must	  balance.40	  	  For,	  this	  cathartic	  component	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  holds,	  almost	  
exclusively,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  offended	  party.41	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Additionally,	  many	  of	  the	  negative	  reactive	  attitudes	  share	  a	  similar	  interpersonal	  
transactional	  structure	  with	  revenge.	  	  In	  such	  cases	  the	  owner	  of	  psychological	  
tension	  (revenge)	  find	  the	  tension	  unbearable	  and	  seeks	  release	  –	  and	  only	  onto	  
another	  will,	  another	  person.	  	  For	  the	  vengeful,	  it’s	  not	  enough	  to	  rid	  one’s	  psyche	  of	  
the	  tension,	  moreover	  the	  tension	  must	  be	  transferred	  to	  another	  psyche,	  and	  
preferable	  to	  the	  one	  viewed	  as	  the	  initial	  offender.	  	  Such	  is	  the	  type	  case	  with	  
revenge.	  	  	  But	  we	  might	  replace	  ‘revenge’	  with	  ‘gratitude’	  for	  instance	  to	  see	  if	  a	  
similar	  intrapsycholgical-­‐to-­‐interpsychological	  structure	  would	  occur.	  	  But	  here	  a	  
sincere	  warning	  is	  in	  order.	  	  Notice	  that	  I’ve	  spoken	  about	  ‘type’	  attitudes	  (revenge,	  
resentment,	  gratitude)	  as	  if	  these	  phenomena	  are	  patterned	  across	  individuals	  and	  
that	  we	  would	  all	  experience	  these	  type	  attitudes	  equally,	  whether	  in	  intensity	  or	  in	  
the	  need	  to	  release	  the	  attitude.	  	  But	  this	  is	  wrong.	  	  So,	  here	  we	  might	  rephrase	  
Strawson’s	  second	  question	  above	  (I.b)	  and	  not	  ask	  about	  the	  variation	  of	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes	  themselves	  but	  about	  the	  variation	  of	  reactors	  and	  how	  the	  type	  
attitudes	  are	  experienced	  unequally.	  	  We	  do	  not	  all	  participate	  in	  the	  same	  number	  
of	  temperaments,	  nor	  with	  the	  same	  intensity.	  	  And	  so,	  we	  cannot	  discuss	  the	  
‘human	  reactive	  attitudes’	  (as	  Strawson	  does,	  and	  as	  I	  have)	  as	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  
experienced	  (qua	  type)	  across	  people	  equally	  and	  monolithically.	  	  This	  is	  what	  
makes	  generalizing	  about	  the	  ‘appropriateness’	  (Strawson	  question	  2)	  of	  a	  reactive	  
attitude	  type	  on	  a	  given	  token	  occasion.	  	  And	  this	  same	  generalization	  problem	  
holds	  for	  the	  query	  into	  the	  ‘causes’	  (Strawson	  question	  1)	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  
Yet	  another	  reference	  to	  Nietzsche	  seems	  appropriate	  here,	  sp.	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  
Morals	  where	  the	  origin	  and	  development	  of	  two	  distinct	  moralities,	  of	  masters	  and	  
of	  slaves,	  is	  charted.	  	  In	  fact,	  one	  might	  just	  revise	  the	  title	  of	  the	  book	  to	  read	  On	  the	  
Genealogy	  of	  Moral	  Psychology,	  as	  the	  fundamental	  distinction	  drawn	  is	  between	  the	  
strong	  and	  weak	  willed	  (or	  strong	  and	  weak	  psychologies)	  and	  the	  moral	  systems	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The	  important	  point	  here,	  however,	  is	  not	  to	  evaluate	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  
the	  cathartic	  nature	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  but	  rather	  to	  acknowledge	  its	  
involvement	  in	  these	  attitudes,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  
instrumental	  nature	  involved	  in	  this	  catharsis.	  	  	  
	   Beyond	  the	  cathartic	  discharge	  of	  psychological	  tension,	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  also	  serve	  as	  reinforcement	  of	  moral	  demands	  and	  this	  frequently	  entails	  a	  
demand	  for	  change	  in	  behavior	  and	  attitude.	  	  Ideally,	  expressing	  the	  reactive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that	  emerged	  from	  those	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  relative	  psychological	  strength	  or	  
weakness.	  	  In	  his	  eyes,	  Christianity	  arises	  from	  slave	  morality	  to	  become	  the	  ‘shining	  
jewel	  of	  resentment’,	  and	  a	  ‘morality	  of	  the	  hangman.’	  	  And	  the	  ‘moral	  community’,	  
whist	  envisioned	  as	  secular	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  current	  philosophical	  scholarship,	  
seems	  too	  similar	  to	  its	  Christian	  predecessor	  for	  comfort	  to	  some	  of	  us.	  	  And	  so,	  
with	  Strawson’s	  third	  question	  in	  mind	  (what	  it	  would	  be	  like	  not	  to	  suffer	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes),	  the	  hidden	  premise	  of	  his	  solution	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  can	  be	  
utterly	  rational	  (how	  Socratic)	  in	  order	  to	  not	  suffer	  the	  psychological	  tension	  of	  
emotion	  that	  imbues	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  But	  there	  is	  another	  way	  to	  address	  the	  
third	  question,	  not	  with	  a	  hyper	  rational	  attempt	  to	  not	  suffer,	  (Socrates’	  dying	  
words	  are	  proof	  that	  this	  is	  NOT	  the	  approach	  to	  the	  good	  life,	  and	  he	  himself	  
realized	  this)	  and	  rather	  with	  intrapsychological	  strength	  that	  does	  not	  share	  either	  
the	  impulse	  to	  extreme	  rationality	  nor	  to	  reject	  suffering	  as	  immediately	  as	  possible.	  	  
From	  Buddha	  and	  Nietzsche	  we	  learn	  to	  ‘not	  requite	  enmity	  with	  enmity’	  and	  rather	  
‘show	  our	  enemy	  that	  he	  did	  us	  some	  good.’	  	  	  
To	  connect	  this	  footnote	  more	  directly	  to	  the	  forthcoming	  discussion	  of	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  psychopaths,	  contrary	  to	  Levy’s	  generalized	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  ‘wrong	  
to	  blame	  the	  psychopath’	  for	  his	  harmful	  violence,	  we	  can’t	  determine	  propriety	  
across	  reactors.	  	  Victims	  of	  psychopaths	  have	  no	  onus	  to	  refrain	  from	  blaming	  their	  
assailants.	  	  ‘We’	  hyper	  rational	  academics	  removed	  from	  the	  consequence	  of	  
psychopathic	  violence	  might	  be	  generally	  inappropriate	  in	  blaming	  psychopaths	  
(though	  this	  is	  not	  obvious	  to	  me	  whatsoever).	  	  But	  we	  might	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  express	  
vicarious	  reactive	  attitudes	  out	  of	  solidarity	  with	  his	  victims.	  	  
41	  The	  reactive	  attitudes	  qua	  psychological	  tension	  may	  be	  bad	  for	  the	  ‘sufferer.’	  	  
Example:	  prolonged	  resentment	  is	  like	  a	  fly	  in	  the	  bottle	  of	  our	  psyche.	  	  It	  sours	  
persons.	  	  Early	  catharsis	  as	  opposed	  to	  delayed	  catharsis	  may	  be	  preferable.	  	  Non-­‐
prolonged	  catharsis	  may	  have	  the	  added	  value	  of	  being	  prone	  to	  voluntary	  release	  
as	  delay	  often	  results	  in	  repressed	  tension	  that	  is	  in	  turn	  sublimated	  and	  released	  
randomly	  and	  unconsciously.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  should	  seek	  a	  noble	  ‘moral	  forgetting’	  as	  
members	  of	  the	  reactive	  moral	  community.	  	  Some	  should,	  but	  we	  can’t	  demand	  that	  
all	  should.	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attitudes	  not	  only	  avoids	  adding	  moral	  misery	  to	  the	  world	  it	  results	  in	  both	  
behavioral	  and	  attitude	  changes	  of	  the	  offending	  party.	  	  I	  say	  ideally	  because	  we	  
prefer	  for	  the	  latter	  to	  consummate	  the	  former.	  	  But	  often	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  a	  moral	  
remonstration	  does	  not	  yield	  change	  in	  the	  offending	  party,	  neither	  in	  his	  behavior	  
nor	  his	  attitude.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  response	  by	  the	  wrongdoer	  is	  something	  shared	  by	  
psychopaths	  and	  non-­‐psychopaths	  alike.	  	  And	  even	  when	  things	  go	  well,	  the	  gains	  
are	  limited	  and	  yield	  only	  behavioral	  changes,	  that,	  only	  if	  rehearsed	  will,	  in	  
Strawson’s	  own	  words,	  ‘modulate	  toward	  true	  performances.’	  	  (Plato,	  in	  Laws	  IX,	  
advocates	  this	  exact	  approach	  in	  attempting	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  incorrigibles	  –	  by	  
mimicking	  the	  virtuous	  person	  until	  the	  practice	  is	  more	  genuinely	  possessed.)	  	  The	  
more	  weight	  we	  put	  on	  special	  interpersonal	  relationships	  the	  more	  we	  want	  others	  
to	  fully	  internalize	  behavioral	  modification	  with	  a	  matching	  attitude.	  	  We	  want	  our	  
offenders	  to	  feel	  differently,	  and	  feel	  differently	  toward	  us	  (we	  want	  a	  change	  of	  will	  
to	  occur	  in	  our	  offenders).	  	  But	  complete	  modification	  (external	  behavior	  and	  
internal	  attitude)	  may	  be	  too	  much	  to	  ask	  of	  some	  agents.	  	  Adolescents	  and	  
psychopaths	  are	  two	  examples.	  	  In	  these	  cases	  we	  are	  happy	  to	  accept	  behavioral	  
modification	  regardless	  of	  the	  ‘truth’	  of	  the	  behavioral	  performances	  as	  verified	  by	  
matching	  attitude.42	  	  If	  expression	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  has	  the	  intentional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  The	  well-­‐rehearsed,	  but	  still	  ill	  advised,	  failed	  tactic	  of	  parents	  of	  teenagers	  
behaving	  badly	  is	  to	  demand	  an	  attitude	  change	  (to	  demand	  a	  certain	  
intrapsychological	  constellation)	  within	  their	  adolescent.	  	  Parents	  often	  want	  to	  
break	  the	  defiant	  will	  of	  their	  teenage	  children,	  and	  usually	  with	  the	  interest	  of	  
moral	  improvement	  in	  mind.	  	  But	  strong	  willed	  adolescents	  will	  go	  to	  war	  against	  
such	  an	  approach.	  	  On	  some	  occasions	  a	  behavioral	  modification	  absent	  a	  matching	  
attitude	  change	  must	  suffice.	  	  Practical	  wisdom	  dictates	  that	  we	  tailor	  the	  demands	  
for	  modification	  and	  this	  means	  we	  proceed	  with	  attuned	  reactive	  attitudes,	  and	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instrumental	  purpose	  of	  behavioral	  modification,	  then	  we	  might	  gauge	  the	  
appropriateness	  accordingly.	  	  	  	  	  
When	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  expressed	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  seeking	  
behavioral	  and	  attitude	  modification	  of	  the	  offender	  they	  take	  on	  a	  similarity	  to	  the	  
objective	  view	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  manipulation	  and	  control	  of	  the	  offending	  party.	  	  We	  
must	  be	  careful	  with	  our	  terms	  here	  though	  as	  ‘modification’	  sounds	  tame	  in	  
comparison	  to	  the	  nefarious	  ‘manipulation.’	  	  But	  why	  naturally	  associate	  the	  
nefarious	  ‘manipulation’	  with	  the	  objective	  view	  whilst	  associating	  mere	  
‘modification’	  with	  the	  reactive	  attitudes?	  	  (This	  question	  turns	  for	  Strawson	  on	  
agency.)	  	  As	  we	  just	  observed,	  there	  is	  often	  much	  emotional	  venom	  contained	  in	  a	  
negative	  reactive	  attitude.	  	  It	  is	  emotional	  venom	  we	  want	  removed	  from	  our	  psyche	  
to	  be	  put	  in	  another	  psyche.	  	  It	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  to	  treat	  the	  offending	  party	  as	  an	  
emotional	  gutter,	  in	  which	  we	  often	  want	  those	  emotions	  to	  pool	  as	  well.	  	  If	  you	  
want	  to	  call	  this	  ‘modification’,	  that’s	  fine.	  	  But	  when	  so	  expressing	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  we	  are	  not	  seeking	  that	  the	  offender	  simply	  cease	  the	  offending	  actions,	  we	  
want	  this	  no	  doubt,	  but	  we	  also	  want	  more.	  	  We	  want	  an	  intrapsychological	  change	  
to	  occur	  within	  the	  offender	  (and	  often	  by	  means	  of	  harm).43	  	  Hence	  the	  cries,	  “I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
without	  abandoning	  them	  altogether	  in	  retreat	  to	  the	  objective	  view,	  as	  this	  is	  
alienating.	  
43	  ‘Suffering	  and	  sanctions’	  are	  the	  terms	  used	  by	  Fischer	  and	  Tognazzini	  (2012)	  for	  
instance.	  	  Here	  too	  the	  authors	  seem	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  caching	  out	  ‘moral	  
responsibility’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  ‘knowing’	  when	  punishment	  is	  justified.	  	  The	  
inability	  to	  emotionally	  affect,	  even	  harm,	  psychopaths	  is	  what	  many	  find	  so	  
puzzling,	  and	  concludes	  that	  psychopaths	  have	  ‘no	  moral	  sense.’	  	  But	  this	  view	  can	  
only	  occur	  against	  a	  desert-­‐based	  morality	  in	  which	  ‘normal	  agents’	  are	  busy	  
seeking	  to	  balance	  the	  emotional	  and	  moral	  ledger.	  	  ‘We	  can’t	  exact	  a	  moral-­‐
emotional	  cost	  from	  psychopaths	  so	  the	  must	  not	  be	  like	  us.’	  	  But	  this	  is	  a	  post	  hoc	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want	  him	  to	  suffer	  like	  I’ve	  suffered.	  	  I	  want	  him	  to	  know	  what	  it	  feels	  like.”	  	  Of	  
course,	  when	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  psychopaths,	  given	  their	  sangfroid	  callousness,	  
this	  exchange	  yields	  nothing.	  	  What	  both	  fascinates	  and	  frustrates	  us	  about	  the	  
psychopath	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  this	  ritual	  in	  the	  way	  the	  rest	  of	  us	  do.	  	  
(This	  is	  of	  course	  true	  for	  many	  non-­‐psychopaths	  as	  well,	  e.g.,	  sexists,	  racists,	  
corporations.)	  	  In	  fact,	  psychopaths	  are	  so	  skilled	  at	  remaining	  impervious	  to	  
emotional	  venom,	  even	  when	  expressed	  in	  moral	  language,	  that	  the	  common	  view	  
infers	  from	  this	  lack	  of	  reciprocity	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  simply	  incapable.	  	  The	  
inferences	  mount	  quickly,	  and	  incorrectly,	  that	  this	  incapacity	  must	  be	  
physiologically	  based	  and	  further,	  paradoxically,	  that	  psychopaths	  can	  be	  harmed	  
when	  we	  blame	  them.	  	  Both	  claims	  cannot	  be	  correct.	  (I	  take	  up	  both	  arguments	  in	  
chapter	  3.)	  	  	  
Two	  distinct	  objections	  to	  these	  observations	  about	  the	  instrumental	  nature	  
of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  lurk.	  	  One	  is	  a	  Strawson	  inspired	  objection	  and	  the	  other	  is	  a	  
Levy	  inspired	  objection.	  	  I	  raise	  both	  here	  briefly	  only	  to	  note	  them;	  chapter	  4	  
contains	  a	  closer	  discussion.	  	  Strawson	  will	  likely	  object	  that	  portraying	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  as	  means	  seeking	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  instrumental	  function	  of	  them	  
requires	  ignoring	  their	  inherent	  nature	  (that	  in	  part	  makes	  them	  impervious	  to	  the	  
thesis	  of	  determinism	  even	  if	  it	  is	  true)	  and	  to	  do	  this	  is	  to	  commit	  a	  kind	  of	  
consequence	  mistake.	  	  My	  brief	  reply	  is	  that	  we	  should	  no	  longer	  ignore	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
argument.	  	  It	  might	  not	  be	  the	  case	  the	  psychopaths	  are	  pathological	  at	  all	  and	  
rather	  than	  they	  have	  rationally	  transcended	  the	  emotional	  warfare	  endemic	  to	  our	  
moral	  community.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  psychopaths	  is	  that	  they	  assault	  and	  kill	  other	  
persons	  and	  only	  tacitly	  should	  we	  be	  concerned	  with	  their	  alleged	  physiological	  
disability	  to	  have	  their	  moral	  attitudes	  modified.	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important	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  contain	  in	  them,	  perhaps	  even	  
inherently,	  the	  impulse	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  –	  on	  ourselves	  and	  on	  those	  who	  offend	  us.	  	  
The	  real	  challenge	  then	  is	  the	  need	  for	  practical	  wisdom	  in	  tracking	  the	  effects	  our	  
various	  attitudes	  do	  indeed	  have.	  	  (In	  chapter	  4	  I	  show	  how	  this	  can	  be	  done	  by	  
more	  carefully	  distinguishing	  our	  sets	  of	  reactans	  and	  reactanda.)	  	  Catharsis,	  owing	  
to	  its	  chaotic	  and	  unwieldy	  nature,	  functions	  much	  like	  cluster	  bombing;	  it	  has	  an	  
effect	  on	  others	  for	  sure,	  but	  the	  damage	  is	  not	  suitably	  contained	  –	  not	  in	  a	  morally	  
preferred	  manner	  anyway.	  	  We	  should	  want	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  to	  target	  and	  
initiate	  change	  and	  to	  be	  more	  not	  less	  effective	  as	  well	  as	  morally	  sensible.	  	  If	  we	  
give	  up	  this	  instrumental	  function	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  then	  the	  expression	  of	  
the	  attitudes	  is	  only	  about	  easing	  the	  psychological	  tension	  of	  the	  offended	  party,	  
and	  the	  very	  act	  of	  moral	  judgment	  in	  this	  scenario	  is	  itself	  merely	  an	  exercise	  of	  
self-­‐indulgence.	  
The	  second	  Levy	  inspired	  objection	  is	  that	  we	  must	  first	  know	  whether	  or	  not	  
an	  agent	  is	  or	  is	  not	  morally	  responsible	  before	  engaging	  in	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
and	  not	  treat	  them	  merely	  as	  if	  they	  were	  a	  morally	  responsible	  agent.	  	  In	  reply,	  the	  
cases	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  1	  show	  that	  the	  psychopath	  does	  not	  present	  in	  us	  any	  
doubt	  that	  his	  agency	  is	  intact.	  	  If	  the	  psychopath	  lacks	  agency	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  
apparent	  –	  and	  often	  not	  even	  to	  skilled	  clinicians.	  	  We	  might	  consider	  a	  more	  
charitable	  approach,	  however,	  and	  agree	  that	  the	  agency	  question	  with	  respect	  to	  
the	  psychopath	  remains	  open.	  	  Once	  in	  this	  position,	  we	  must	  form	  a	  response	  to	  
psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  based	  on	  either	  an	  ‘as	  if’	  or	  ‘as	  if	  not’	  assumption.	  	  (I	  argue	  
in	  chapters	  3	  and	  4	  that	  the	  ‘as	  if’	  approach	  is	  the	  practically	  and	  morally	  superior	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option.)	  	  Besides,	  it	  is	  practically	  unachievable	  that	  we	  first	  establish	  agency	  (an	  
intractable	  conceptual	  problem)	  prior	  to	  holding	  and	  expressing	  our	  reactive	  
attitudes.	  	  	  
The	  upshot	  of	  the	  preceding	  discussion	  is	  that	  the	  propriety	  of	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  even	  between	  two	  healthy	  agents	  is	  a	  standard	  of	  holding	  others	  
responsible	  that	  is	  not	  without	  its	  problems,	  even	  when	  propriety	  does	  not	  turn	  on	  
the	  intractable	  problems	  of	  assessing	  agency.	  	  The	  negative	  reactive	  attitudes	  might	  
be	  inappropriate	  regardless	  of	  whether	  special	  considerations	  apply.	  	  The	  reactive	  
attitudes	  seek	  to	  bend	  the	  will	  of	  another	  and	  sometimes	  this	  takes	  on	  a	  demand	  for	  
modification	  and	  at	  other	  times	  a	  manipulative	  character	  (especially	  when	  we	  want	  
to	  put	  someone	  to	  shame).	  	  We	  also	  see	  that	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  contain	  an	  
instrumental	  function	  and,	  once	  acknowledged,	  one	  component	  alleged	  to	  divide	  
them	  from	  the	  objective	  view	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  rather	  connect	  these	  sets	  of	  
attitudes.	  	  Here	  we	  might	  rest	  with	  noting	  that	  the	  alleged	  goods	  of	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  are	  not	  beyond	  criticism	  and	  that	  often	  when	  expressed,	  the	  instrumental	  
purpose	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  appears	  to	  seek	  similar	  ends	  sought	  in	  the	  
objective	  view:	  to	  control	  and	  manipulate	  others.	  	  When	  doing	  so,	  we	  never	  engage	  
other	  subjects	  but	  only	  other	  objects.	  	  	  
	  
2.4.3	  On	  the	  general	  propriety	  of	  the	  objective	  view	  
	  
	   This	  section	  has	  three	  aims.	  	  The	  first	  is	  to	  summarize	  Strawson’s	  account	  of	  
the	  objective	  view,	  including	  its	  alleged	  value	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  arrive	  at	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this	  view	  (much	  of	  which	  has	  been	  discussed	  and	  doubts	  have	  been	  raised).	  	  
Following	  this	  summary	  I	  raise	  some	  objections	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  show	  the	  limits	  
of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  objective	  view	  as	  portrayed	  by	  Strawson.	  	  When	  we	  consider	  the	  
potential	  impropriety	  of	  the	  objective	  view	  we	  can	  better	  appreciate	  the	  downside	  
to	  this	  resource	  and	  see	  that,	  just	  as	  we	  can	  wrongly	  hold	  the	  reactive	  attitudes,	  we	  
can	  likewise	  wrongly	  hold	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  More	  specifically,	  we	  can	  wrongly	  
refrain	  from	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  (and	  treating	  the	  psychopath	  as	  the	  common	  
view	  commands	  shows	  this	  mistake).	  	  Finally,	  this	  section	  concludes	  with	  examining	  
the	  nature	  of	  ‘detachment’	  as	  involved	  in	  taking	  up	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  Strawson	  is	  
not	  clear	  from	  what	  it	  is	  that	  we	  as	  reactors	  are	  supposed	  to	  detach.	  	  I	  consider	  some	  
options	  and	  suggest	  a	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘detachment’	  to	  the	  role	  of	  
affect	  in	  both	  sets	  of	  attitudes,	  the	  reactive	  and	  objective.	  	  Herein	  lies	  another	  way	  in	  
which	  these	  sets	  of	  attitudes	  are	  connected.	  
To	  Strawson,	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  ensuing	  move	  
to	  take	  up	  the	  ‘profoundly	  opposed’	  objective	  view	  toward	  the	  abnormal	  is	  a	  
consequence	  of	  our	  seeing	  the	  agent	  in	  an	  abnormal	  light.44	  	  By	  now,	  however,	  we	  
see	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  psychopath	  there	  is	  not	  an	  obvious	  absence	  of	  agency	  that	  
nudges	  the	  attitude	  shift.	  	  (Our	  intuitions	  still	  divide	  with	  respect	  to	  specifically	  
moral	  agency.)	  	  This	  invitation	  to	  inhibit	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  is	  not	  prescient	  with	  
psychopaths	  as	  it	  is,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Harold	  and	  Lori	  discussed	  in	  
chapter	  1.	  	  Suppose,	  however,	  that	  we	  follow	  Strawson’s	  intuitions	  for	  the	  moment.	  	  
When	  a	  person’s	  psychological	  normalcy	  is	  called	  into	  question,	  we	  detach	  from	  the	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  Strawson	  p.	  52,	  58	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reactive	  attitudes	  and	  adopting	  the	  objective	  view	  from	  whence,	  ‘individuals	  are	  not	  
resented	  or	  esteemed,	  but	  are	  treated	  as	  one	  to	  be	  controlled,	  managed,	  
manipulated,	  etc.’45	  Using	  the	  ‘moral	  idiot’	  as	  his	  paradigm	  case,	  Strawson	  insists	  
that	  resentment	  toward	  him	  is	  naturally	  inhibited,	  which	  “tends	  to	  promote	  instead	  
the	  purely	  objective	  view	  of	  the	  [abnormal]	  agent	  as	  one	  posing	  problems	  simply	  of	  
an	  intellectual	  understanding,	  management,	  treatment	  and	  control.”46	  	  Let	  us	  be	  
clear	  about	  Strawson’s	  view	  with	  respect	  to	  psychopaths	  and	  that	  the	  appropriate	  
view	  to	  take	  toward	  him	  is	  to	  be	  a	  thoroughgoing	  and	  purely	  objective	  view	  because,	  
“the	  moral	  idiot	  is,	  as	  we	  say,	  wholly	  lacking	  in	  moral	  sense…	  not	  one	  toward	  whom	  
the	  demands	  and	  expectations	  lie…	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  moral	  obligation;	  he	  is	  not,	  to	  
that	  extent,	  seen	  as	  a	  morally	  responsible	  agent.”47	  	  (Recall	  that	  in	  the	  introductory	  
chapter	  that	  I	  portrayed	  the	  common	  view,	  which	  finds	  its	  roots	  in	  Strawson,	  to	  see	  
the	  psychopath	  as	  completely	  and	  incorrigibly	  morally	  blind.)	  	  I	  have	  already	  raised	  
a	  series	  of	  concerns	  about	  how	  unlikely	  it	  is	  that	  we	  see	  the	  psychopath	  as	  a	  non-­‐
agent,	  especially	  not	  with	  any	  immediacy.	  	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case	  and	  the	  psychopath	  
indeed	  possesses	  some	  degree	  of	  agency,	  then	  taking	  the	  objective	  view	  toward	  him	  
is	  wrong	  in	  a	  perceptual	  or	  epistemic	  sense,	  but	  it	  is,	  in	  addition	  potentially	  morally	  
wrong	  to	  view	  him	  in	  as	  stark	  terms	  as	  Strawson	  portrays.	  	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  examine	  
the	  impropriety	  of	  the	  objective	  view.	  
One	  way	  to	  see	  the	  downside	  to	  the	  objective	  view	  is	  via	  Strawson’s	  
application	  of	  this	  view	  in	  relatively	  normal	  relationships	  ‘as	  a	  resource’	  available	  to	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  Ibid	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  Ibid	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‘relieve	  ourselves	  from	  the	  strain	  of	  involvement,’	  where	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  other	  
party	  is	  not	  in	  question.48	  	  Strawson	  doesn’t	  provide	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  what	  he	  has	  
in	  mind	  in	  these	  cases,	  but	  does	  suggest	  that	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  ‘offender’	  is	  not	  
clearly	  in	  question.	  	  Perhaps	  ‘relief	  from	  the	  burden	  of	  involvement’	  that	  objective	  
view	  provides	  goes	  badly,	  for	  example,	  that	  occurs	  between	  homosexual	  children	  of	  
fundamentally	  religious	  parents,	  where	  resentment	  quickly	  devolves	  into	  studied	  
indifference;	  in	  this	  case	  the	  objective	  view	  may	  indicate	  a	  moral	  failure.	  	  Likewise,	  
such	  refuge	  from	  burden	  may	  be	  a	  gradual	  slide	  into	  a	  new	  default	  position	  of	  a	  
couple	  together	  too	  long	  and	  rather	  than	  parting	  ways,	  remain	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  
suspended	  animation.	  	  However,	  such	  relief	  is	  more	  understandable,	  say,	  as	  
something	  that	  adult	  children	  of	  dying	  parents	  must	  adopt	  in	  the	  face	  of	  their	  own	  
deteriorating	  narrative	  and	  when	  the	  demands	  of	  care	  force	  a	  suspension	  of	  grief.	  
A	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  the	  objective	  view	  in	  each	  of	  these	  examples	  will	  not	  
yield	  the	  same	  verdict.	  	  The	  alienation	  that	  occurs	  in	  the	  first	  two	  cases	  is	  a	  result	  of	  
taking	  up	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  It	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  alienation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  is	  not	  
in	  the	  last	  example.	  	  This	  means	  that	  we	  need	  to	  be	  very	  careful	  in	  the	  way	  we	  both	  
use	  and	  commit	  to	  the	  objective	  view,	  even	  when	  the	  slide	  into	  that	  view	  feels	  
involuntary.	  	  Since	  alienation	  divorces	  us	  from	  relationships	  (whether	  wholly	  or	  
partially)	  we	  must	  take	  care	  not	  to	  perpetuate	  alienation	  in	  our	  use	  of	  the	  objective	  
view	  as	  it	  can	  be	  used	  both	  as	  a	  resource	  and	  a	  weapon.	  	  Furthermore,	  if	  taking	  up	  
the	  objective	  view	  plays	  a	  contributing	  role	  in	  diminishing	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  
relationship,	  it	  might	  likewise	  contribute	  to	  whether	  we	  see	  the	  agent	  as	  responsible	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Strawson	  p.	  52	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or	  not.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  alienation,	  relationships,	  the	  objective	  view,	  
agency	  and	  responsibility	  may	  well	  be	  circular	  in	  nature	  and	  not	  linear.	  	  The	  
common	  view	  appears	  to	  assume	  this	  linear	  view	  and	  that	  agency	  (and	  it’s	  absence)	  
is	  the	  starting	  point	  that	  causes	  the	  alienation,	  and	  then	  the	  diminished	  relationship,	  
thereby	  prompting	  of	  the	  objective	  view	  and	  the	  exempting	  from	  responsibility.	  	  The	  
assumption	  that	  all	  of	  these	  factors	  rather	  neatly	  fall	  into	  line	  is	  false,	  of	  course,	  and	  
this	  mistake	  begins	  with	  many	  incorrect	  assumptions	  that	  philosophers	  hold	  about	  
the	  nature	  of	  mental	  illness,	  psychopathy	  included	  (hence	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
discussion	  in	  chapter	  1).	  	  We	  should	  note	  that	  the	  objective	  view,	  because	  of	  the	  
‘detachment’	  that	  defines	  it,	  can	  itself	  be	  an	  obstacle	  in	  relationships,	  and	  thus	  in	  our	  
understanding	  of	  responsibility.	  	  Since	  the	  notion	  of	  detachment	  plays	  such	  a	  crucial,	  
if	  understated,	  role	  in	  the	  set	  of	  attitudes	  we	  take	  up,	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  its	  role	  and	  value.	  
The	  notion	  of	  detachment	  is	  the	  last	  on	  the	  list	  of	  pitfalls	  of	  the	  objective	  
view.	  	  I	  first	  say	  what	  I	  take	  Strawson	  to	  mean	  in	  his	  use	  of	  the	  ‘non	  detached’	  
reactive	  attitudes	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  ‘detached’	  objective	  view.	  	  I	  then	  highlight	  some	  
unwanted	  implications	  of	  detachment.	  
Strawson	  is	  not	  explicit	  in	  describing	  what	  exactly	  it	  is	  that	  we	  are	  detaching	  
from	  when	  we	  take	  up	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  There	  are	  (at	  least)	  two	  components	  
involved	  in	  detachment:	  emotions	  and	  agents.	  	  Since	  we	  have	  just	  discussed	  the	  
issue	  of	  detachment	  and	  agency,	  I	  will	  primarily	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  emotional	  
detachment	  in	  the	  attitudes.	  	  It	  is	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  take	  Strawson	  to	  be	  primarily	  
using	  the	  notion	  of	  detachment.	  	  (Mental	  health	  practitioners	  tend	  to	  use	  ‘affect’	  in	  
place	  of	  ‘emotion.’)	  	  When	  we	  take	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  emotional	  magnitude	  of	  a	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given	  attitude,	  which	  in	  turn	  inform	  our	  assessment	  of	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  
attitude,	  we	  must	  be	  clear	  that	  we	  are	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  emotional	  and	  
intrapsychological	  states	  of	  the	  reactor.	  	  Here,	  Strawson	  cites	  the	  view	  a	  therapist	  
takes	  up	  toward	  her	  patient	  as	  a	  model	  for	  describing	  what	  occurs	  when	  taking	  up	  
the	  objective	  view.	  	  But,	  I	  think	  Strawson	  is	  quite	  wrong	  in	  his	  depiction	  of	  the	  
therapeutic	  ideal	  by	  explicating	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  objective	  view,	  and	  thus,	  appears	  
to	  beg	  the	  question	  that	  the	  objective	  view	  is	  the	  right	  one	  to	  take	  toward	  type	  2	  
agents.	  	  Let	  me	  further	  explain.	  
While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  mental	  health	  practitioners	  are	  trained	  to	  reign	  in	  our	  
affective	  responses,	  at	  least	  revealing	  our	  affective	  responses,	  we	  are	  also	  trained	  to	  
use	  them	  as	  a	  therapeutic	  tool,	  including	  the	  building	  of	  a	  genuine	  human	  
relationship	  with	  our	  ‘patient.’	  	  We	  therapists	  are	  also	  trained	  to	  use	  our	  affective	  
responses	  as	  a	  diagnostic	  tool.	  	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  we	  therapists	  are	  also	  
under	  a	  professional,	  and	  I	  think	  moral,	  obligation	  to	  refer	  our	  patients	  to	  a	  
colleague	  (or	  better,	  include	  a	  colleague	  in	  the	  ongoing	  relationship	  so	  as	  not	  to	  
abandon	  our	  patients)	  when	  our	  affective	  reactions	  become	  an	  obstacle	  in	  the	  
relationship.	  	  Note	  that	  affective	  responses	  often	  function	  as	  an	  obstacle	  in	  any	  
relationship,	  let	  alone	  a	  therapeutic	  one.	  	  Furthermore,	  therapeutic	  models	  differ	  in	  
approach	  to	  the	  other	  party	  in	  the	  relationship.	  	  Some	  see	  ‘patients’	  (e.g.,	  cognitive	  
behavioral	  models)	  or	  just	  brains	  in	  need	  of	  chemical	  titration	  
(psychopharmacological	  models),	  whereas	  others	  see	  ‘persons,’	  (e.g.,	  gestalt	  model).	  	  
(I	  leave	  aside	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Strawson	  specifically	  botches	  the	  
psychotherapeutic	  model.)	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  taking	  up	  the	  objective	  view	  does	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not	  straightforwardly	  dictate	  a	  ‘non	  agency’	  perception	  or	  stance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
therapist,	  as	  Strawson’s	  use	  of	  the	  objective	  view	  stipulates	  our	  disposition.	  	  There	  
is	  no	  uniform	  conception	  of	  ‘agency’	  and	  ‘self’	  across	  models	  of	  treating	  
psychopathology.	  	  So,	  we	  should	  not	  take	  care	  that	  a	  ‘she’	  not	  become	  an	  ‘it’	  when	  
diagnosed	  with	  a	  mental	  illness.	  	  When	  we	  depersonalize	  the	  mentally	  ill	  we	  may	  
not	  only	  disrespect	  them	  in	  so	  doing,	  but	  worse,	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  further	  disrespect	  
and	  even	  abuse.	  	  When	  we	  speak	  of	  type	  2	  type	  subjects	  in	  the	  Strawsonian	  language	  
as	  objects	  to	  be	  ‘controlled,’	  ‘managed’,	  ‘manipulated’,	  we	  must	  not	  forget	  that	  
mental	  illness,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  moral	  concept,	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  we	  put	  to	  use	  
in	  our	  social	  and	  political	  institutions.49	  	  This	  is	  not	  always	  done	  with	  sufficient	  
gravity.	  	  (In	  many	  respects,	  this	  language	  itself	  is	  morally	  abhorrent.)	  	  Suffice	  it	  to	  
say	  that	  this	  discussion	  should	  serve	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  our	  extolling	  the	  objective	  




	   There	  is	  a	  third	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  might	  conceive	  detachment	  and	  this	  sense	  
will	  open	  up	  new	  options	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  move	  beyond	  Strawson’s	  stark	  distinction	  
between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  objective	  view.	  	  Here	  I	  only	  wish	  to	  introduce	  the	  
idea	  and	  will	  return	  to	  further	  discuss	  its	  role	  in	  forming	  the	  response	  to	  
psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  that	  I	  favor.	  	  Given	  that	  affect	  plays	  an	  inescapable	  role	  in	  
the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  this	  underwrites	  some	  of	  the	  concern	  with	  having	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  See	  Ian	  Hacking	  (1999)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  mental	  illness	  as	  an	  interactive	  kind	  
rather	  than	  as	  a	  natural	  kinds	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reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  type	  2	  agents,	  then	  a	  key	  distinction	  may	  alleviate	  this	  
concern.	  	  We	  can	  distinguish	  two	  types	  of	  reactanda	  (the	  things	  being	  reacted	  to)	  to	  
which	  we	  direct	  our	  reactans	  (the	  reaction	  itself).	  	  The	  first	  reactandum	  is	  the	  agent.	  	  
This	  is	  what	  most	  of	  the	  literature,	  including	  proponents	  of	  the	  common	  view,	  have	  
focused	  on	  thus	  far	  in	  assessing	  the	  responsibility	  of	  psychopaths.	  	  Instead,	  we	  can,	  
and	  should,	  direct	  our	  reactans	  (our	  affective	  reactive	  attitudes)	  to	  behavior.	  	  There	  
are	  many	  gains	  to	  be	  made	  when	  we	  draw	  this	  distinction.	  	  By	  doing	  so	  we	  avoid	  a	  
key	  concern	  raised	  by	  proponents	  of	  the	  common	  view	  (that	  we	  harm	  type	  2	  agents	  
when	  we	  hold	  them	  responsible,	  which	  is	  only	  really	  done	  when	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  are	  appropriately	  involved).	  	  Additionally,	  focusing	  on	  behavior	  as	  the	  
appropriate	  reactandum	  allows	  us	  to	  maintain,	  or	  maybe	  even	  initiate,	  genuine	  
interpersonal	  contact	  that	  begins	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  alienation,	  and	  maybe	  
even	  to	  increasing	  the	  agency	  of	  ‘the	  other.’	  	  Lastly,	  this	  distinction	  has	  the	  added	  
benefit	  of	  being	  consistent	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  those	  with	  Antisocial	  Personality	  
Disorder	  are	  actually	  diagnosed	  –	  and	  that	  is	  by	  their	  behavior.	  	  
Before	  closing	  this	  chapter	  I	  wish	  to	  note	  an	  important	  insight	  that	  emerges	  
from	  the	  preceding	  discussion,	  which	  is	  that	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  apply	  the	  standard	  
responses	  to	  wrongdoing	  by	  ‘normal’	  people	  and	  then	  apply	  that	  standard	  to	  inform	  
our	  responses	  to	  abnormal	  people,	  like	  psychopaths,	  we	  should	  instead	  take	  a	  
lesson	  from	  responses	  to	  abnormal	  wrongdoing	  and	  apply	  them	  more	  generally	  to	  
all	  agents.	  	  We	  should	  take	  caution	  not	  to	  ever	  emphasize	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  as	  
having	  neither	  privileged	  insight	  into,	  nor	  an	  exclusive	  hold	  on	  moral	  responsibility.	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Chapter	  3:	  Levy’s	  view	  
3.1	  Introduction:	  Levy’s	  general	  view	  and	  its	  appeal	  
	  
	   Levy	  (2007a,	  b,	  2010)	  provides	  the	  most	  current	  and	  well	  supported	  
argument	  that	  we	  should	  not	  hold	  psychopaths	  responsible	  because	  they	  lack	  the	  
capacity	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  that	  blaming	  them	  harms	  them	  unjustifiably.	  	  
His	  view	  represents	  an	  empirically	  updated	  version	  of	  both	  Watson’s	  and	  
Strawson’s	  accounts	  (what	  we	  might	  call	  a	  ‘folk	  psychological’	  account	  in	  which	  the	  
moral	  idiot	  suffers	  from	  ‘misfortune	  of	  formative	  circumstances’)	  that	  includes	  
cutting	  edge	  data	  from	  fMRI	  scans	  that	  allege	  to	  reveal	  neuro-­‐anatomical	  
abnormalities	  in	  the	  brains	  of	  psychopaths	  that	  explains	  their	  inability	  to	  be	  morally	  
responsible	  agents.	  	  	  
After	  providing	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  Levy’s	  view	  and	  its	  appeal,	  I	  engage	  four	  of	  
his	  arguments	  supporting	  the	  conclusion	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  morally	  
responsible.	  	  First,	  Levy’s	  prioritizing	  of	  the	  ‘is	  responsible’	  question	  (as	  a	  rather	  
stark	  disjunct:	  ‘is	  the	  psychopath	  responsible	  or	  not?’)	  to	  the	  ‘hold	  responsible’	  
(which,	  like	  Strawson	  is	  rather	  coarse-­‐grained)	  is	  discussed	  as	  the	  backdrop	  to	  the	  
empirical	  argument.	  	  Second,	  Levy’s	  twofold	  value-­‐free	  commitment,	  that	  both	  the	  
concept	  of	  psychopathy	  is	  purely	  empirical	  and	  value-­‐free	  and	  perhaps	  more	  
provocatively	  that	  the	  question	  of	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  agents	  is	  an	  essentially	  
empirical	  matter,	  is	  challenged.	  	  Third,	  I	  criticize	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  an	  inversion	  of	  
the	  responses	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  called	  for	  by	  Levy,	  that	  we	  imprison	  
psychopaths	  (perhaps	  indefinitely)	  so	  long	  as	  we	  refrain	  from	  blaming	  them.	  	  Last,	  I	  
engage	  Levy’s	  argument	  that	  psychopaths	  lack	  the	  capacity	  for	  moral	  knowledge	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(another	  refinement	  of	  the	  ‘understanding’	  condition	  advanced	  by	  Strawson	  and	  
Watson).	  	  	  
	   The	  appeal	  of	  Levy’s	  view	  lies	  primarily	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  our	  moral	  responses	  
should	  track	  the	  moral	  capacities	  of	  agents.	  	  His	  account	  is	  additionally	  valuable	  in	  
supplying	  empirical	  research	  to	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  capacity	  for	  moral	  
responsibility.	  	  If	  a	  psychopathic	  agents	  lack	  the	  capacity	  for	  moral	  responsibility,	  
and	  we	  can	  show	  this	  with	  empirical	  research,	  then	  the	  moral	  response	  of	  blaming	  
psychopaths	  is	  both	  epistemically	  unjustified	  and	  perhaps,	  as	  Levy	  argues,	  is	  
morally	  wrong	  too.	  	  	  The	  appeal	  of	  an	  evidence	  based	  approach	  to	  explaining	  the	  
capacity	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  possessed	  by	  psychopaths	  lies,	  in	  part,	  as	  a	  
welcome	  countermeasure	  to	  the	  tendency	  to	  censure	  and	  blame	  wrongdoers,	  
perhaps	  especially	  the	  most	  inimical	  wrongdoers.	  	  Our	  understanding	  of	  moral	  
agency,	  (and	  mental	  illness	  for	  that	  matter),	  is	  enhanced	  by	  evidence.	  	  	  
	   A	  brief	  analogy	  might	  help.	  On	  Levy’s	  view,	  to	  make	  moral	  demands	  of	  
psychopaths	  is	  tantamount	  to	  demanding	  someone	  with	  a	  spinal	  cord	  injury	  to	  ‘run.’	  	  
It	  would	  be	  grotesquely	  ignorant	  of	  us	  to	  demand	  that	  quadriplegics	  will	  themselves	  
to	  stand.	  	  Likewise,	  to	  make	  moral	  demands	  of	  psychopaths	  and	  then	  blame	  them	  
when	  they	  fail	  to	  meet	  those	  demands,	  displays	  a	  similar	  ignorance	  capped	  off	  with	  
a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐indulgence	  that	  frequents	  blaming.	  	  And	  when	  we	  hear	  of	  the	  horrible	  
childhood	  suffered	  by	  psychopaths	  like	  Robert	  Harris,	  there	  is	  something	  wrongful	  
about	  adding	  to	  his	  misery	  by	  morally	  condemning	  him.	  	  Surely	  we	  should	  not	  add	  
to	  the	  misery	  of	  psychopaths.	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3.2	  Causal	  responsibility	  and	  morally	  responsibility	  
	  
The	  empirical	  evidence	  Levy	  provides	  is	  in	  support	  of	  a	  larger	  causal	  
argument	  that	  psychopaths	  lack	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Since	  psychopaths	  cannot	  
cause	  their	  actions	  with	  specifically	  moral	  reasons,	  he	  argues	  (2008,	  2010),	  they	  
cannot	  be	  morally	  responsible	  agents.	  	  Hence,	  psychopaths	  lack	  the	  moral	  volition	  
necessary	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Levy	  argues	  in	  favor	  the	  volitionist	  theory	  of	  
responsibility	  in	  which	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  an	  action,	  omission,	  etc.,	  and	  agent	  
must	  have	  sufficiently	  caused	  the	  action	  or	  omission	  by	  properly	  choosing	  to	  act.	  	  
Per	  Levy’s	  volitionist	  account,	  since	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  the	  proper	  causes	  of	  their	  
selves,	  then	  they	  do	  not	  choose	  their	  reasons	  for	  acting	  in	  the	  way	  that	  grounds	  
moral	  responsibility.	  	  Hence,	  on	  Levy’s	  view,	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  only	  psychopathic	  
causes	  of	  action	  (that	  emanate	  from	  the	  illness)	  in	  which	  psychopathic	  reasons	  for	  
action	  are	  thereby	  pathological	  reasons.	  	  	  
(Interestingly,	  Levy	  appears	  to	  sweep	  up	  the	  attributionist	  account	  of	  
responsibility	  –	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  responsible	  for	  a	  given	  act	  in	  so	  far	  as	  that	  act	  is	  
attributable	  to	  her	  –	  in	  his	  volitionist	  account	  by	  maintaining	  that	  psychopaths	  do	  
not	  have	  a	  proper	  self	  because	  it	  was	  not	  a	  self	  that	  was	  chosen	  by	  the	  psychopath.	  	  
However,	  the	  ‘choice	  of	  self’	  condition	  is	  not	  something	  that	  clearly	  separates	  
psychopaths	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  us.50)	  	  	  
Given	  Levy’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  view	  that	  psychopaths	  do	  not	  properly	  
cause	  themselves	  it	  seems	  odd	  for	  him	  to	  admit	  elsewhere	  (Levy,	  2007a)	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Galen	  Strawson	  (1993)	  offers	  a	  compelling	  argument	  against	  the	  causa	  sui	  notion	  
of	  self.	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psychopaths	  are	  ‘causally	  responsible	  for	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  crimes,’	  (referencing	  
Reznek	  1997).	  	  Levy	  of	  course	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  at	  length	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  
specifically	  morally	  responsible	  (2007a,b,	  2008,	  2010).	  	  Yet	  Levy,	  (2007b,	  p.	  169)	  
also	  remarks	  that	  he	  believes	  the	  question	  of	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  agents	  can	  
be	  largely	  answered	  ‘without	  actually	  doing	  any	  moral	  philosophy.’	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  
case	  then	  we	  appear	  to	  be	  solely	  engaged	  in	  a	  question	  of	  whether	  psychopaths	  are	  
the	  cause	  of	  their	  own	  actions.	  	  Since	  Levy	  admits	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  causally	  
responsible	  for	  their	  actions	  –	  and	  this	  is	  supported	  by	  their	  engagement	  in	  
instrumental	  aggression	  which	  requires	  calm,	  intentional,	  deliberate	  and	  planned	  
actions	  –	  then	  the	  degree	  of	  agency	  and	  control	  psychopaths	  appear	  to	  possess	  over	  
their	  actions	  makes	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  see	  why	  they	  are	  not	  both	  causally	  
responsible	  and	  morally	  responsible.	  	  The	  failure	  of	  psychopaths	  to	  intend	  morally	  
good	  or	  worthy	  actions	  does	  not	  itself	  demonstrate	  that	  such	  failure	  is	  itself	  not	  
blameworthy.	  	  	  	  
On	  Levy’s	  view	  psychopaths	  are	  undeniably	  causally	  responsible	  for	  their	  
criminal	  actions	  but	  are	  not	  specifically	  morally	  responsible	  for	  them.	  	  Levy	  also	  
believes	  that	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  a	  given	  agent	  is	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  free	  
agency,	  where	  moral	  theory	  need	  not	  be	  among	  our	  considerations.	  	  Hence,	  moral	  
responsibility	  is	  about	  causing	  actions	  freely,	  and	  psychopaths	  are	  causally	  
responsible	  for	  their	  actions	  in	  so	  much	  as	  they	  freely	  do	  them,	  but	  are	  not	  morally	  
responsible	  for	  them.	  	  (The	  space	  between	  the	  causal	  freedom	  of	  action	  psychopaths	  
possess	  and	  the	  moral	  unfreedom	  they	  like	  wise	  possess	  is,	  more	  so	  the	  size	  and	  
significance	  of	  that	  space,	  is	  the	  primary	  domain	  of	  dispute	  over	  the	  responsibility	  of	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psychopaths.)	  	  If	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  determined,	  in	  part,	  by	  causal	  freedom	  and	  
psychopaths	  are	  causally	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions	  to	  a	  high	  degree	  (to	  which	  
Levy	  consents),	  then	  they	  may	  also	  be,	  in	  some	  part,	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  
actions.	  	  Causal	  knowledge	  appears	  to	  establish	  at	  least	  some	  sense	  of	  moral	  
knowledge	  and	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  	  
Drawing	  from	  the	  cases,	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  both	  Harold	  and	  Lori	  are	  
causally	  responsible	  for	  the	  damage	  that	  resulted	  from	  their	  actions.	  	  But	  neither	  
Harold	  nor	  Lori	  intended	  to	  harm	  anyone	  so	  it	  seems	  incorrect	  to	  say	  that	  they	  are	  
morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  harm	  that	  resulted.	  	  The	  gulf	  between	  the	  causal	  
responsibility	  and	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  borne	  by	  Harold	  and	  Lori	  is	  very	  wide.	  	  
Psychopaths	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  deliberately	  intend	  to	  cause	  harm	  to	  others	  with	  
such	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  causal	  control	  over	  their	  own	  actions	  that	  makes	  it	  very	  hard	  to	  
see	  why	  they	  are	  not	  likewise	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  harm	  they	  cause.	  	  The	  gulf	  
between	  the	  causal	  responsibility	  and	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  much	  narrower	  
because	  of	  the	  calm	  behavioral	  control	  exhibited	  in	  the	  signature	  behavior	  of	  
instrumental	  aggression	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  known	  for	  possessing.	  
	  
3.3	  The	  epistemic	  condition	  for	  moral	  responsibility:	  understanding,	  reasons,	  
and	  ‘pathological’	  reasons	  
	  
	   The	  section	  below	  takes	  up	  the	  question	  of	  the	  role	  in	  which	  moral	  
understanding	  informs	  the	  capacity	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Levy	  (2010)	  attributes	  
psychopath’s	  lack	  of	  moral	  understanding	  to	  a	  failure	  to	  grasp	  the	  force	  of	  moral	  
demands.	  	  I’m	  not	  sure,	  however,	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Levy’s	  portrays	  the	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psychopath’s	  failure	  to	  grasp	  is	  accurate.	  	  I	  am	  equally	  unclear	  on	  what	  exactly	  Levy	  
means	  by	  grasping	  a	  moral	  demand,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  nature	  
of	  this	  condition.	  	  (Furthermore,	  why	  one	  must	  possess	  a	  high	  level	  of	  conceptual	  
command,	  if	  this	  is	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  ‘grasp’,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  proper	  target	  of	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes	  is	  also	  unclear.	  	  Responses	  to	  wrongdoing	  can,	  and	  should,	  contain	  
the	  attempt	  to	  promote	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  moral	  understanding	  by	  the	  
wrongdoer.)	  	  I	  provide	  a	  sample	  of	  responses	  that	  reflect,	  or	  appear	  to	  reflect,	  
various	  depths	  of	  understanding.	  	  Doing	  so	  affords	  the	  opportunity	  to	  examine	  the	  
alleged	  differences	  between	  bad	  reasons,	  superficial	  reasons,	  and	  ‘pathological’	  
reasons.	  	  The	  latter	  among	  these,	  when	  held	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  a	  disease	  model	  
of	  mental	  illness	  (and	  psychopathy),	  are	  viewed	  as	  causes	  more	  so	  than	  as	  reasons.	  	  
So	  when	  we	  refer	  to	  ‘pathological	  reasons’	  what	  it	  really	  meant	  is	  ‘dysfunctional	  
cause,’	  or	  ‘neural	  failure,’	  or	  something	  similar.	  	  This	  is	  not	  always	  (and	  maybe	  only	  
rarely)	  what	  has	  actually	  occurs	  as	  the	  madness	  isn’t	  simply	  or	  easily	  revealed	  in	  the	  
reasons	  given;	  it	  is	  also	  inferred	  by	  the	  listener,	  however	  correctly	  or	  incorrectly.	  	  
Thus,	  as	  Jaspers	  forewarned,	  (and	  even	  Freud),	  that	  psychiatry	  contains	  an	  
irreducibly	  hermeneutic	  element,	  particularly	  so	  as	  these	  crafts	  are	  actively	  
practiced.	  	  This	  hermeneutic	  element	  follows	  us	  to	  the	  armchair	  as	  well	  depending	  
on	  our	  portrayal	  of	  the	  psychopath.	  
Quite	  aside	  from	  assigning	  moral	  understanding	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  moral	  
responsibility	  is	  the	  question	  of	  what	  moral	  understanding	  actually	  amounts	  to.	  	  A	  
strict	  read	  is	  to	  require	  that	  one	  be	  morally	  autonomous	  in	  order	  to	  possess	  moral	  
understanding.	  	  But	  (full)	  moral	  autonomy	  may	  be	  an	  overly	  strict	  standard	  for	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moral	  responsibility.	  	  That	  is,	  one	  can	  be	  less	  than	  autonomous	  a	  still	  morally	  wrong	  
someone.	  
Moral	  autonomy	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  condition	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  as	  it	  is	  an	  
idealization	  of	  a	  robustly	  moral	  agent.	  	  But	  who	  among	  us	  are	  good	  practicing	  
Kantians?	  	  Besides,	  autonomy	  may	  not	  be	  the	  moral	  ideal	  that	  we	  believe	  it	  to	  be.	  	  
On	  my	  view,	  Levy’s	  account	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  requires	  that	  agents	  possess	  a	  
level	  of	  moral	  autonomy	  that	  is	  too	  high	  as	  well	  as	  a	  depth	  of	  moral	  understanding	  
that	  is	  to	  deep,	  which	  leaves	  us	  with	  overly	  narrow	  the	  population	  of	  morally	  
responsible	  agents.	  	  There	  are	  many	  examples	  in	  which	  the	  apparent	  failure	  to	  grasp	  
a	  moral	  reason	  is	  itself	  grounds	  for	  blame.	  	  	  
Consider	  the	  following	  reason,	  ‘I	  killed	  him	  because	  it	  was	  Tuesday.’	  	  On	  Levy’s	  
view,	  this	  reason	  is	  evidence	  of	  a	  psychological	  disease.	  	  (To	  ‘clarify’	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  
disease	  here,	  in	  part,	  is	  the	  causal	  role	  disease	  is	  assumed	  to	  play	  as	  a	  specifically	  
potent	  reason	  for	  why	  we	  should	  think	  an	  agent	  is	  not	  responsible.	  	  This	  is	  not	  
strictly	  true,	  however.	  	  Responsibility	  is	  not	  silenced	  by	  disease,	  including	  those	  
mental	  illnesses	  that	  are	  argued	  to	  belong	  under	  the	  same	  conceptual	  umbrella	  as	  
physical	  diseases.	  	  In	  fact,	  even	  the	  presence	  of	  paradigmatic	  physical	  disease	  –	  say,	  
cancer	  –	  reveals	  the	  increased	  responsibility	  that	  a	  dying	  person	  has	  to	  her	  family.)	  	  
Since	  the	  reason	  is	  deemed	  as	  incoherent,	  it	  is	  inferred	  to	  be	  a	  mad	  reason	  rather	  
than	  a	  bad	  reason.	  	  To	  see	  this,	  let’s	  examine	  the	  argument:	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1. If	  an	  agent	  provides	  an	  odd/abnormal/incoherent	  reason	  for	  her	  action,	  then	  
her	  reason	  arises	  from	  a	  psychological	  ailment.	  (Thus,	  it	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  no	  
reason	  at	  all.)	  
2. The	  agent	  provided	  an	  odd/abnormal/incoherent	  reason.	  
3. Hence,	  the	  agent	  is	  ill.	  (And	  is,	  this,	  not	  really	  an	  agent	  at	  all.)	  
	  
Of	  course,	  the	  conclusion	  does	  not	  necessarily	  follow.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  agent	  was	  
under	  orders	  to	  kill	  someone	  on	  a	  specific	  Tuesday,	  or	  maybe	  even	  one	  among	  
several	  Tuesdays	  because	  the	  victim	  had	  a	  specific	  routine	  that	  afforded	  the	  assassin	  
her	  opportunity.	  	  This	  counterfactual	  counterexample	  shows	  that	  this	  argument	  is	  
invalid.	  	  So,	  the	  inference	  from	  bad	  reasons	  to	  mad	  reasons	  is	  something	  to	  we	  
should	  actively	  guard	  against.	  	  Recall	  Levy	  committing	  this	  pathologizing	  error	  with	  
his	  interpretation	  of	  welfare	  maximizing	  responses	  to	  the	  trolley	  problem,	  in	  which	  
utilitarians	  and	  psychopaths	  appear	  to	  provide	  pathological	  moral	  judgments.	  	  
Drawing	  the	  inference	  from	  ‘bad	  reason’	  to	  ‘mad	  reason’	  is	  weak	  in	  this	  case	  of	  
‘Tuesday’	  being	  the	  reason	  cited	  for	  acting.	  	  Although	  ‘it	  was	  Tuesday’	  is	  an	  odd,	  
unclear	  and	  perhaps	  unreasonable	  reason,	  it	  is	  far	  more	  coherent	  than,	  say,	  
glossogonal	  utterances	  as	  a	  response.	  	  A	  glossogonal	  ‘reason’	  does	  make	  the	  
inference	  to	  ‘mad	  reason’	  far	  more	  plausible	  than	  the	  reason	  ‘it	  was	  Tuesday.’	  	  
Suffice	  it	  to	  say,	  the	  clash	  of	  intuitions	  about	  when	  a	  bad	  reason	  is	  better	  explained	  
as	  a	  mad	  reason	  is	  central	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  enlisting	  mental	  illness	  as	  an	  intuitive	  
guide	  to	  understanding	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  On	  my	  view,	  moral	  
philosophers	  are	  far	  too	  liberal	  in	  such	  attributions	  and	  the	  burden	  should	  be	  much	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higher	  (for	  both	  epistemic	  and	  moral	  reasons).	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  understand	  the	  appeal,	  
however.	  	  Bad	  and	  really	  ignorant	  reasons	  psychopaths	  give	  for	  acting	  violently	  (e.g.,	  
‘she	  said	  I’m	  fat’)	  do	  tempt	  us	  to	  explain	  away	  such	  lack	  of	  insight	  to	  madness.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  attributing	  madness	  to	  an	  individual	  (by	  virtue	  of	  the	  reasons	  they	  give	  
for	  acting)	  carries	  moral	  consequences,	  (the	  insane	  are	  divested	  of	  civil	  liberties).	  
Let	  us	  examine	  a	  list	  of	  reasons	  for	  acting	  (violently)	  that	  provide	  insight	  into	  
levels	  of	  competence.	  	  Whilst	  examining	  these	  different	  reasons	  we	  must	  keep	  in	  
mind	  that	  what	  we	  are	  ultimately	  after	  is	  a	  standard	  of	  moral	  understanding	  (as	  it	  is	  
held	  internally	  by	  an	  agent)	  that	  gives	  insight	  into	  the	  level	  of	  responsibility	  
possessed	  by	  an	  agent	  –	  and	  not	  whether	  an	  agent	  ‘is’	  or	  ‘is	  not’	  responsible	  as	  if	  
there	  is	  no	  middle	  ground.	  	  We	  must	  then	  hash	  out	  where	  this	  normative	  standard	  is	  
to	  be	  drawn.	  	  On	  Levy’s	  view	  one	  must	  grasp	  moral	  concepts	  to	  be	  morally	  
responsible;	  and	  he	  picks	  his	  examples	  of	  reasoning	  to	  suit	  his	  conclusion.	  	  This	  may	  
be	  too	  high	  of	  a	  standard,	  however	  (let	  alone	  how	  phenomenological	  thick	  this	  
concept	  is).	  	  Perhaps	  the	  standard	  should	  be	  lower,	  requiring	  a	  more	  basic	  
conversational	  competence	  short	  of	  a	  full	  cognitive	  command.	  	  	  
Examples	  of	  ‘reasons’	  for	  acting	  (violently):	  
1. ‘I	  didn’t	  kill	  him	  but	  I	  did	  kill	  the	  dragon.’	  
2. ‘I	  killed	  him	  because	  it	  was	  a	  Tuesday.’	  
3. ‘I	  killed	  her	  because	  she	  said	  I	  was	  fat.’	  
4. ‘I	  killed	  him	  because	  the	  coin	  landed	  on	  tails.’	  
5. ‘I	  mugged	  her	  because	  she	  was	  easy	  prey.’	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Each	  reason	  in	  the	  set	  reveals	  increased	  normative	  (and	  psychological)	  
competence	  and	  yet	  all	  four	  fall	  short	  of	  an	  ideal	  appreciation	  for	  the	  force	  of	  moral	  
norms.	  	  The	  first	  is	  a	  response	  we	  might	  hear	  from	  a	  person	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  
hallucinogenics	  or	  in	  the	  throes	  of	  a	  severe	  psychotic	  episode.	  	  Yet	  there	  is	  some	  
sense	  of	  moral	  accomplishment	  this	  person	  has	  for	  having	  killed	  a	  dragon,	  thus	  the	  
moral	  competence	  is	  not	  absent	  or	  even	  the	  problem.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  
psychotic	  killer	  thought	  that	  the	  person	  she	  killed	  was	  a	  dragon;	  hence	  her	  global	  
disorientation	  to	  reality	  is	  the	  problem.	  	  The	  second	  reason	  was	  discussed	  above,	  
and	  shows	  that	  we	  cannot	  simply	  infer	  a	  failure	  of	  moral	  competence	  with	  this	  
response,	  not	  at	  least	  without	  more	  context	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  We	  need	  to	  be	  clear	  
that	  this	  second	  reason	  is	  not	  indicative	  of	  psychopathic	  responses.	  The	  third	  
response	  is	  an	  actual	  paradigmatic	  psychopathic	  response.	  	  It	  is	  a	  rebarbative	  
reason	  no	  doubt,	  (more	  so	  when	  it	  is	  uttered	  gleefully).	  	  It	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  
superficial	  reason	  and	  certainly	  a	  reason	  that	  fails	  to	  grasp	  the	  force	  of	  moral	  norms.	  	  	  
Reason	  four	  is	  adapted	  from	  Cormac	  McCarthy’s	  book	  No	  Country	  for	  Old	  Men,	  in	  
which	  a	  psychopath	  ‘decides’	  who	  he	  will	  kill	  or	  let	  live	  by	  the	  flip	  of	  a	  coin.	  	  Now,	  
one	  might	  quickly	  point	  out	  that	  one	  cannot	  properly	  make	  a	  moral	  decision	  by	  
flipping	  a	  coin.	  	  And	  even	  if	  one	  alleges	  to	  ‘decide	  by	  the	  coin’,	  then	  such	  an	  agent	  is	  
not	  properly	  reasons	  responsive	  in	  the	  way	  that	  grounds	  responsibility.	  	  Neither	  of	  
these	  of	  these	  objections	  are	  that	  convincing,	  however.	  	  It	  may	  well	  be	  that	  the	  
psychopath	  (meta)decided	  that	  for	  his	  own	  amusement	  he	  would	  introduce	  an	  
arbitrary	  system	  to	  ‘decide’	  who	  to	  kill	  or	  not,	  and	  (unlike	  in	  the	  book)	  make	  his	  
victims	  aware	  that	  their	  life	  hangs	  in	  the	  arbitrary	  balance	  for	  his	  morally	  insulated	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amusement	  (since	  he	  can’t	  control	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  toss).	  	  Why	  the	  structure	  of	  
this	  decision	  to	  harm	  others	  fails	  to	  qualify	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  acting	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  
the	  moral	  appraisal	  of	  others	  is	  perplexing	  to	  me.	  	  It	  seems	  more	  like	  psychopathic	  
wholeheartedness.	  	  The	  insertion	  of	  the	  coin	  by	  the	  psychopath	  is	  intentional	  so	  that	  
he	  can	  rationalize	  (in	  the	  psychoanalytic	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  not	  the	  epistemic	  sense)	  
his	  evasion	  of	  responsibility.	  	  His	  ill	  will	  toward	  others	  does	  not	  simply	  evaporate	  
into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  structure	  than	  he	  deliberately	  instituted.	  	  It	  is	  manifest	  in	  
his	  carrying	  out	  the	  verdict	  called	  for	  by	  the	  coin.	  	  This	  is	  one	  example	  of	  
instrumental	  aggression	  (deliberate	  and	  sangfroid	  as	  opposed	  to	  reactive	  and	  
impulsive	  aggression)	  that	  was	  identified	  in	  chapter	  1.	  
Reason	  five,	  “I	  mugged	  her	  because	  she	  was	  easy	  prey,”	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  
paradigmatic	  psychopathic	  on	  the	  list	  of	  reasons	  above.	  	  It	  is	  a	  practically	  rational	  
reason	  but	  a	  morally	  rebarbative	  one	  all	  the	  same.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  mugging	  
psychopath	  does	  not	  place	  any	  worth	  on	  his	  victim,	  and	  only	  on	  what	  he	  can	  
possibly	  divest	  her	  of,	  does	  very	  little	  by	  way	  of	  mitigating	  the	  wrongness	  of	  his	  
action.	  
Which	  on	  this	  list	  is	  a	  mad	  reason?	  	  I	  suspect	  that	  only	  the	  first	  on	  this	  list	  
represents	  an	  obvious	  exemption	  from	  moral	  responsibility,	  (provided	  we	  are	  
certain	  we	  are	  not	  being	  conned	  or	  duped	  by	  a	  con	  artist	  feigning	  psychosis	  –	  
something	  a	  psychopath	  is	  clever	  enough	  to	  pull	  off,	  by	  the	  way).	  	  Many	  on	  this	  list	  
fail	  to	  be	  anything	  remotely	  on	  the	  level	  of	  an	  agent	  fully	  appreciative	  of	  the	  force	  of	  
moral	  demands,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  2-­‐5	  are	  not	  blameworthy	  reasons	  
because	  they	  are	  mad	  reasons.	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To	  summarize	  the	  picture	  before	  us:	  depending	  on	  which	  among	  these	  reasons	  
we	  think	  are	  bad	  reasons	  and	  which	  are	  mad	  ‘reasons’,	  will	  determine	  our	  
assessment	  of	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  the	  agent	  giving	  these	  reasons.	  	  This	  in	  
turn	  will	  instruct	  our	  normative	  responses	  to	  that	  agent,	  and	  whether	  we	  should	  
blame	  her	  or	  detach	  from	  her,	  or	  impose	  various	  sanctions	  on	  her.	  	  The	  concern	  I	  
raise	  here	  is	  that	  Levy’s	  view	  requires	  us	  to	  lump	  far	  too	  many	  bad	  reasons	  in	  with	  
the	  mad	  reasons.	  	  To	  support	  my	  criticism,	  Levy’s	  view	  (actually,	  cf.	  2010)	  commits	  
us	  to	  including	  welfare	  maximizing	  reasons	  as	  mad	  reasons.	  	  I	  find	  this	  to	  be	  a	  
dangerous	  move	  –	  and	  what	  we	  might	  call	  the	  ‘pathologization	  of	  bad	  moral	  
reasons.’	  	  The	  allegation	  of	  when	  a	  bad	  reason	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  mad	  reason	  
deserves	  much	  more	  careful	  treatment	  it	  ordinarily	  receives.	  	  	  
The	  nature	  of	  moral	  standards	  may	  also	  be	  a	  source	  of	  disagreement	  between	  
me	  and	  Levy.	  	  Perhaps	  an	  analogy	  will	  help.	  	  If	  a	  logic	  student	  learns	  that	  affirming	  
the	  consequent	  is	  a	  valid	  argument	  form,	  just	  because	  she	  fails	  to	  grasp	  her	  mistake	  
and	  continues	  to	  routinely	  affirm	  the	  consequent,	  it	  does	  not	  render	  her	  arguments	  
valid	  or	  otherwise	  free	  from	  scrutiny.	  	  Whatever	  conclusions	  she	  draws	  from	  her	  
arguments	  are	  invalid	  regardless	  of	  her	  grasp.	  To	  reorient	  the	  rules	  of	  inference	  to	  
the	  student’s	  failed	  logic	  is	  to	  pervert	  the	  rules	  to	  suit	  an	  individual	  (or	  even	  for	  the	  
entire	  group	  of	  routine	  consequent	  affirmers).	  	  If	  the	  student	  believes	  that	  affirming	  
the	  consequent	  is	  a	  valid	  form	  because	  her	  logic	  teacher	  taught	  her	  this,	  then	  
perhaps	  he	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  error	  of	  her	  ways,	  but	  he	  can’t	  be	  responsible	  for	  
all	  her	  invalid	  beliefs.	  	  When	  the	  student	  leaves	  the	  classroom	  and	  enters	  the	  world,	  
her	  invalid	  reasoning	  renders	  her	  prone	  to	  judgment,	  maybe	  even	  ridicule	  from	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others	  and	  that	  is	  a	  responsibility	  that	  her	  logic	  teacher	  can’t	  bear,	  unless	  she	  is	  
present	  for	  her	  student’s	  ridiculing,	  grasps	  the	  criticism	  and	  owns	  her	  role	  in	  the	  
problem.	  	  At	  best,	  the	  student	  may	  be	  ajustified	  for	  her	  invalid	  reasoning.	  	  Her	  
reasoning	  is	  bad,	  wrong	  and	  invalid	  but	  we	  may	  still	  attune	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  
set	  her	  straight.	  	  The	  specific	  response	  to	  the	  failed	  logic	  student	  is	  the	  normatively	  
contested	  area	  of	  debate;	  the	  standard	  of	  validity	  is	  not.	  	  I	  suspect	  the	  very	  same	  
thing	  is	  happening	  with	  the	  debate	  over	  psychopaths.	  	  Only,	  rather	  than	  a	  failed	  
‘logic	  agent’,	  psychopaths	  are	  failed	  moral	  agents.	  
But	  are	  the	  standards	  of	  morality	  sufficiently	  like	  the	  rules	  of	  logic	  for	  this	  
analogy	  to	  be	  accurately	  drawn?	  	  As	  for	  a	  comparative	  metaphysics	  of	  the	  two,	  I	  am	  
not	  qualified	  to	  comment.	  	  But	  metaphysical	  parity	  of	  logic	  and	  morality	  is	  not	  the	  
point.	  	  The	  example	  above	  could	  just	  as	  well	  refer	  to	  those	  individuals	  believing	  the	  
earth	  is	  flat.	  Here	  the	  failure	  of	  conceptual	  grasp	  does	  nothing	  to	  nullify	  the	  
epistemic	  error.	  	  So,	  is	  the	  psychopath	  morally	  ajustified	  when	  he	  assaults	  and	  kills?	  	  
No.	  	  The	  consequences	  of	  affirming	  the	  consequent	  are	  relatively	  low	  compared	  
those	  of	  psychopathic	  killing.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  there	  has	  been	  a	  failure	  to	  meet	  the	  
basic	  standards,	  but	  in	  only	  one	  of	  those	  results	  in	  victims.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  
psychopathic	  actions	  produce	  terrible	  moral	  consequences,	  even	  though	  the	  
psychopath	  places	  no	  moral	  weight	  –	  aside	  from	  his	  own	  amusement	  –	  on	  the	  
outcome	  makes	  it	  very	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  we	  should	  exempt	  psychopaths	  from	  
responses	  that	  contain	  moral	  sentiment.	  	  	  
The	  upshot	  of	  this	  section	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  assume	  that	  a	  failure	  of	  action	  
entails	  a	  failure	  of	  grasp,	  nor	  then	  can	  we	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  psychopaths	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flout	  moral	  norms.	  	  Because	  psychopaths	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  weigh	  moral	  values	  does	  
not	  entail	  that	  they	  cannot.	  	  Nor	  do	  we	  need	  them	  to	  for	  that	  matter.	  	  What	  we	  need	  
from	  the	  psychopath	  is	  for	  him	  to	  refrain	  from	  his	  violent	  and	  aggressive	  behavior	  
and,	  in	  so	  much	  as	  this	  occurs,	  he	  may	  be	  morally	  improving.	  	  (Later	  in	  chapter	  4,	  I	  
entertain	  the	  objection	  that	  a	  ‘reduction	  of	  symptoms’	  is	  not	  what	  we	  have	  in	  mind	  
by	  moral	  improvement.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  idea.)	  
Furthermore,	  the	  over	  emphasis	  on	  providing	  adequate	  causal	  accounts	  of	  
psychopathic	  actions	  distracts	  us	  from	  taking	  up	  the	  task	  of	  setting	  the	  norms	  for	  
properly	  responding	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  Since	  the	  task	  of	  putting	  to	  rest	  
the	  allegedly	  factual	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  psychopath	  is	  responsible	  remains	  
an	  unresolved	  debate,	  it	  makes	  some	  sense,	  if	  not	  at	  least	  to	  relieve	  ourselves	  from	  
the	  strain	  of	  inquiry,	  to	  take	  up	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  
psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  In	  the	  following	  section	  I	  summarize	  and	  then	  criticize	  
the	  response	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  that	  is	  suggested	  by	  Levy,	  specifically	  that	  
he	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  cost,	  perhaps	  even	  the	  harm	  that	  his	  response	  entails.	  	  	  
	  
	  
3.4.1	  Levy’s	  inversion	  
	  
For	  as	  much	  attention	  to	  detail	  that	  Levy	  pays	  to	  the	  (allegedly)	  factual	  
question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  psychopath	  is	  responsible,	  his	  account	  is	  not	  equally	  
careful	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  
Levy	  does	  not	  attend	  closely	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  should	  hold	  psychopaths	  
responsible	  because	  he	  is	  focused	  on	  first	  answering	  what	  he	  takes	  to	  be	  the	  factual	  
question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  psychopath	  ‘is’	  responsible.	  	  On	  my	  view,	  the	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response	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  that	  does	  emerge	  from	  Levy	  (as	  an	  
afterthought)	  is	  morally	  problematic.	  	  Thus,	  I	  focus	  in	  detail	  on	  Levy’s	  suggested	  
response	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  below.	  	  I	  first	  provide	  some	  context	  with	  
respect	  to	  three	  senses	  of	  ‘holding	  responsible’	  to	  situate	  Levy’s	  view	  and	  my	  
criticism	  of	  it.	  	  	  
Fisher	  and	  Tognazzinni	  (2013)	  claim	  that	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  be	  morally	  
responsible	  for	  an	  act	  or	  omission	  results	  in	  ‘opening’	  them	  to	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
of	  others,	  and	  perhaps	  as	  well,	  to	  ‘suffering	  and	  sanctions.’	  	  To	  be	  ‘open’	  in	  this	  way	  
can	  have	  (at	  least)	  two	  senses.	  	  The	  first	  sense	  is	  that	  one	  is	  open	  to	  responses	  of	  
others.	  	  The	  opening	  is	  provided	  to	  the	  potential	  blamers,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  
they	  avail	  themselves	  of	  the	  opportunity.	  	  The	  second	  sense	  refers	  to	  the	  sense	  in	  
which	  the	  offender	  is	  herself	  open,	  or	  receptive,	  to	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  or	  suffering	  
and	  sanctions	  when	  they	  are	  enforced.	  	  (Note:	  This	  second	  sense	  is,	  I	  suspect,	  what	  
Watson	  means	  by	  the	  second	  ‘face’	  of	  responsibility,	  ‘answerability.’	  	  I	  am	  not	  
entirely	  clear	  if	  the	  first	  sense	  of	  ‘open’	  identified	  above	  is	  what	  Watson	  means	  by	  
the	  first	  ‘face’	  of	  responsibility,	  ‘accountability.’	  	  I	  think	  it	  is	  close	  in	  meaning	  but	  
needs	  added	  to	  it	  the	  account	  of	  responsibility	  known	  as	  ‘attributionism’,	  in	  which	  
case	  a	  person	  is	  responsible	  only	  if	  we	  can	  attribute	  the	  act	  or	  omission	  to	  her	  –	  to	  
her	  person,	  self,	  etc.)	  	  It	  is	  this	  second	  sense	  of	  opening,	  in	  which	  the	  offender	  is	  
either,	  broadly	  speaking,	  conciliatory	  for	  the	  wrongs	  she	  is	  being	  called	  out	  for	  
committing,	  or	  rather,	  she	  remains	  steadfast,	  defiant	  or	  defensive	  in	  owning	  up	  to	  
the	  wrong	  she	  did.	  	  When	  all	  goes	  right,	  offenders	  apologize	  for	  the	  wrong	  they	  have	  
done	  and	  the	  consequences	  other	  suffered	  as	  a	  result;	  here	  responsibility	  is	  ‘taken’	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or	  ‘owned.’	  	  This	  does	  not	  occur	  with	  psychopaths,	  however,	  as	  this	  openness	  is	  not	  
to	  be	  found.	  	  (Despite	  the	  evidence	  offered	  by	  Levy,	  we	  still	  do	  not	  know	  why	  
psychopaths	  are	  this	  way.	  	  We	  only	  know	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  this	  way.)	  	  The	  
nature	  of	  this	  absence	  of	  openness	  is	  what	  is	  so	  polarizing	  about	  psychopathic	  
responsibility.	  	  To	  some	  this	  lack	  of	  openness	  represents	  a	  willful	  refusal	  to	  
acknowledge	  responsibility	  for	  wrongdoing	  arising	  out	  of	  an	  entrenched	  
intransigence.	  	  Yet	  to	  others,	  specifically	  Levy,	  this	  absence	  of	  openness	  shows	  that	  
psychopaths	  lack	  moral	  sense,	  moral	  understanding,	  and	  likely	  the	  neural	  structure	  
necessary	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  
The	  focus	  of	  this	  section	  is	  primarily	  on	  the	  first	  sense	  of	  openness,	  in	  which	  
case	  we	  must	  give	  an	  account,	  or	  justify,	  our	  responses	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  
In	  chapter	  3	  we	  distinguished	  between	  holding	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  expressing	  
those	  attitudes	  in	  response	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  We	  have	  not	  so	  far	  said	  
much	  about	  a	  third	  type	  of	  response	  in	  the	  form	  of	  negative	  consequences,	  including	  
punishment,	  detention,	  or	  more	  generally,	  to	  bring	  suffering	  and	  sanctions	  to	  the	  
wrongdoing	  psychopath.	  	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  on	  Levy’s	  view,	  only	  the	  last	  on	  this	  list	  is	  
a	  justified	  response	  to	  wrongdoing	  psychopaths.	  	  After	  summarizing	  Levy’s	  view	  I	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3.4.2	  Levy’s	  response	  to	  wrongdoing	  psychopaths	  
	  
Consider	  the	  following	  claims	  made	  by	  Levy:	  	  	  
“In	  my	  view,	  an	  agent	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  action	  just	  in	  case	  he	  or	  she	  
deserves	  to	  be	  treated	  in	  certain	  ways	  in	  virtue	  of	  her	  having	  performed	  that	  
action.”	  (2007a,	  p.133)	  
“Holding	  psychopaths	  responsible	  imposes	  moral	  costs.	  	  It	  requires	  us	  to	  treat	  
agents	  in	  ways	  they	  do	  not	  deserve.”	  	  
(2007b,	  p.	  134)	  
“We	  can	  excuse	  the	  psychopath	  for	  her	  wrongdoing,	  without	  being	  committed	  to	  
releasing	  her	  to	  offend	  again.”	  (2007a,	  p.	  136)	  	  
	  
I	  respond	  to	  each	  individual	  claim	  and	  then	  criticize	  what	  I	  call	  the	  Levy	  
inversion	  (although	  he	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  holding	  this	  view).51	  	  	  
	   With	  respect	  to	  the	  first	  claim,	  I	  simply	  want	  to	  note	  how	  this	  claim	  connects	  
to	  another	  claim	  of	  Levy’s	  that	  we	  can	  resolve	  the	  question	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  
empirically	  and	  without	  reliance	  on	  moral	  philosophy.52	  	  This	  claim	  shows,	  
however,	  how	  much	  Levy	  relies	  on	  the	  specifically	  moral	  notion	  of	  desert	  in	  forming	  
his	  response	  to	  wrongdoing	  psychopaths.	  	  Since	  I	  will	  argue	  later	  (chapter	  4.5)	  in	  
this	  dissertation	  that	  the	  common	  view	  places	  too	  much	  emphasis	  on	  history	  (as	  a	  
reactandum	  alleged	  to	  be	  of	  paramount	  consideration),	  and	  since	  the	  moral	  notion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Strawson	  (1993),	  Watson	  (1993),	  Fisher	  and	  Ravizza	  (1998),	  Fisher	  and	  
Tognazzini	  (2013),	  Benn	  (1999)	  
52	  Levy	  (2007b)	  fn.	  5	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of	  desert	  shares	  the	  same	  historical	  focus,	  it	  follows	  that	  my	  view	  likewise	  resists	  
emphasizing	  an	  historic	  laden	  notion	  of	  desert	  in	  judging	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  
an	  agent.	  	  A	  critical	  analysis	  of	  desert	  would	  take	  us	  too	  far	  afield,	  but	  suffice	  it	  so	  
say	  that	  the	  spirit	  of	  my	  objection	  is	  that	  future	  considerations	  should	  factor	  into	  
our	  concept	  of	  desert	  as	  well.	  	  (Levy’s	  use	  of	  desert	  is	  itself	  under-­‐described.)	  	  It	  is	  
not	  clear,	  however,	  that	  psychopaths	  deserve	  to	  be	  detained	  indefinitely	  nor	  that	  
they	  deserve	  to	  be	  approached	  merely	  from	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  Perhaps	  
psychopaths	  do	  deserve	  to	  be	  blamed	  but	  we	  are	  not	  yet	  in	  a	  position	  commit	  to	  this	  
claim.	  	  	  
Claim	  two	  and	  three	  paired	  together	  is,	  in	  my	  view,	  rather	  astounding.	  	  To	  
repeat	  Levy,	  “[h]olding	  psychopaths	  responsible	  imposes	  moral	  costs,”	  (author’s	  
emphasis).	  	  And,	  “[w]e	  can	  excuse	  the	  psychopath	  for	  her	  wrongdoing,	  without	  
being	  committed	  to	  releasing	  her	  to	  offend	  again.”	  	  Why	  this	  pair	  of	  claims	  is	  
astounding	  arises	  from	  Levy’s	  other	  claims	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  both	  a	  
developmental	  and	  terminal	  disease.	  	  On	  Levy’s	  view,	  to	  make	  moral	  demands	  of	  
psychopaths	  is	  wrong	  because	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  an	  “option	  that	  will	  always	  be	  
closed	  off	  to	  her,”	  (2007b,	  137).	  	  Levy	  takes	  great	  pains	  to	  establish	  that	  
psychopaths	  possess	  nothing	  in	  the	  way	  of	  moral	  capacity.	  	  I	  myself	  cannot	  reconcile	  
the	  two	  competing	  notions.	  	  	  
Levy	  assumes	  that	  to	  hold	  persons	  responsible	  in	  general	  is	  to	  exact	  a	  moral	  
cost.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  also	  assumed	  that	  we	  have	  only	  successfully	  held	  an	  individual	  
responsible	  if	  that	  person	  accepts	  or	  takes	  responsibility	  for	  their	  wrongdoing.	  	  This	  
imbues	  the	  practice	  of	  holding	  responsible	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  emotional	  commerce.	  	  There	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are	  serious	  problems	  with	  such	  an	  approach.	  (See	  Nietzsche’s	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  
Morals	  for	  attacking	  our	  moral	  practices	  because	  they	  center	  on	  resentment	  and	  the	  
desire	  to	  make	  others	  pay.)	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  assumes	  something	  that	  is	  rather	  
contrary	  to	  Levy’s	  insistence	  that	  psychopaths	  thoroughly	  lack	  moral	  knowledge	  
and	  moral	  sense,	  and	  that	  is	  if	  we	  are	  imposing	  a	  moral	  cost	  on	  the	  psychopath	  then	  
he	  must	  be	  paying	  emotionally,	  or	  in	  some	  other	  sense.	  	  For	  if	  the	  psychopath’s	  
moral	  account	  is	  bankrupt,	  as	  the	  common	  view	  insists,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  moral	  
currency	  with	  which	  to	  pay.	  	  Hence,	  no	  moral	  cost	  can	  be	  exacted	  from	  an	  agent	  
whose	  agency	  is	  already	  devoid	  of	  morality.	  	  This	  worry	  cannot,	  on	  pain	  of	  
consistency,	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  Levy’s	  view.	  	  But	  it	  can	  represent	  a	  problem	  for	  my	  
view,	  however.	  
Since	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  remains	  something	  within	  the	  psychology	  of	  the	  
psychopath	  that	  can	  impose	  a	  moral	  cost,	  then	  my	  view	  is	  immediately	  faced	  with	  
justifying	  whatever	  moral	  cost	  is	  actually	  imposed	  on	  the	  psychopath.	  	  I	  think	  we	  
can.	  	  Given	  his	  relative	  insensitivity,	  we	  are	  less	  in	  a	  position	  to	  morally	  harm	  the	  
psychopath	  than	  we	  are	  to	  morally	  harm	  a	  non-­‐psychopath	  when	  we	  affectively	  
express	  blame	  toward	  them	  (and	  not	  their	  behavior	  or	  their	  reasons).	  	  In	  fact,	  don’t	  
we	  desire	  to	  impose	  a	  moral	  cost	  on	  the	  wrongdoing	  psychopath?	  	  His	  paying	  up	  
represents	  an	  ideal	  result.	  	  	  
On	  my	  view,	  Levy	  must	  forfeit	  one	  of	  the	  following	  two	  claims.	  	  Either	  he	  
must	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  psychopath	  is	  not	  as	  morally	  blind	  as	  he	  portrays	  (and	  
he	  must	  admit,	  on	  pain	  of	  evidence,	  that	  psychopathy	  is	  not	  terminal;	  most	  simply	  
‘get	  better’	  around	  age	  forty).	  	  Or	  he	  must	  acknowledge	  that	  blaming	  psychopaths	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harms	  them	  by	  exacting	  a	  moral	  cost.	  	  For	  if	  there	  is	  no	  cost	  to	  exact	  then	  there	  is	  no	  
moral	  currency	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  psychopath’s	  psychology.	  
	   It	  may	  be	  that	  we	  can	  morally	  harm	  non-­‐moral	  agents	  without	  them	  being	  
aware	  of	  the	  harm	  that	  is	  done	  to	  them.	  	  We	  morally	  harm	  animals	  when	  we	  factory	  
farm	  them,	  but	  to	  say	  that	  they	  are	  aware	  that	  the	  harm	  being	  done	  to	  them	  is	  a	  
specifically	  moral	  harm	  seems	  odd.	  	  Perhaps	  all	  harms	  done	  in	  the	  slaughterhouse	  
are	  moral	  harms.	  	  To	  the	  point,	  if	  as	  Levy	  suggests,	  psychopaths	  are	  non-­‐moral	  
agents	  whom	  we	  can	  nonetheless	  morally	  harm,	  can	  we	  morally	  harm	  psychopaths	  
by	  indefinitely	  detaining	  them?	  	  Or,	  by	  confining	  them	  to	  solitary	  housing	  units	  even	  
within	  prison?	  	  Mentally	  ill	  inmates	  (particularly	  the	  violently	  ill)	  occupy	  more	  than	  
their	  fair	  share	  of	  solitary	  units.	  	  The	  evidence	  of	  the	  psychological	  harm	  of	  solitary	  
confinement	  speaks	  to	  the	  moral	  problem	  of	  detention,	  which	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  
among	  Levy’s	  consideration.	  	  I	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  view	  that	  imprisoning	  or	  
otherwise	  detaining	  someone	  –	  even	  for	  a	  finite	  period,	  let	  alone	  indefinitely	  –	  does	  
not	  exact	  a	  moral	  cost.	  	  In	  fact,	  a	  prison	  sentence	  often	  carries	  with	  it	  the	  intent,	  by	  
reason	  d’état,	  to	  exact	  a	  moral	  cost.	  	  And	  not	  only	  does	  imprisonment	  exact	  a	  moral	  
cost	  from	  individual	  offenders	  (‘the	  guilty	  must	  pay!’),	  it	  exacts	  all	  sorts	  of	  costs	  
(financial,	  psychological,	  emotional	  and	  moral)	  from	  the	  family	  members	  of	  
offenders	  as	  well	  as	  society	  at	  large.	  	  	  
Perhaps	  we	  justify	  detaining	  the	  psychopath	  by	  drawing	  a	  quarantine	  
analogy.	  	  The	  quarantine	  analogy	  is	  problematic	  because	  it	  commits	  us	  to	  the	  
prevention	  of	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  response	  to	  it.	  	  Can	  we	  
justify	  preventive	  detention	  of	  psychopaths?	  	  Consider	  the	  neurologist	  researcher	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who	  discovered	  that	  images	  of	  his	  own	  brain	  revealed	  that	  he	  too	  is	  a	  psychopath	  –	  
only	  one	  whom	  has	  never	  behaved	  psychopathically.	  	  If	  we	  were	  serious	  about	  the	  
quarantine	  analogy	  we	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  round	  up	  all	  individuals	  whose	  fMRI	  
fit	  the	  profile	  and	  detain	  them,	  only	  this	  time	  our	  refraining	  from	  blame	  is	  
appropriate.	  	  Detaining	  psychopaths	  who	  have	  done	  no	  wrong	  is	  not	  morally	  
justifiable,	  however.	  	  (Besides,	  the	  evidence	  that	  ‘non	  offending’	  psychopaths	  exist	  
appears	  to	  present	  serious	  counter-­‐evidence	  to	  the	  common	  view’s	  account	  of	  the	  
psychopath	  –	  as	  an	  individual	  determined	  to	  harm	  others.	  	  I	  think	  this	  suggests	  that,	  
despite	  all	  the	  evidence	  from	  fMRI,	  the	  continued	  inclusion	  of	  psychopathy	  among	  
the	  list	  of	  mental	  illnesses	  should	  be	  seriously	  reconsidered.)	  
Levy’s	  inverted	  approach	  sees	  blaming	  the	  psychopath	  as	  a	  more	  severe	  
moral	  offense	  than	  indefinite	  detention.	  	  But	  we	  typically	  we	  think	  that	  affective	  
expressions	  of	  blame	  interfere	  less	  with	  a	  wrongdoer’s	  autonomy	  than	  physical	  
incarceration.	  	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  affectively	  blame	  someone	  for	  her	  wrongdoing,	  
(whether	  that	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  censure	  or	  a	  harsher	  condemnation,	  for	  instance),	  
but	  it	  is	  quite	  another	  to	  restrict	  a	  person’s	  liberty	  of	  movement	  by	  isolating	  them	  in	  
prison.	  	  And	  since	  psychopaths	  are	  so	  interpersonally	  (and	  morally)	  calloused,	  it	  is	  
very	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  a	  verbal	  expression	  of	  blame	  can	  do	  any	  harm	  to	  a	  
psychopath,	  let	  alone	  a	  moral	  harm.	  	  Even	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  blaming	  psychopath	  
does	  indeed	  morally	  harm	  them,	  and	  since	  we	  want	  to	  harm	  non-­‐psychopaths	  when	  
we	  blame	  them,	  then	  psychopaths	  and	  non-­‐psychopaths	  appear	  have	  more	  in	  
common	  than	  the	  common	  view	  acknowledges.	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I	  want	  to	  pause	  momentarily	  in	  order	  to	  briefly	  query	  what	  is	  ‘in’	  a	  blame	  
that	  is	  so	  worrisome	  to	  some	  philosophers.	  	  Clearly	  Levy	  places	  considerable	  weight	  
on	  the	  act	  and	  attitude	  of	  blaming.	  	  Though	  he	  says	  little	  about	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  
blame,	  we	  might	  infer	  that	  it	  is	  infused	  with	  the	  paradigmatic	  attitude	  of	  resentment	  
and	  it	  is	  the	  resentful	  attitude	  of	  the	  offended	  party	  that	  is	  alleged	  to	  morally	  harm	  
the	  offending	  party.	  	  Nietzsche	  warns	  us	  that	  resentment	  is	  most	  harmful	  to	  the	  
resenter.	  	  (Perhaps	  this	  is	  why	  we	  appear	  so	  ready	  to	  give	  it	  away.)	  	  Consider	  
Watson’s	  (1996)	  preferred	  response	  to	  psychopaths:	  ‘we	  can	  fight	  the	  psychopath,	  
and	  call	  him	  a	  ‘son	  of	  a	  bitch’	  among	  other	  things,	  but	  we	  can’t	  reason	  with	  him	  in	  
the	  way	  we	  can	  morally	  responsible	  agents.’	  	  I	  suppose	  Levy	  would	  not	  include	  
fisticuffs	  and	  swearing	  among	  the	  list	  of	  morally	  harmful	  responses.	  	  Quite	  aside	  
from	  the	  common	  view’s	  limited	  range	  of	  moral	  harms,	  this	  view	  begs	  the	  question	  
that	  a	  person	  is	  reasonable	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  morality.	  	  Racists	  and	  
misogynists	  are	  unreasonable	  too	  and	  we	  see	  them	  as	  paradigmatically	  failed	  moral	  
agents	  whom	  are	  nonetheless	  blameworthy	  for	  the	  state	  of	  their	  moral	  character	  as	  
well	  as	  for	  individual	  actions.	  	  Once	  we	  remove	  medical	  content	  from	  the	  label	  
‘psychopath’	  that	  we	  began	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  persistently	  aggressive	  wrongdoer	  
(Cleckley,	  1955)	  then	  we	  have	  before	  us	  even	  more	  of	  a	  failed	  agent	  than	  a	  racist,	  
though	  psychopaths	  do	  come	  in	  racist	  and	  misogynist	  varieties.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  very	  first	  
case	  of	  a	  psychopath	  documented	  by	  Cleckley	  is	  of	  a	  misogynistic	  domestic	  abuser	  
that	  he	  wrongly	  labels	  a	  ‘psychopath’	  (because	  he	  felt	  the	  field	  was	  in	  need	  of	  this	  
clinical	  title).	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3.5	  Conclusion	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  criticized	  Levy’s	  thesis	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  in	  fact	  
responsible	  and	  accordingly,	  should	  not	  be	  held	  responsible.	  	  I	  began	  (in	  chapter	  1)	  
by	  epistemically	  disputing	  Levy’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  empirical	  evidence,	  and	  
furthermore,	  revealed	  how	  and	  where	  Levy’s	  analysis	  mistakes,	  perhaps	  substitutes,	  
factual	  evidence	  for	  normative	  evaluation	  (specifically	  in	  his	  assessment	  of	  the	  
trolley	  problem)	  and	  how	  a	  controversial	  reason	  is	  thereby	  reframed	  as	  a	  
pathological	  reason.	  	  I	  then	  turned	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  
wrongdoing	  psychopaths	  and	  criticized	  Levy’s	  response	  as	  unduly	  inverted.	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Chapter	  4:	  Beyond	  the	  common	  view	  	  	  
4.1	  Introduction	  
	   	  
I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  that,	  with	  respect	  to	  psychopaths	  and	  other	  
type	  2	  agents,	  the	  common	  view	  recognizes	  only	  one	  way	  of	  going	  wrong	  when	  we	  
(mistakenly)	  attempt	  to	  hold	  these	  agents	  responsible	  and	  that	  is	  that	  we	  
inappropriately	  hold	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  them.	  	  I	  also	  argued	  that	  this	  
results	  in	  proponents	  of	  the	  common	  view	  overlooking	  the	  moral	  downside	  of	  
retreating	  to	  the	  default	  objective	  view.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  resources	  that	  the	  
objective	  view	  provide	  is	  assessed	  from	  the	  common	  view	  exclusively	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  offended	  party.	  	  It	  likely	  does	  not	  seem	  like	  such	  a	  great	  resource	  to	  those	  being	  
managed,	  manipulated	  and	  controlled,	  however.	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  common	  view	  
assume	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  objective	  view	  as	  a	  resource	  specifically	  for	  the	  
offending	  party	  comes	  by	  way	  of	  providing	  a	  kind	  of	  protection	  from	  blame	  and	  
resentment.	  	  (This	  is	  Strawson’s	  position	  by	  default;	  Levy	  argues	  specifically	  for	  this	  
claim,	  however.)53	  	  The	  value	  of	  the	  objective	  view	  is	  not	  analyzed	  independently	  or	  
in	  much	  detail,	  and	  its	  value	  is	  assessed	  only	  in	  how	  it	  is	  not	  like	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes.	  	  I	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  objective	  view	  have	  more	  in	  
common	  than	  Strawson	  recognizes	  and	  then	  raised	  some	  concerns	  with	  the	  
objective	  view,	  including	  the	  tendency	  to	  perpetuate,	  and	  even	  reinforce,	  the	  
alienation	  of	  type	  2	  agents.	  	  The	  starkness	  of	  Strawson’s	  distinction,	  between	  the	  
reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view,	  specifically	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Levy	  2007a,	  2007	  b	  
	   122	  
application	  to	  the	  ‘moral	  idiot,’	  requires	  us	  to	  seek	  new	  options	  for	  responding	  to	  
psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  that,	  ideally,	  make	  the	  best	  of	  what	  both	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes	  and	  objective	  view	  have	  to	  offer.	  	  	  
Accordingly,	  this	  chapter	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  conceptually	  map	  out	  some	  new	  
options	  for	  responding	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  This	  task	  is	  not	  merely	  to	  seek	  
out	  new	  options	  but	  also	  to	  explicate	  the	  rationale	  for	  a	  better	  response	  to	  
psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  than	  offered	  by	  the	  common	  view.	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  
chapter	  attempts	  to	  provide	  something	  missing	  from	  the	  common	  view	  and	  that	  is	  
to	  articulate	  our	  responses	  in	  more	  detailed	  and	  operationalized	  form,	  for	  moral	  
language	  is	  often	  bewitching.	  	  For	  example,	  consider	  the	  phrase,	  ‘we	  should	  not	  hold	  
the	  psychopath	  responsible.’	  	  This	  is	  far	  too	  nebulous	  to	  provide	  much	  at	  all	  in	  the	  
way	  of	  informing	  our	  responses,	  neither	  internally	  (intrapsychologically)	  nor	  
externally	  (in	  terms	  of	  our	  behavior).	  	  To	  be	  fair	  to	  philosophers	  arguing	  to	  exempt	  
psychopaths	  from	  responsibility,	  the	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  what	  psychopaths	  are	  
alleged	  to	  lack	  in	  their	  moral	  psychology	  are	  discussed	  in	  great	  and	  insightful	  detail.	  	  
Not	  so,	  however,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  details	  regarding	  our	  responses	  to	  psychopathic	  
wrongdoing.	  	  What	  philosophers	  do	  provide,	  often	  as	  afterthoughts,	  are	  two	  general	  
tactics	  that	  we	  first,	  refrain	  from	  blaming	  psychopaths,	  and	  second,	  that	  we	  lock	  
them	  away	  indefinitely.	  	  However,	  silence	  and	  isolation	  are	  two	  morally	  debatable	  
policies.	  	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  morally	  superior	  options	  to	  holding	  psychopaths	  
responsible.	  	  
To	  begin,	  I	  return	  to	  a	  distinction	  drawn	  at	  the	  close	  of	  chapter	  2	  between	  
reactans	  (our	  reactions)	  and	  reactandum	  (what	  our	  reactions	  map	  onto).	  	  The	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preceding	  discussion	  of	  Strawson	  afforded	  an	  initial	  but	  not	  complete	  survey	  of	  
reactans,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  broad	  distinction	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  
the	  objective	  view.	  	  To	  fill	  in	  this	  discussion	  with	  more	  detailed	  options,	  two	  broad	  
candidates	  of	  reactans	  are	  offered	  below:	  the	  holding	  of	  attitudes	  as	  
intrapsychological	  states	  that	  are	  distinct	  from	  the	  expressing	  of	  attitudes	  as	  
interpersonal	  exchange.	  	  (Discussion	  of	  a	  third	  response	  to	  psychopathic	  
wrongdoing,	  the	  enactment	  of	  consequences,	  including	  punishment,	  is	  postponed	  in	  
order	  to	  focus	  more	  closely	  on	  distinguishing	  holding	  and	  expressing	  the	  reactive	  
attitudes.)	  	  After	  discussing	  two	  candidates	  of	  reactans,	  I	  turn	  to	  mark	  a	  distinction	  
of	  reactanda	  that	  is	  overlooked	  by	  the	  common	  view.	  	  This	  will	  highlight	  both	  the	  
shortfall	  of	  the	  common	  view	  while	  simultaneously	  revealing	  an	  option	  for	  holding	  
psychopaths	  responsible	  in	  a	  way	  that	  addresses	  a	  legitimate	  concern	  that	  arises	  
from	  the	  common	  view.	  	  If	  philosophers	  want	  to	  do	  right	  by	  the	  psychopath,	  as	  
common	  viewers	  plainly	  claim	  to	  wish,	  we	  need	  an	  option	  that	  calls	  for	  more	  than	  
the	  common	  view	  conclusion	  of	  detachment	  and	  isolation.	  	  	  
With	  a	  more	  detailed	  structure	  of	  both	  reactans	  and	  reactanda	  in	  place	  we	  
can	  see	  both	  where	  and	  how	  the	  common	  view	  is	  limited.	  	  (Strawson	  and	  Levy	  use	  
the	  notions	  of	  holding	  and	  expressing	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  interchangeably,	  
making	  it	  unclear,	  for	  instance,	  how	  our	  resentment	  should,	  if	  at	  all,	  show	  itself	  to	  
the	  offending	  psychopath.	  	  Watson,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  provides	  interesting	  detail	  
about	  how	  our	  attitudes	  might	  unfold	  as	  we	  learn	  about	  Richard	  Harris’	  deeds	  and	  
then	  his	  personal	  history.	  	  Albeit	  improved	  detail	  from	  Watson,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  our	  
reactive	  attitudes	  can	  be	  more	  nimble	  than	  even	  he	  acknowledges.)	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4.2	  Two	  types	  of	  reactans:	  holding	  and	  expressing	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  	  
	  
When	  organizing	  types	  of	  reactans	  the	  most	  general	  distinction,	  following	  
Strawson’s	  schema,	  is	  drawn	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  objective	  view.	  	  
(I	  have	  already	  argued	  that	  this	  distinction	  is	  too	  starkly	  applied	  to	  psychopaths.	  	  
Also,	  I	  raised	  concerns	  about	  using	  psychopaths	  as	  a	  tool	  designed	  to	  illustrate	  this	  
distinction.)	  	  In	  this	  section,	  however,	  I	  am	  more	  interested	  in	  further	  distinctions	  of	  
reactive	  attitudes	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  on	  a	  middle	  level,	  above	  that	  of	  distinguishing	  
particular,	  or	  token,	  attitudes	  such	  as	  resentment	  or	  gratitude.	  	  	  	  
We	  can	  distinguish	  holding	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  from	  expressing	  them	  in	  our	  
practices	  of	  holding	  others	  responsible.	  (We	  will	  ignore	  the	  third	  category	  of	  
consequences	  for	  the	  time	  being.)	  	  When	  we	  speak	  of	  holding	  a	  reactive	  attitude	  we	  
are	  describing	  an	  internal	  (intrapsychological)	  state	  that	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  fluid	  
combination	  of	  doxastic	  attitude	  coupled	  with	  an	  emotional	  attitude.	  	  Our	  belief	  that	  
we	  have	  been	  wronged	  corresponds	  with	  some	  emotional	  attitude,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  
(Unfortunately,	  resentment	  is	  the	  paradigmatic	  attitude	  frequently	  cited	  in	  the	  
literature,	  but	  as	  noted,	  may	  be	  a	  poor	  standard	  to	  guide	  us	  in	  our	  theorizing	  about	  
the	  nature	  of	  responsibility).	  	  Though	  often	  a	  bare	  reflection	  of	  the	  internal	  attitude	  
we	  hold,	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  attitudes	  can	  be	  markedly	  different	  than	  the	  holding	  of	  
an	  attitude.	  	  Perhaps	  our	  expressions	  should	  be	  different	  than	  our	  holdings.	  	  (I	  will	  
first	  explain	  the	  ways	  these	  can	  differ	  before	  defending	  the	  claim	  that	  they	  should	  
differ,	  specifically	  with	  respect	  to	  psychopaths.)	  
	   125	  
When	  drawing	  this	  distinction,	  in	  both	  theory	  and	  practice,	  we	  must	  
maintain	  vigilant	  awareness	  of	  the	  gap	  that	  occurs	  between	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
we	  hold	  internally	  and	  how	  they	  are	  revised	  when	  expressed.	  	  We	  must	  balance	  the	  
practical	  gains	  we	  seek	  in	  our	  expressions	  with	  remaining	  genuine	  to	  the	  attitudes	  
underlying	  them.	  	  (Perhaps	  the	  genuineness	  to	  which	  I	  refer	  maintains	  what	  
Strawson	  calls	  the	  ‘vital	  thing’	  that	  is	  contained	  in	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  that	  points	  
us	  to	  moral	  responsibility,	  and	  that	  which	  he	  takes	  to	  be	  unaccounted	  for	  when	  
taking	  up	  the	  objective	  view	  and	  considering	  the	  social	  utility	  of	  the	  attitudes.)	  	  We	  
need	  not	  be	  overly	  concerned,	  however,	  that	  the	  wider	  the	  gap	  between	  holding	  and	  
expressing	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  necessarily	  entails	  that	  we	  are	  moving	  out	  of	  the	  
domain	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  distinction	  between	  holding	  and	  
expressing	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  is	  specifically	  important	  for	  informing	  our	  
responses	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  	  
A	  further	  distinction	  with	  perhaps	  even	  more	  importance	  is	  one	  that	  is	  
drawn	  by	  mental	  health	  professionals	  between	  affective	  and	  non-­‐affective	  reactive	  
attitudes.54	  	  My	  use	  of	  ‘affective’	  here	  follows	  the	  clinical	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  as	  
describing	  an	  individual’s	  emotional	  state	  and	  the	  relative	  passion	  or	  depth	  of	  that	  
state	  as	  it	  is	  embodied.	  	  For	  example,	  ‘the	  anhedonic	  exhibit	  a	  flat	  affect.’	  	  More	  to	  
the	  point,	  we	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  engage	  in	  affective	  blame,	  and	  this	  comes	  in	  
relatively	  charged	  degrees.	  	  I	  want	  to	  pause	  at	  this	  point	  to	  note	  that	  on	  my	  
understanding	  of	  the	  common	  view,	  it	  is	  this	  particular	  subtype	  of	  reactans	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  This	  distinction	  is	  common	  in	  clinician	  use.	  	  See	  Hannah	  Pickard’s	  (2008)	  use	  of	  
the	  terms	  ‘affective	  and	  non-­‐affective	  blame’	  in	  her	  approach	  to	  working	  with	  
individuals	  diagnosed	  with	  personality	  disorders.	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common	  viewers	  take	  to	  be	  the	  exclusive	  domain	  of	  the	  language	  of	  moral	  
responsibility.	  	  So,	  when	  common	  view	  instructs	  that	  we	  ‘should	  not	  hold	  
psychopaths	  responsible,’	  what	  is	  meant	  is	  that	  we	  ‘should	  not	  blame	  them.’	  	  On	  my	  
understanding	  it	  is	  this	  specific	  domain	  of	  expressing	  affective	  reactive	  attitudes	  that	  
we	  are	  warned	  to	  avoid.	  	  I	  return	  to	  this	  point	  shortly	  to	  crystallize	  my	  objection	  to	  
the	  common	  view	  that	  this	  is	  an	  overly	  narrow	  approach	  to	  holding	  responsible.	  	  	  
We	  might	  issue	  instead,	  a	  non-­affective	  expression	  of	  a	  given	  attitude.	  	  To	  imagine	  
this,	  we	  must	  first	  purge	  ourselves	  of	  the	  paradigmatic	  ‘go	  to’	  attitudes	  of	  blame	  and	  
resentment,	  otherwise	  the	  incoherent	  idea	  of	  non-­‐emotional	  resentment	  prevents	  
us	  from	  considering	  alternatives.	  	  Rather,	  issuing	  moral	  demands	  can	  be	  done	  
absent	  the	  heightened	  level	  of	  affective	  content	  that	  Levy	  and	  others	  assume	  must	  
accompany	  all	  form	  of	  ‘holding	  responsible.’	  	  Our	  concern	  here	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  
underlying	  reactive	  attitude	  that	  is	  actually	  held	  as	  it	  is	  with	  the	  manner	  that	  that	  
attitude	  is	  expressed	  qua	  a	  moral	  demand.	  	  	  
Summarizing	  these	  distinctions	  then,	  we	  have	  the	  general	  distinction	  
between	  the	  reactive	  attitude	  and	  the	  objective	  view;	  under	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
we	  have	  the	  internal	  holding	  of	  the	  attitudes	  that	  are	  distinct	  from	  external	  
expression	  of	  the	  attitudes;	  and	  under	  each	  of	  these	  we	  have	  affective	  and	  non-­‐
affective	  subtypes.	  	  	  This	  yields	  the	  following	  possible	  reactans:	  internally	  held	  
affective	  reactive	  attitudes,	  internally	  held	  non-­‐affective	  reactive	  attitudes,	  
externally	  expressed	  affective	  reactive	  attitudes,	  and	  externally	  expressed	  non-­‐
affective	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  (To	  be	  thorough	  we	  would	  have	  corresponding	  
divisions	  under	  the	  objective	  view:	  internally	  held	  affective	  objective	  attitudes,	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internally	  held	  non-­‐affective	  objective	  attitudes,	  externally	  expressed	  affective	  
objective	  attitudes,	  and	  externally	  expressed	  non-­‐affective	  attitudes.	  	  Common	  view	  
philosophers	  will	  hasten	  to	  point	  out	  two	  items	  on	  this	  list	  that	  are,	  in	  their	  view,	  
incoherent:	  the	  internally	  held	  non-­‐affective	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  the	  internally	  
held	  affective	  objective	  attitudes.	  	  But	  all	  this	  charge	  reveals	  is	  the	  narrow	  
importance	  common	  viewers	  attach	  to	  the	  role	  of	  emotion	  in	  how	  we	  justify	  our	  
holding	  others	  responsible.	  	  Thus,	  the	  role	  of	  emotion	  in	  our	  practices	  of	  holding	  
other	  responsible	  is	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  dispute	  between	  my	  view	  and	  the	  
common	  view.)	  
Before	  leaving	  this	  section,	  I	  want	  to	  examine	  a	  viable	  candidate	  from	  the	  list	  
above	  that	  provides	  a	  sensible	  and	  morally	  acceptable	  approach	  to	  holding	  
psychopaths	  responsible,	  the	  non-­‐affective	  expression	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  This	  
candidate	  reactans	  will	  shortly	  be	  coupled	  with	  the	  candidate	  reactanda	  (behavior)	  
that	  will	  emerge	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  following	  section.	  	  	  
Given	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  so	  difficult	  to	  identify	  and	  distinguish	  from	  other	  
thoroughly	  bad	  agents,	  when	  we	  are	  assaulted,	  and	  thus	  offended	  by	  a	  psychopath,	  
we	  are	  likely	  to	  form	  an	  internal	  affective	  reactive	  attitude	  that	  is	  unfiltered	  in	  our	  
expression	  of	  that	  same	  internally	  held	  affective	  reactive	  attitude.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  it	  is	  
the	  affective	  component,	  in	  both	  the	  holding	  and	  expression	  of	  the	  attitudes,	  with	  
which	  common	  viewers	  appear	  to	  be	  most	  concerned.	  	  At	  best,	  the	  more	  
levelheaded	  among	  us	  might	  be	  able	  to	  uncouple	  an	  internally	  held	  affective	  attitude	  
enough	  to	  express	  that	  attitude	  non-­‐affectively.	  	  To	  be	  more	  specific	  on	  this	  point,	  if	  
we	  can	  internally	  detach	  from	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  affect	  involved	  in	  the	  attitude	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enough	  to	  express	  a	  however	  slightly	  filtered	  version	  of	  that	  attitude,	  then	  we	  may	  
have	  a	  response	  option	  to	  psychopaths	  that	  common	  viewers	  will	  find	  attractive.	  	  
But	  this	  internal	  affective	  detaching	  is,	  no	  doubt,	  quite	  difficult	  to	  achieve,	  especially	  
when	  we	  are	  reacting	  to	  the	  aggressive	  behavior	  that	  defines	  the	  psychopath.	  	  It	  may	  
be,	  however,	  that	  in	  the	  very	  attempt	  to	  non-­‐affectively	  express	  the	  affective	  
attitudes	  we	  hold,	  we	  will	  in	  turn	  aid	  in	  the	  internal	  detaching,	  or	  reducing	  the	  
affective	  of,	  the	  internal	  state	  we	  hold.	  	  We	  might	  think	  of	  this	  attempt	  as	  a	  
measuring	  of	  release	  that	  is	  less	  intense	  than	  naked	  catharsis.	  	  	  
So,	  the	  candidate	  reactans	  we	  have	  before	  us	  is	  the	  non-­‐affective	  expression	  
of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  Now,	  what	  of	  the	  targets	  of	  these	  reactions,	  the	  reactanda?	  	  
	  
4.3	  Two	  types	  of	  reactanda:	  agents	  and	  behavior	  
	  
	   When	  we	  form	  a	  reactive	  attitude,	  (momentarily	  ignoring	  the	  distinctions	  
just	  discussed	  above),	  to	  what	  is	  it	  exactly	  that	  we	  are	  reacting?	  	  For	  brevity,	  let	  us	  
refer	  to	  the	  ‘thing	  to	  which	  we	  are	  reacting’	  as	  the	  reactandum.	  	  For	  understandable	  
reasons,	  the	  common	  view	  assumes	  the	  agent	  is	  the	  obvious	  and	  proper	  
reactandum.	  	  This	  is	  also	  generally	  true	  of	  the	  wider	  literature	  on	  moral	  
responsibility.55	  	  However,	  there	  are	  additional	  reactanda	  that	  can	  be	  accounted	  for,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Consider	  George	  Sher’s	  (2008)	  claim,	  “If	  anything	  about	  the	  concept	  
(responsibility)	  is	  clear,	  it	  is	  that	  what	  any	  given	  agent	  is	  responsible	  for	  is	  a	  
function	  only	  of	  what	  he	  himself	  has	  done	  or	  failed	  to	  do,”	  [emphasis	  added],	  p.	  99.	  	  
Levy	  (2010)	  notes	  two	  distinct	  theories	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  are	  generally	  
recognized	  in	  the	  wider	  literature:	  attributionism	  and	  volitionism.	  The	  former	  
focuses	  centrally	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  agent	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  act	  is	  directly	  
attributable	  to	  her,	  whereas	  the	  latter	  focuses	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  an	  individual’s	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and	  though	  we	  might	  identify	  a	  lengthy	  list	  of	  these	  (reasons,	  choices,	  personal	  
history,	  etc.),	  I	  wish	  to	  focus	  on	  behavior	  as	  the	  reactandum	  that	  is	  particularly	  
relevant	  to	  the	  debate	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  should	  hold	  psychopaths	  responsible.	  	  The	  
general	  case	  for	  shifting	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  psychopath	  
rather	  than	  the	  psychopathic	  agent	  himself	  is	  first	  briefly	  described.	  	  This	  is	  
followed	  by	  some	  observations	  of	  the	  reactanda	  as	  accounted	  for	  in	  the	  common	  
view,	  and	  noting	  why	  these	  are	  alleged	  to	  attract	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  their	  
suspension.	  	  I	  then	  defend	  the	  behavioral	  reactandum	  approach	  against	  some	  
objections.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  see	  the	  value	  of	  the	  shift	  from	  steering	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  away	  
from	  an	  agent	  and,	  in	  place,	  toward	  her	  behavior,	  we	  need	  to	  recall	  a	  core	  concern	  
held	  from	  the	  common	  view	  that	  we	  should	  not	  hold	  psychopaths	  responsible	  
(specifically,	  that	  we	  should	  refrain	  from	  blaming	  them)	  because	  doing	  so	  both	  
harms	  them	  and	  places	  an	  unreasonable	  demand	  on	  them.	  	  The	  common	  view	  
objects	  to	  blaming	  psychopaths	  because	  they	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  agents	  incapable	  of	  
understanding	  even	  basic	  moral	  obligations	  (Strawson,	  Levy)	  and	  because	  blaming	  
them	  would	  harm	  psychopaths	  in	  a	  way	  they	  do	  not	  deserve	  (Levy).	  	  These	  
objections	  raised	  by	  the	  common	  view	  arise	  from	  a	  prioritizing	  of	  the	  diseased	  agent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
choice	  in	  so	  acting.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  volitionism,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	  relevant	  
reactandum	  is	  the	  freedom	  status	  of	  a	  choice	  a	  given	  agent	  makes,	  but	  the	  
assessment	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  choice	  will	  result	  in	  reactans	  that	  are	  directed	  at	  the	  
agent.	  	  Levy	  (2007,	  2010),	  though	  a	  professed	  defender	  of	  volitionism,	  is	  particularly	  
prone	  to	  collapse	  volitionism	  into	  attributionism	  when	  discussing	  psychopaths.	  	  For	  
instance,	  he	  claims	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  not	  responsible	  because,	  owing	  to	  their	  
moral	  disease,	  they	  do	  not	  choose	  to	  be	  the	  person	  they	  are,	  thus,	  they	  cannot	  intend	  
to	  act	  morally,	  and	  thus,	  are	  not	  responsible	  for	  the	  things	  they	  do.	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and	  her	  personal	  history	  as	  the	  reactanda.	  	  But	  an	  agent’s	  mental	  illness	  and	  her	  
history	  are	  not	  the	  only	  relevant	  reactanda	  that	  can,	  and	  do,	  inform	  our	  reactions.	  	  
We	  do,	  and	  should,	  include	  behavior	  and	  an	  agent’s	  future	  to	  the	  list	  of	  reactanda.	  	  
Perhaps	  behavior	  should	  be	  the	  reactanda	  that	  warrants	  prioritizing.	  	  Let’s	  look	  at	  
the	  case	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  	  
	   Suppose	  for	  a	  moment	  that	  the	  common	  view	  is	  correct	  and	  that	  when	  we	  
express	  reactive	  attitudes	  to	  psychopaths	  we	  harm	  them.	  	  Suppose	  also	  that	  we	  are	  
wary	  of	  alienating	  psychopathic	  agents	  by	  taking	  up	  a	  purely	  objective	  view	  toward	  
them	  (and	  furthermore,	  suppose	  that	  we	  are	  wary	  of	  the	  conclusion	  that	  we	  simply	  
lock	  psychopaths	  away	  indefinitely).	  	  Here	  is	  where	  the	  option	  of	  prioritizing	  
behavior	  as	  the	  more	  apt	  reactandum	  gains	  its	  appeal.	  	  For,	  if	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  
are	  centered	  on	  behavior	  then	  we	  avoid	  a	  direct	  attack	  on,	  or	  criticism	  of,	  the	  
character	  or	  agent	  herself.	  	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  condemn	  a	  person	  and	  quite	  another	  to	  
condemn	  behavior.	  	  Although	  this	  may	  be	  true	  generally,	  it	  seems	  to	  apply	  even	  
more	  so	  in	  cases	  of	  emerging	  agents,	  including	  psychopaths.	  	  Character,	  including	  
self-­‐perception	  of	  our	  own	  character,	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  change	  or	  modify	  
than	  behavior	  and	  behavioral	  patterns,	  especially	  when	  we	  metaphysically	  over	  
commit	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  behavioral	  change	  can	  only	  follow	  character	  change.	  	  For,	  
when	  we	  comment	  on	  character	  (as	  revealed	  in	  the	  reactive	  attitudes)	  we	  are	  
alleging	  to	  comment	  on	  something	  constitutive	  of	  an	  agent,	  something	  that	  is	  more	  
deeply	  rooted	  than	  behavior,	  more	  so	  patterned	  behavior,	  which	  is	  alleged	  to	  reveal	  
one’s	  character.	  	  If,	  however,	  we	  diminish	  the	  commitment	  to	  direct	  our	  reactive	  
attitudes	  at	  an	  agent’s	  character	  and	  prioritize	  behavior	  instead,	  then	  we	  have	  more	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reason	  for	  optimism	  that	  moral	  improvement	  can	  occur	  by	  way	  of	  behavioral	  
modification.	  	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  character,	  or	  to	  be	  precise	  -­‐	  diseased	  character	  -­‐	  as	  
the	  source	  of	  behavior,	  perhaps	  we	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  character	  and	  
behavior	  actually	  work	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  gravitational	  tandem.	  	  This	  approach	  also	  helps	  
avoid	  the	  conclusion	  that	  psychopaths	  suffer	  from	  an	  incorrigible	  disease	  of	  moral	  
character,	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  treatment.	  	  	  
	   When	  we	  prioritize	  behavior	  as	  the	  more	  apt	  reactandum,	  then	  the	  
distinction	  between	  holding	  and	  expressing	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  previously	  
discussed	  gains	  salience.	  	  It	  just	  may	  be	  a	  brute	  fact	  about	  us	  that	  when	  we	  hold	  a	  
reactive	  attitude	  internally	  that	  we	  do	  so	  with	  the	  reactandum	  of	  the	  offending	  agent	  
firmly	  in	  mind.	  	  It	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  this,	  however,	  that	  when	  we	  express	  the	  held	  
attitude	  that	  the	  expression	  cannot	  be	  redirected	  from	  the	  agent	  to	  direct	  reference	  
to	  the	  offending	  behavior	  rather	  than	  the	  agent	  herself,	  her	  character.	  	  	  
It	  may	  be	  that	  we	  need	  to	  help	  psychopaths	  believe	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  
permanently	  damaged	  moral	  characters	  and	  that	  wrongful	  behaviors	  need	  not,	  as	  a	  
matter	  of	  Pavlovian	  reflex,	  beget	  a	  lifetime	  of	  wrongful	  behavior.	  	  Recall	  Robert	  
Harris’	  confession	  in	  his	  final	  hours	  that	  when	  he	  killed	  the	  two	  boys	  that	  he	  knew	  
then	  he	  had	  made	  his	  choice	  to	  go	  to	  hell.	  	  Unlike	  Watson’s	  experience	  of	  reactive	  
attitudes	  toward	  Harris,	  it	  is	  this	  confession	  that	  is	  the	  first,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  only,	  
time	  in	  reading	  his	  story	  that	  I	  felt	  compassion	  for	  him.	  	  (Whether	  it	  arose	  from	  a	  
religious	  commitment,	  or	  a	  moral	  metaphysical	  commitment,	  or	  an	  underlying	  belief	  
that	  his	  formative	  years	  were	  so	  bad	  that	  he	  was	  psychologically	  ruined,	  or	  what	  
have	  you,	  what	  is	  saddest	  about	  Harris’	  story	  is	  his	  idea	  that	  he	  was	  eternally	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condemned	  for	  his	  behavior.	  	  I	  think	  this	  suggests	  that	  there	  was	  guilt	  somewhere	  
deep	  within	  Harris’	  moral	  psychology.)	  	  If	  we	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  Watson’s	  reactive	  
attitudes	  to	  Harris,	  we	  can	  see	  a	  key	  source	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  
should	  hold	  psychopaths	  responsible.	  	  	  
	   As	  Watson	  describes	  the	  flow	  of	  reactive	  attitudes	  we	  feel	  when	  we	  read	  
about	  Harris’	  case,	  the	  antipathy	  we	  feel	  toward	  Harris	  when	  we	  hear	  about	  his	  
execution	  of	  the	  two	  boys	  and	  his	  ensuing	  fantasy	  of	  impersonating	  a	  policeman	  in	  
order	  to	  tell	  the	  parents	  of	  the	  young	  boys	  about	  their	  killing	  so	  that	  he	  may	  be	  
entertained	  and	  amused	  by	  their	  grief	  turns	  to	  sympathy	  when	  we	  read	  about	  the	  
horrible	  abuse	  Harris	  suffered	  in	  his	  childhood.	  	  Now,	  I	  must	  admit,	  my	  reactive	  
attitudes	  do	  not	  make	  this	  shift	  from	  antipathy	  to	  sympathy.	  	  To	  paraphrase	  
Wittgenstein	  regarding	  the	  gestalt	  duck-­‐rabbit	  illusion,	  the	  duck	  does	  not	  turn	  into	  a	  
rabbit	  for	  me,	  even	  when	  hearing	  about	  Harris’	  history.	  	  Perhaps	  I	  am	  overly	  
censorious.	  	  The	  account	  provided	  by	  the	  common	  view	  here	  that	  would	  urge	  me	  to	  
shift	  my	  seeing	  as	  victim	  instead	  of	  victimizer	  goes	  as	  follows	  (and	  we	  will	  note	  the	  
reactanda	  that	  the	  common	  view	  emphasizes).	  
	   For	  example,	  the	  shift	  from	  an	  attitude	  of	  antipathy	  to	  one	  of	  sympathy	  as	  
describe	  by	  Watson,	  occurs	  with	  a	  shift	  of	  reactandum	  from	  the	  murdering	  adult	  
Harris	  to	  the	  child	  victim	  Harris.	  	  Phenomenologically,	  for	  Watson,	  the	  antipathy	  felt	  
is	  altogether	  eclipsed	  by	  sympathy.	  	  The	  problem,	  as	  I	  see	  this	  response,	  is	  that	  it	  
assumes	  much	  like	  the	  duck-­‐rabbit	  example	  that	  we	  can	  only	  take	  up	  one	  attitude	  to	  
the	  expense	  of	  other	  competing	  attitudes.	  	  Not	  everyone,	  however,	  is	  so	  skilled	  a	  
making	  the	  duck-­‐rabbit	  switch,	  nor	  making	  the	  switch	  many	  times	  and	  nimbly	  so.	  	  I	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think	  this	  shifting	  precisely	  what	  is	  called	  for	  in	  how	  we	  should	  approach	  holding	  
psychopaths,	  like	  Harris,	  responsible.	  	  So,	  rather	  than	  allowing	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  
to	  categorically	  shift	  in	  reactandum	  from	  Harris	  the	  bad	  adult	  to	  Harris	  the	  
unfortunate	  child,	  (thus,	  the	  shift	  in	  reactans	  from	  antipathy	  to	  sympathy),	  we	  must	  
balance	  these	  two	  considered	  reactanda,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  balance	  these	  two	  with	  a	  
third	  consideration,	  the	  future	  Harris.	  	  	  
Taking	  stock	  then,	  yes,	  when	  we	  learn	  of	  Harris’	  terrible	  childhood	  we	  feel	  
sympathy	  for	  him	  given	  the	  abuse	  he	  suffered,	  and	  when	  we	  learn	  of	  the	  horrific	  
murders	  he	  commits,	  we	  feel	  moral	  disgust	  toward	  him.	  	  But	  none	  of	  these	  
observations	  strictly	  entail	  that	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  we	  express,	  despite	  the	  
complexities	  of	  our	  mixed	  attitudes,	  should	  not	  make	  specific	  reference	  to	  his	  
behavior.	  	  Nor	  must	  we	  go	  about	  (attempting	  to)	  hold	  psychopaths	  like	  Harris	  
responsible	  by	  only	  considering	  how	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  are	  informed	  by	  
historical	  concerns.	  	  	  
To	  further	  sum	  up	  the	  common	  view	  account	  of	  the	  things	  to	  which	  we	  react,	  
the	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  must	  always	  be	  directed	  at	  the	  
psychopathic	  agent	  and	  the	  historical	  and	  psychological	  considerations	  that	  
(somehow)	  define	  his	  lack	  of	  moral	  agency.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  common	  view	  sees	  the	  
psychopath	  as	  an	  agent	  whose	  moral	  development	  was	  arrested	  in	  his	  youth	  and	  
can	  never	  be	  restored	  in	  any	  capacity.	  	  From	  this	  it	  follows,	  according	  to	  the	  
common	  view,	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  him.	  	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  
in	  this	  section,	  the	  expression	  of	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  can,	  and	  should,	  target	  
behavior	  rather	  than	  agents.	  	  And	  when	  we	  express	  reactive	  attitudes	  in	  response	  to	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wrongdoing	  psychopaths,	  those	  expressions	  need	  to	  comment	  directly	  on	  the	  (in	  
this	  case,	  immoral)	  behavior	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  giving	  psychopaths	  the	  impression	  that	  
their	  moral	  character	  is	  so	  rotten	  that	  they	  too	  believe	  they	  should	  be	  isolated	  and	  
locked	  away	  indefinitely.	  	  
	  
4.4.1	  The	  common	  view’s	  narrow	  reactans-­reactandum	  pairing	  
	  
	   Now	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  better	  see	  the	  narrow	  sense	  of	  both	  the	  reactans	  
and	  reactandum	  involved	  in	  ‘holding	  responsible’	  that	  the	  common	  view	  has	  in	  
mind.	  	  When	  the	  common	  view	  instructs	  us	  that	  we	  should	  not	  blame	  the	  
psychopath,	  what	  is	  meant	  is	  that,	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  reactans,	  we	  should	  not	  express	  
affective	  reactive	  attitudes,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  reactandum,	  that	  our	  reactans	  are	  
assumed	  to	  be	  specifically	  to	  be	  reserved	  for	  agents.	  	  And	  when	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  
the	  common	  view’s	  preferred	  reactandum	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  psychopath,	  we	  see	  a	  
diseased	  agent	  (maybe	  not	  even	  an	  agent	  at	  all)	  and	  the	  agent’s	  past	  history.	  	  And,	  
given	  this	  narrow	  reactandum,	  the	  common	  view	  argues,	  it	  is	  wrong	  for	  us	  to	  
respond	  with	  the	  narrow	  reactans	  of	  affective	  blame.	  	  	  
	   Of	  course,	  we	  need	  not	  commit	  to	  such	  a	  narrow	  sense	  of	  either	  the	  
reactanda	  or	  the	  reactans.	  	  Or,	  if	  you	  like,	  we	  need	  not	  commit	  the	  common	  view’s	  
narrowed	  sense,	  but	  rather	  commit	  to	  another	  narrow	  paired	  sense	  of	  reactanda	  
and	  reactans.	  	  My	  suggestion	  then,	  is	  that	  we	  re-­‐conceive	  what	  it	  means	  to	  hold	  a	  
psychopath	  responsible.	  	  We	  do	  this	  first,	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  substantial	  
objections	  to	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  psychological	  disorder	  qua	  moral	  disease	  because	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the	  standards	  for	  the	  disease	  are	  normative	  and	  not	  medical.	  	  Second,	  we	  take	  up	  an	  
alternative	  reactans-­reactanda	  pairing,	  specifically,	  non-­‐affective	  reactive	  attitudes,	  
the	  expression	  of	  which	  specifically	  target	  behavior	  rather	  than	  the	  agent’s	  
character.	  	  	  
What	  is	  so	  troubling	  about	  psychopaths	  is	  that,	  given	  the	  commitment	  to	  the	  
narrow	  sense	  of	  reactans-­reactanda	  pairing,	  assumed	  by	  the	  common	  view,	  our	  
typical	  practices	  work	  with	  most	  people.	  	  To	  be	  more	  specific,	  our	  customary	  
practice	  of	  merging	  our	  affective	  holding	  of	  attitudes	  with	  an	  affective	  expression	  of	  
those	  same	  attitudes	  (and	  with	  matching	  magnitude)	  targeted	  at	  agents	  that	  is	  so	  
effective	  in	  our	  uncontroversially	  normal	  lives,	  has	  zero	  effect	  on	  psychopaths.	  	  And	  
since	  our	  traditional	  modus	  operandi	  of	  holding	  responsible	  utterly	  fails	  with	  
psychopaths,	  the	  common	  view	  infers	  from	  this	  that	  we	  have	  on	  our	  hands	  a	  
thoroughly	  morally	  diseased	  quasi-­‐agent.	  	  (Even	  more	  oddly,	  we	  infer	  something	  
like	  Levy,	  that	  psychopaths	  are	  physiologically	  lacking	  a	  conscience.	  	  This,	  of	  course,	  
is	  a	  rather	  egregious	  category	  mistake.)	  	  But	  why	  should	  we	  think	  that	  our	  
traditional	  practices	  of	  holding	  responsible,	  (in	  the	  narrow	  reactans-­‐reactandum	  
combination	  just	  discussed),	  is	  a	  standard	  that,	  when	  it	  fails,	  reveals	  that	  the	  
problem	  must	  be	  with	  the	  non-­‐responding	  agent,	  and	  never	  with	  the	  standard	  
practice	  itself?	  	  We	  should	  not.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  case	  of	  psychopaths	  forces	  us	  to	  
acknowledge	  that	  the	  commitment	  to	  (justified)	  affective	  blame	  is	  a	  poor	  standard	  
for	  holding	  responsible.	  	  	  
It	  is	  also	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  gives	  us	  many	  different	  
accounts	  of	  how	  we	  should	  go	  about	  responding	  to	  the	  moral	  wrongdoing	  of	  others.	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Often	  when	  we	  seek	  to	  address	  a	  moral	  mistake	  made	  by	  others	  the	  range	  of	  
interventions	  available	  are	  wide.	  	  Kant,	  for	  instance,	  might	  nudge	  the	  conscience	  of	  
the	  wrongdoer	  whilst	  respecting	  her	  autonomy	  and	  refraining	  from	  being	  a	  moral	  
busybody.56	  	  	  No	  philosopher,	  however,	  was	  busier	  than	  the	  gadfly	  Socrates.	  	  
Unafraid	  to	  ‘bite	  into	  the	  flesh’	  and	  harm	  the	  stupidity	  of	  the	  wrongdoer,	  Socrates	  
would	  put	  his	  interlocutor	  to	  shame	  if	  necessary,	  and	  where	  shame	  fails,	  
eschatological	  appeals	  are	  thrown	  in	  for	  extreme	  measure.57	  	  (Socrates	  is	  notably	  
unable	  to	  put	  Callicles	  to	  shame	  in	  Gorgias.	  	  In	  fact,	  this	  very	  strategy	  of	  putting	  to	  
shame	  for	  the	  goal	  of	  moral	  improvement	  is	  what	  –	  I	  suspect	  -­‐	  Nietzsche	  takes	  to	  be	  
the	  core	  error	  of	  all	  post-­‐Socratic	  philosophy,	  hence	  his	  own	  ‘campaign	  against	  
resentment.’)58	  	  Plato	  is	  even	  more	  heavy-­‐handed,	  particularly	  with	  the	  incorrigible	  
temple	  robbers	  for	  whom	  execution	  awaits	  for	  those	  who	  morally	  fail	  even	  once	  
more.59	  (The	  Greeks	  took	  the	  concept	  of	  moral	  pollution	  seriously	  indeed.)	  But	  the	  
steadier	  hand	  of	  Aristotle	  guides	  us	  seek	  out	  a	  response	  to	  offense	  that	  displays	  our	  
own	  virtue	  as	  well	  as	  promoting	  the	  development	  of	  virtue	  in	  the	  character	  of	  the	  
wrongdoer.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Thanks	  to	  Adam	  Cureton	  for	  pointing	  this	  out.	  
57	  The	  exchange	  between	  Socrates	  and	  Callicles,	  the	  third	  interlocutor	  in	  Gorgias,	  is	  
particularly	  noteworthy	  to	  this	  discussion.	  	  Callicles	  is	  the	  character	  that	  most	  
closely	  resembles	  a	  highly	  intelligent,	  instrumentally	  aggressive,	  psychopath	  that	  we	  
find	  in	  Plato	  (aside	  from	  the	  incorrigibles	  discussed	  in	  Laws)	  because	  Socrates’	  old	  
successful	  trick	  of	  putting	  his	  interlocutor	  to	  shame	  utterly	  fails	  with	  Callicles.	  
58	  While	  all	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  writings	  might	  be	  described	  as	  a	  campaign	  against	  
ressentiment,	  he	  first	  acknowledges	  this	  motivation	  within	  his	  revaluation	  of	  values	  
in	  the	  book,	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals.	  
59	  Plato’s	  Dialogues,	  Laws	  IX	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The	  range	  of	  available	  interventions	  appears	  to	  shrink	  when	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  
address	  not	  just	  a	  single	  moral	  mistake,	  but	  patterns	  of	  wrongdoing.	  	  Habitual	  
wrongdoing,	  not	  unlike	  major	  single	  offenses,	  elicits	  in	  us	  a	  tendency	  to	  narrow	  our	  
psychological	  responses	  to	  deeply	  held	  affective	  states,	  thus	  blinding	  us	  to	  
alternative	  options	  for	  responding.	  	  (It	  is	  of	  course	  easy	  to	  criticize	  this	  delimiting	  
tendency	  from	  the	  detached	  comfort	  of	  the	  armchair.	  	  Such	  is	  the	  enterprise	  of	  the	  
‘cool	  contemporary	  style’	  of	  philosophy	  noted	  by	  Strawson.)	  	  Thus,	  the	  ensuing	  
frustration	  we	  have	  with	  habitual	  wrongdoing	  arises	  because	  our	  customary	  
response,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  our	  reactive	  attitudes,	  appear	  to	  have	  no	  affect.	  	  From	  this,	  
we	  then	  infer	  that	  habitual	  wrongdoing	  is	  really	  the	  more	  thoroughgoing	  
incorrigibility,	  again,	  because	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  do	  not	  result	  in	  changes	  to	  
behavior	  or	  attitude	  we	  expect.	  	  (Incorrigibility	  is	  then	  further	  explained	  as	  being	  
caused	  by	  a	  disease.)	  	  But	  this	  could	  be	  wrong	  and	  it	  may	  be	  that	  our	  limited	  ranges	  
of	  responding	  are	  just	  as	  much	  to	  account	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  affect	  in	  responding	  to	  
psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  Nor	  is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  when	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  fail	  to	  
have	  the	  desired	  affect	  on	  the	  wrongdoer	  that	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  the	  wrongdoer	  is	  not	  
a	  responsible	  agent.	  	  This	  is	  to	  confuse	  moral	  responsibility	  with	  moral	  
responsiveness	  and	  to	  confuse	  the	  problem	  of	  shamelessness	  as	  residing	  solely	  in	  
the	  wrongdoer.	  	  	  
So,	  when	  we	  ask	  the	  psychopath	  what	  led	  to	  the	  killing	  of	  his	  wife	  (instead	  of	  
asking,	  ‘why	  did	  you	  kill	  your	  wife?’),	  and	  his	  reply	  is	  that	  ‘she	  said	  I	  was	  fat,’	  we	  do	  
not	  ask	  rhetorically	  and	  with	  affective	  charge,	  ‘what	  is	  the	  matter	  with	  you!?’	  	  Nor	  do	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we	  exclaim,	  ‘You	  should	  be	  ashamed!’	  	  This	  is	  what	  I	  suspect	  the	  common	  view	  has	  
in	  mind	  by	  ‘holding	  responsible.’	  	  Nor	  do	  we	  bite	  our	  tongue,	  disengage	  and	  detain	  
him	  indefinitely.	  	  Rather,	  we	  might	  respond	  by	  saying	  something	  like,	  ‘since	  killing	  is	  
typically	  considered	  morally	  wrong,	  and	  very	  strong	  moral	  reasons	  are	  required	  to	  
justify	  killing,	  help	  me	  understand	  why	  your	  wife’s	  saying	  that	  you	  are	  fat	  is	  a	  strong	  
moral	  reason	  that	  justifies	  kill	  her.’	  	  This	  response	  carries	  no	  affective	  charge,	  and	  
neither	  does	  it	  attempt	  to	  heap	  shame	  on	  the	  psychopath	  himself.	  	  What	  it	  does	  is	  
reinforce	  a	  moral	  boundary	  and	  suggest	  that	  a	  particular	  act	  of	  his	  appears	  to	  run	  
afoul	  of	  moral	  standards,	  and	  invites	  him	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  his	  reason	  for	  acting,	  
(however	  appalling	  those	  are	  likely	  to	  be).	  	  For	  now,	  this	  response	  marks	  an	  
improvement	  from	  the	  common	  view.	  	  It	  is	  however,	  not	  complete,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  rather	  
abstract	  and	  hyper	  rational	  style	  response.	  	  But	  the	  absence	  of	  affect	  is	  part	  of	  the	  
cost	  of	  responding	  to	  the	  psychopath	  whilst	  maintaining	  some	  hope	  for	  promoting	  
his	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Beyond	  this	  response,	  however,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  case	  to	  be	  
made	  that	  even	  affective	  attitudes	  have	  a	  place	  in	  our	  exchange	  with	  the	  psychopath.	  	  
For	  if	  we	  want	  to	  promote	  his	  moral	  responsibility,	  and	  we	  remain	  committed	  to	  the	  
role	  of	  affect	  in	  our	  moral	  relationships,	  then	  the	  psychopath	  will	  need	  some	  
assistance	  in	  placing	  more	  (or	  any)	  weight	  on	  the	  affective	  states	  of	  others.	  
	  
4.4.2	  Is	  gratitude	  prohibited	  too?	  
	  
	   The	  common	  view	  is	  silent	  on	  the	  appropriate	  role,	  if	  any,	  of	  the	  positive	  
reactive	  attitudes	  (or	  more,	  the	  affective	  expression	  of	  positive	  reactive	  attitudes).	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Should	  we	  refrain	  from	  affective	  expressions	  of	  the	  positive	  reactive	  attitudes,	  like	  
gratitude	  (or	  good	  will	  in	  the	  Aristotelian	  sense?),	  toward	  psychopaths?	  	  If	  we	  take	  a	  
strong	  common	  view	  stance,	  then	  we	  should	  refrain	  from	  holding	  and	  expressing	  all	  
reactive	  attitudes	  to	  psychopaths,	  both	  negative	  and	  positive	  alike.	  	  Strawson’s	  view	  
steadfastly	  commits	  us	  to	  a	  purely	  objective	  view;	  hence,	  even	  the	  positive	  reactive	  
attitudes	  are	  inappropriate	  to	  hold	  toward	  psychopaths.	  	  Levy’s	  view	  might	  not	  be	  
as	  strong,	  however,	  and	  allow	  for	  expressions	  of	  gratitude	  (when	  called	  for,	  because,	  
presumably,	  psychopaths	  are	  capable	  of	  token	  acts	  where	  gratitude	  is	  called	  for	  by	  
the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  act).	  	  	  
Beginning	  from	  Levy’s	  view	  that	  we	  should	  not	  blame	  psychopaths	  because	  
doing	  so	  harms	  him,	  then	  how	  we	  are	  to	  extend	  this	  ‘principle’	  to	  the	  positive	  
attitudes	  is	  not	  clear.	  	  We	  should	  also	  note	  here	  that	  Levy’s	  principle	  too	  appears	  to	  
hinge	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  our	  response	  to	  psychopaths;	  we	  should	  not	  blame	  him	  
because	  it	  harms	  him.	  	  (I	  am	  not	  the	  only	  party	  committed	  to	  weighing	  the	  
consequences	  of	  our	  various	  responses	  to	  psychopaths.)	  	  Suppose	  then,	  by	  
extension,	  that	  our	  expressing	  gratitude	  to	  a	  good-­‐doing	  psychopath	  benefits	  him	  in	  
some	  way.	  	  If	  so,	  and	  if	  we	  are	  committed	  to	  producing	  certain	  effects	  in	  the	  
psychology	  of	  psychopaths,	  then	  it	  appears	  that	  we	  should	  express	  gratitude	  to	  
them.	  	  If	  we	  do	  justify	  expressing	  gratitude	  because	  of	  the	  effect	  it	  has	  on	  
psychopaths,	  then	  a	  key	  premise	  in	  Levy’s	  argument	  must	  be	  false,	  namely,	  the	  claim	  
that	  psychopaths	  have	  no	  moral	  sense.	  	  For	  if	  we	  acknowledge	  that	  gratitude	  
psychologically	  (maybe	  morally)	  benefits	  the	  psychopath	  in	  some	  way,	  then	  there	  
must	  be	  some,	  however	  minute,	  moral	  sense	  on	  which	  gratitude	  gets	  its	  purchase.	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There	  is	  something	  then	  within	  the	  psychology	  of	  psychopaths	  (within	  their	  agency)	  
that	  we	  have	  to	  work	  with.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  if	  he	  lacks	  ‘full	  moral	  
sense’,	  he	  possesses	  enough	  for	  us	  to	  express	  the	  full	  range	  of	  attitudes	  to	  him,	  
however	  nuanced	  in	  delivery	  these	  are	  to	  be	  expressed.	  	  	  
	  
4.5	  Objections	  	  
	  
	   I	  consider	  two	  objections	  to	  close	  this	  chapter.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that,	  per	  the	  
common	  view,	  I	  am	  wrong	  about	  the	  source	  of	  agency	  alienation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
psychopath.	  	  The	  second	  is	  that	  my	  own	  emphasis	  on	  behavior	  as	  the	  more	  
appropriate	  reactandum	  commits	  my	  view	  to	  another	  version	  of	  agency	  alienation	  
that	  I	  aim	  to	  avoid.	  
The	  common	  view	  proponent	  will	  no	  doubt	  object	  that	  the	  source	  of	  
alienation	  of	  type	  2	  agents	  that	  I	  bemoan	  is	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  reactive	  attitudes	  
of	  the	  offended	  party,	  and	  that,	  rather,	  the	  source	  of	  alienation	  is	  the	  mental	  illness!	  	  
And	  this	  mental	  illness	  is	  what	  causes	  the	  psychopath	  to	  be	  alienated	  from	  his	  own	  
agency,	  which	  then	  results	  in	  alienation	  from	  others.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  mental	  illness	  
causes	  all	  of	  the	  intrapersonal	  and	  interpersonal	  alienation.	  	  But,	  this	  is	  a	  poor	  
argument	  for	  several	  reasons.	  
First,	  I	  have	  already	  argued	  extensively	  against	  the	  causal	  disease	  model	  of	  
psychopathy	  in	  chapter	  1,	  so	  I	  will	  not	  repeat	  that	  argument	  here.	  	  I	  wish	  only	  to	  
point	  out	  that	  the	  disease	  model	  of	  psychopathy	  is	  wrong	  for	  two	  reasons:	  there	  is	  
insufficient	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  psychopathy	  lies	  in	  anatomy,	  and,	  that	  the	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criteria	  by	  which	  one	  is	  diagnoses	  with	  psychopathy	  (Antisocial	  Personality	  
Disorder)	  are	  entirely	  behavioral	  and	  normative.	  	  These	  two	  objections	  to	  the	  
disease	  model	  support	  my	  argument	  that	  the	  question	  ‘is’	  the	  psychopath	  
responsible	  or	  not	  is	  to	  be	  answered	  either	  in	  the	  affirmative,	  or	  that	  it	  remain	  an	  
open	  question.	  	  I	  then	  suggested	  that	  to	  better	  inform	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  
psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  we	  should	  begin	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  question	  of	  
psychopathic	  responsibility	  (inasmuch	  as	  it	  can	  ever	  be	  established	  as	  fact)	  remains	  
open.	  	  But	  this	  seems	  odd,	  for	  how	  are	  we	  to	  begin	  to	  form	  a	  policy	  that	  is	  entirely	  
neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  responsible	  agent?	  	  
Perhaps	  we	  really	  are	  unable	  to	  begin	  our	  deliberations	  without	  making	  some	  
assumptions;	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  plausible	  observation.	  	  All	  I	  am	  suggesting	  here	  is	  
that	  we	  exercise	  some	  suspension	  of	  prior	  belief,	  even	  if	  this	  falls	  short	  of	  what	  D.T.	  
Suzuki	  calls	  the	  ‘beginner’s	  mind,’	  where	  there	  are	  more,	  not	  fewer	  possibilities.	  
Second,	  even	  if	  the	  causal	  story	  that	  is	  assumed	  in	  the	  common	  view	  was	  in	  
fact	  true,	  (that	  the	  disease	  of	  psychopathy	  is	  the	  causal	  fountainhead	  of	  all	  ensuing	  
alienation),	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  we,	  as	  the	  responding	  offended	  party,	  should	  
perpetuate	  the	  alienation.	  	  The	  defense	  that	  the	  disease	  alienation	  precedes	  the	  
alienation	  compounded	  by	  the	  reaction	  is	  no	  defense	  at	  all.	  	  As	  reactors,	  we	  are	  in	  
some	  sense	  responsible	  for	  reacting	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  perpetuate	  
alienation,	  and	  maybe	  we	  should	  even	  respond	  in	  ways	  that	  begin	  to	  reduce	  the	  
alienation.	  	  One	  way	  to	  do	  this	  is	  to	  maintain	  the	  inherently	  human	  reactive	  
attitudes	  so	  that	  the	  offending	  party,	  even	  when	  these	  are	  psychopaths,	  experience	  
genuine	  human	  exchange.	  	  (Of	  course,	  this	  assumes	  that	  we	  define	  our	  humanity	  as	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genuine	  expressed	  in	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  I	  am	  not	  sure,	  however,	  that	  inasmuch	  
as	  resentment	  feels	  genuine	  to	  us,	  that	  it	  is	  an	  attitude	  reflecting	  what	  is	  most	  
genuine	  about	  humanity.)	  	  	  
	   Regarding	  the	  second	  objection	  that	  my	  view	  is	  inconsistent	  by	  de-­‐
prioritizing	  agency	  as	  a	  reactandum.	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  objection,	  but	  one	  that	  has	  
a	  response.	  	  Recall	  that	  I	  criticized	  Strawson	  for	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  he	  suspends	  
agency	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  psychopath.	  	  The	  first	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  psychopaths	  
intuitively	  lack	  agency,	  and	  second	  is	  the	  idea	  that,	  owing	  to	  his	  illness,	  he	  lacks	  
agency	  such	  that	  we	  should	  rather	  see	  him	  as	  something	  merely	  to	  be	  controlled	  or	  
manipulated.	  	  My	  own	  call	  to	  steer	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  behavior	  rather	  
than	  the	  agent	  is	  a	  suspension	  based	  on	  a	  practical	  strategy	  that	  aims	  to	  prevent	  
agency	  from	  being	  completely	  written	  out	  of	  the	  picture,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
psychopath.	  	  This	  practical	  strategy	  simply	  subordinates,	  but	  does	  not	  extirpate,	  
metaphysical	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  psychopath.	  	  In	  fact,	  when	  we	  
direct	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  toward	  (psychopathic)	  behavior	  rather	  than	  
(psychopathic)	  agents,	  we	  keep	  do	  so	  with	  the	  agent	  firmly,	  yet	  tacitly	  in	  mind.	  	  
After	  all,	  we	  want	  to	  respond	  in	  the	  most	  respectful	  way	  possible	  and	  we	  want	  her	  
to	  modify	  her	  behavior,	  and	  for	  the	  better	  morally.	  	  By	  emphasizing	  behavior,	  and	  
behavioral	  modification,	  we	  at	  least,	  however	  slightly,	  keep	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  
‘making’	  psychopaths	  more	  morally	  responsible.	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4.6	  Conclusion	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  psychopaths	  appear	  to	  be	  impervious	  to	  blame	  shows	  only	  that	  
our	  customary	  habits	  of	  holding	  responsible	  by	  way	  of	  blaming	  do	  not	  work	  and	  
that,	  rather	  than	  giving	  up	  altogether,	  we	  should	  revise	  our	  practices.	  	  Blaming	  
psychopaths	  is	  impractical,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  show	  –	  nor	  entail	  –	  that	  psychopaths	  
are	  thus	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  wrongs	  that	  they	  do.	  	  Psychopathic	  
imperviousness	  suggests	  that	  our	  old	  narrowly	  conceived	  practices	  of	  holding	  each	  
other	  responsible	  solely	  conceived	  as	  blaming	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐evaluated.	  	  It	  also	  
shows	  that	  blame	  no	  longer	  corners	  the	  conceptual	  market	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  
And	  rather	  than	  entirely	  writing	  psychopaths	  off	  as	  non-­‐agents	  to	  be	  isolated	  and	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Conclusion	  	  
	  
In	  philosophy	  there	  are	  rarely,	  if	  ever,	  conclusions.	  	  The	  discussion	  remains	  
ongoing.	  	  But	  I	  hope	  in	  this	  dissertation	  to	  have	  thrown	  some	  doubt	  on	  a	  prevailing	  
paradigm	  in	  several	  interconnected	  ways.	  
Psychopathy	  is	  a	  value-­‐laden	  concept	  such	  that	  its	  inclusion	  among	  the	  value-­‐
free	  medical	  diseases	  is	  doubtful.	  	  So	  far,	  empirical	  research	  gathered	  on	  the	  brains	  
of	  psychopaths	  has	  not	  yet	  established	  the	  anatomical	  origin	  of	  their	  wrongdoing	  or	  
of	  the	  disorder.	  	  As	  yet,	  there	  is	  no	  corresponding	  lesion	  of	  the	  brain	  that	  provides	  a	  
causal	  explanation	  of	  psychopathic	  behavior.	  	  Aside	  from	  commenting	  on	  the	  state	  
of	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  the	  level	  of	  epistemological	  credence	  we	  lend	  to	  that	  
evidence,	  I	  also	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  with	  a	  detailed	  a	  specific	  example	  of	  how	  the	  
insistent	  search	  for	  an	  empirical	  cause	  of	  psychopathy	  can	  lead	  to	  carelessness	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  values	  that	  are	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  psychopathy.	  	  I	  hope	  to	  
have	  raised	  awareness	  to	  the	  smuggling	  of	  facts	  into	  an	  inherently	  value-­‐laden	  
concept	  of	  psychopathy.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  Luddite	  
conception	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Levy	  is	  to	  be	  commended	  for	  bringing	  empirical	  
facts	  and	  a	  scientific	  worldview	  to	  the	  difficult	  question	  of	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  
of	  psychopaths.	  	  My	  objections	  to	  Levy,	  I	  hope,	  serve	  as	  a	  warning	  and	  reminder	  that	  
even	  when	  we	  take	  up	  a	  scientific	  view,	  (including	  what	  Strawson	  calls	  the	  ‘objective	  
view’),	  that	  moral	  and	  social	  values	  remain	  present	  in	  both	  the	  concept	  of	  
psychopathy	  as	  well	  as	  sorting	  out	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  his	  wrongdoing.	  	  For	  if	  
we	  desire	  a	  morally	  sensible	  response	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing,	  then	  good	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evidence	  must	  be	  matched	  with	  good	  values.	  	  In	  one	  sense,	  my	  dissertation	  can	  be	  
viewed	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  bring	  values	  back	  up	  to	  pace	  with	  the	  focus	  on	  burgeoning	  
empirical	  data	  gathered	  on	  psychopath’s	  brains.	  	  The	  debate	  over	  the	  responsibility	  
of	  psychopaths	  is	  incomplete	  without	  both	  facts	  and	  values	  involved	  in	  our	  
considerations.	  
In	  addition	  to	  showing	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  values	  remain	  central	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  
psychopathy	  I	  also	  attended	  closely	  to	  how	  moral	  philosophers	  suggest	  we	  respond	  
to	  wrongdoing	  psychopaths.	  	  I	  argued	  that	  we	  need	  to	  seek	  out	  better	  responses	  
than	  simply	  locking	  psychopaths	  away	  indefinitely.	  	  I	  also	  offered	  alternative	  ways	  
in	  which	  we	  might	  hold	  psychopaths	  responsible	  by	  demanding	  basic	  moral	  
expectations	  of	  them	  and	  that	  one	  way	  we	  can	  do	  so	  is	  by	  way	  of	  the	  non-­‐affective	  
expression	  of	  the	  reactive	  attitudes.	  	  	  
This	  brings	  me	  to	  some	  of	  the	  ideas	  to	  which	  I	  can	  now	  turn	  my	  attention.	  	  These	  
ideas	  include	  both	  forward	  thinking	  about	  the	  more	  general	  problem	  of	  mental	  
illness	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  that	  will	  be	  better	  served	  with	  a	  good	  history,	  or	  
genealogy,	  of	  the	  emerging	  tension	  between	  disease	  and	  resentment.	  
In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  argued	  in	  favor	  of	  directing	  our	  reactive	  attitudes	  (preferably	  
expressed	  non-­‐affectively)	  at	  wrongful	  behavior	  rather	  than	  at	  an	  agent’s	  character.	  	  
In	  as	  much	  as	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  designed	  to	  promote	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  of	  
psychopaths,	  however	  small	  the	  behavioral	  gains,	  it	  is	  on	  my	  view	  a	  far	  more	  
sensible	  response	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing	  than	  the	  common	  view	  approach	  to	  
detach,	  detain	  and	  isolate.	  	  My	  approach	  remains	  committed	  to	  expressing	  moral	  
demands	  from	  psychopaths	  without	  maintaining	  a	  commitment	  to	  mere	  censure	  
	   146	  
and	  judgment	  typically	  associated	  with	  blaming.	  	  The	  next	  and	  perhaps	  most	  
challenging	  task	  is	  to	  confront	  psychopath’s	  reasons	  –	  or,	  more	  specifically	  and	  
ideally,	  to	  help	  psychopath’s	  confront	  their	  own	  reasons.60	  	  Since	  reasons-­‐giving	  and	  
reasons-­‐receptivity	  is	  central	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  morally	  
responsible	  agents,	  (and	  confronting	  reasons	  is	  central	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  holding	  
others	  responsible),	  it	  follows	  that	  we	  want	  to	  hold	  psychopaths	  responsible	  in	  the	  
reasons	  domain.	  	  This	  is	  a	  very	  difficult	  conceptual	  task.61	  	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  was	  
only	  able	  to	  object	  to	  the	  tendency	  of	  philosophers	  (especially	  Levy)	  to	  insist	  that	  
psychopaths	  can	  only	  produce	  mad	  reasons	  and	  never	  bad	  reasons.	  	  I	  revealed	  how	  
Levy	  (2010)	  committed	  the	  pathologizing,	  bad-­‐to-­‐mad,	  move	  in	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  
trolley	  problem	  (in	  which	  controversial	  moral	  judgments	  are	  deemed	  pathological	  
moral	  judgments).	  	  What	  Levy	  and	  others	  of	  a	  similar	  mind	  owe	  us	  is	  an	  argument	  
demonstrating	  why	  psychopaths	  can	  only	  have	  mad	  reasons	  rather	  than	  bad	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  My	  own	  work	  with	  psychopaths	  (primarily	  with	  the	  nascent	  version,	  Conduct	  
Disorder)	  leaves	  me	  with	  the	  suspicion	  that	  psychopath’s	  possess	  rather	  exquisitely	  
robust	  ego	  defensiveness	  (in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  psychoanalytic	  tradition).	  	  The	  
defiant	  refusal	  to	  admit	  to	  wrongdoing	  displayed	  by	  psychopaths	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  
stem	  more	  from	  a	  need	  to	  psychologically	  self-­‐protect	  than	  from	  a	  completed	  
ignorance	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  both	  society	  and	  morality.	  	  It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  diminished	  
violence	  that	  comes	  with	  aging	  psychopaths	  reveals	  a	  loosening	  of	  defensiveness	  as	  
much	  as	  it	  shows	  an	  emerging	  respect	  for	  others	  –	  or	  evidence	  of	  subsiding	  
symptoms	  of	  a	  moral	  disease.	  
61	  It	  might	  even	  be	  dangerous	  to	  gather	  better	  empirical	  data.	  	  I	  suspect	  that	  the	  
empirical	  evidence	  that	  we	  have	  gathered	  on	  psychopaths	  is	  deeply	  flawed	  –	  
specifically	  methodologically.	  	  All	  of	  the	  empirical	  studies	  have	  been	  conducted	  in	  
prisons	  with	  guards	  serving	  as	  proctors.	  	  Since	  we	  know	  that	  psychopaths	  want	  to	  
please	  authority	  figures	  (once	  detained),	  then	  we	  know	  psychopath’s	  responses	  to	  
moral	  questions	  are	  designed	  to	  please	  the	  authoritative	  questioner.	  	  Someone	  
psychopaths	  know	  to	  have	  no	  leverage	  over	  their	  prison	  sentence	  must	  conduct	  
these	  studies	  so	  that	  we	  can	  separate	  genuine	  responses	  to	  moral	  thought	  
experiments	  from	  ingratiating	  responses.	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reasons.	  	  A	  simple	  reference	  to	  mental	  illness	  as	  the	  ‘cause’	  is	  thus	  far	  insufficient.	  	  
The	  first	  chapter	  of	  this	  dissertation	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  pathologizing	  
the	  human	  condition	  of	  psychopathy	  by	  denying	  the	  tendency	  to	  identify	  a	  mad	  
reason	  as	  one	  that	  originates	  from	  madness.	  	  Such	  circularity	  is	  not	  convincing.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  social	  and	  moral	  norms	  that	  define	  the	  behavioral	  criteria	  for	  
psychopathy	  make	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  accept	  the	  view	  that	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  
bona	  fide	  medical	  disease	  with	  this	  disorder.	  	  If	  moral	  madness	  is	  a	  disease	  it	  is	  so	  
only	  by	  analogy.	  	  I	  find	  this	  analogy	  strained	  to	  the	  breaking	  point	  such	  that	  we	  need	  
to	  entirely	  reconceive	  the	  condition	  and	  concept	  of	  psychopathy.	  	  And	  we	  need	  not	  
do	  so	  simply	  so	  that	  we	  can	  indulge	  ourselves	  in	  cathartic	  affective	  expressions	  of	  
blame	  at	  his	  character.	  	  Because	  we	  want	  to	  morally	  respect	  psychopaths	  we	  need	  to	  
seek	  out	  better	  responses	  to	  psychopathic	  wrongdoing.	  	  We	  should	  do	  so	  because	  it	  
is	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.	  
Throughout	  this	  dissertation,	  I’ve	  found	  myself	  wavering	  between	  saying	  that	  
issues	  related	  to	  ‘holding	  responsible’	  should	  be	  prior	  to	  issues	  concerning	  ‘is	  
responsible’	  and	  saying	  only	  that	  both	  warrant	  equal	  attention.	  	  I	  realize	  that	  I	  have	  
not	  demonstrated	  the	  priority	  of	  ‘holding	  responsible’	  to	  be	  true.	  	  I	  would	  like	  to	  
explore	  a	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  solid	  argument	  can	  be	  offered	  for	  the	  priority	  of	  holding	  
responsible.	  	  I	  am	  also	  highly	  suspicious	  that	  whatever	  tacit	  assumptions	  we	  have	  in	  
mind	  about	  how	  holding	  other	  responsible	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  understood	  inform,	  
consciously	  or	  otherwise,	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  ‘is	  responsible’	  issue.	  	  And,	  as	  a	  
corollary	  to	  my	  claim	  that	  both	  facts	  and	  values	  must	  be	  involved	  in	  our	  
understanding	  of	  mental	  illness	  and	  moral	  responsibility,	  so	  too	  must	  we	  include	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both	  the	  ‘hold	  responsible’	  and	  ‘is	  responsible’	  questions	  in	  considering	  the	  broader	  
gestalt	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  	  
The	  facts	  and	  values	  approach	  that	  is	  particularly	  pertinent	  to	  psychiatric	  ethics	  
is,	  I	  think,	  pertinent	  to	  the	  emerging	  field	  of	  neuroethics.	  	  The	  work	  of	  Bill	  Fulford	  
(1995	  and	  more)	  shows	  us	  that	  the	  principles-­‐based	  account	  of	  bioethics	  (also	  
known	  as	  the	  ‘Georgetown	  mantra’)	  in	  which	  facts	  are	  first	  settled	  before	  ethical	  
matters	  are	  taken	  up	  does	  not	  translate	  to	  good	  psychiatric	  ethics	  because	  the	  
concepts	  of	  psychiatry	  are	  for	  more	  value-­‐laden	  (and	  ‘non-­‐descriptive’)	  than	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  paradigmatic	  physical	  illness.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  Fulford’s	  work	  can	  serve	  as	  
advance	  warning	  to	  any	  future	  neuroethics	  involving	  psychiatric	  disorder	  to	  not	  
repeat	  the	  Georgetown	  mistake.	  	  I	  key	  concern	  I	  have	  with	  Levy’s	  approach	  to	  the	  
psychopath	  and	  neuroethics	  in	  general	  is	  this	  very	  mistake.	  	  Good	  psychiatric	  ethics	  
requires	  close	  consideration	  of	  both	  facts	  and	  values.	  
This	  dissertation	  as	  focused	  narrowly	  on	  the	  specific	  mental	  illness	  of	  
psychopathy.	  	  I	  am	  interested	  to	  further	  investigate	  how	  my	  arguments	  here	  
(specifically	  the	  argument	  for	  redrawing	  the	  reactans-­‐reactandum	  pairing)	  have	  to	  
tell	  us	  about	  moral	  responses	  to	  people	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  mental	  illness	  and	  even	  
to	  normal	  adult	  agents.	  	  Many	  normal	  people	  possess	  various	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  
defects	  that	  fall	  into	  a	  subclinical	  range	  in	  a	  way	  that	  falls	  significantly	  short	  of	  the,	  I	  
think	  oft	  idealized,	  ‘responsible	  agent’	  of	  contemporary	  moral	  theory.	  
Complex	  issues	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  lie	  at	  the	  core	  of	  philosophy	  of	  
psychiatry.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  
contribution	  to	  the	  ongoing	  methodological	  debate	  between	  the	  natural	  science	  and	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the	  human	  sciences.	  	  This	  has	  direct	  bearing	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  practice	  and	  
treatment	  of	  mental	  health	  should	  operate.	  	  The	  tendency	  for	  psychiatry	  to	  view	  
itself	  and	  present	  itself	  as	  a	  natural	  science	  runs	  a	  very	  dangerous	  risk	  of	  neglecting	  
the	  values	  and	  ethics	  of	  a	  practice	  that	  remains	  inherently	  human	  and	  irreducibly	  
normative.	  
With	  respect	  to	  my	  suggestion	  that	  we	  rethink	  reasoning	  from	  the	  normal	  
holding	  responsible	  paradigm	  (in	  which	  we	  justify	  blame	  and	  resentment)	  to	  the	  
abnormal	  (which	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  mentally	  ill	  are	  not	  morally	  
responsible)	  –	  my	  worry	  is	  that	  blame	  and	  resentment	  may	  themselves	  represent	  a	  
pathological	  response	  and,	  as	  such	  are	  not	  desirable	  qualities	  on	  which	  to	  build	  
theories	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  	  
In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  address	  ethical	  problems	  relating	  to	  social	  
and	  legal	  policy,	  as	  psychopaths	  are	  involved.	  	  To	  predict	  ethical	  problems	  on	  the	  
horizon	  of	  empirical	  research	  on	  psychopaths,	  there	  is	  a	  lurking	  challenge	  relating	  
to	  so-­‐called	  neuro-­‐prediction	  (of	  aggressive	  behavior)	  and	  how	  this	  evidence	  can	  
and	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  legal	  domain.	  	  Since	  we	  already	  view	  psychopaths	  
as	  quasi-­‐human	  (analogies	  to	  wild	  animals	  and	  viruses	  –	  to	  be	  quarantined	  –	  are	  
commonplace	  in	  discussions	  about	  psychopaths)	  then	  there	  is	  little	  impetus	  to	  
protect	  the	  civil	  liberties	  of	  such	  individuals.	  	  And	  given	  the	  severity	  of	  problems	  
that	  psychopaths	  present,	  it	  may	  be	  well	  positioned	  conceptually	  to	  inform	  our	  
policies	  more	  generally	  toward	  mentally	  ill	  offenders.	  	  Likewise,	  there	  are	  very	  
difficult	  ethical	  problems	  relating	  to	  scarce	  resource	  allocation.	  	  For,	  if	  psychopaths	  
are	  merely	  rabid	  humans	  then	  we	  ought	  not	  devote	  any	  scarce	  resources	  to	  them,	  
	   150	  
either	  in	  the	  way	  of	  treatment	  or	  for	  detention.	  	  Perhaps,	  however,	  we	  can	  make	  
better	  use	  of	  existing	  resources	  and	  likewise,	  arrest	  the	  tendency	  to	  categorize	  such	  
persons	  among	  the	  beasts.	  	  Furthermore,	  we	  must	  recognize	  our	  moral	  failing	  
(without	  shaming	  ourselves)	  as	  a	  society	  that	  produces	  psychopaths.	  	  One	  way	  to	  
address	  this	  problem	  is	  to	  invest	  more	  resources	  to	  developing	  treatment	  
approaches	  that	  target	  early	  intervention.	  	  An	  indication	  of	  success	  might	  be	  
measured	  longitudinally	  and	  in	  a	  generation	  we	  will	  be	  (if	  all	  goes	  well)	  discussing	  
how	  the	  natural	  reduction	  of	  psychopathic	  symptoms	  reduced	  from	  age	  forty	  to	  age	  
thirty.	  	  But	  we	  must	  first	  make	  an	  auxiliary	  moral	  commitment	  to	  take	  up	  such	  a	  
task.	  	  We	  must	  decide	  if	  psychopaths	  are	  worth	  the	  effort.	  
As	  for	  the	  need	  for	  the	  tension	  that	  we	  feel	  between	  the	  disease	  concepts	  of	  
mental	  illness	  and	  moral	  responsibility,	  I	  think	  we	  first	  need	  a	  history	  of	  the	  
emergence	  of	  this	  tension.	  	  I	  think	  a	  good	  place	  to	  begin	  is	  with	  Nietzsche’s	  
engagement	  with	  Socrates,	  in	  which	  Nietzsche	  urges	  us	  to	  see	  Socrates	  (and	  all	  
‘moral	  wrongdoing’)	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  sickness.	  	  Crucially,	  Nietzsche	  advocates	  
this	  approach	  as	  part	  of	  his	  own	  campaign	  against	  resentment	  –	  more	  specifically	  
against	  morality	  that	  is	  based	  on	  resentment	  –	  and	  sees	  the	  roots	  of	  this	  view	  as	  
emanating	  from	  the	  psychology	  of	  Socrates.	  	  This	  ‘story’	  of	  offsetting	  blame	  with	  
sickness	  carries	  though,	  I	  think,	  into	  the	  methodological	  debate	  between	  the	  natural	  
sciences	  and	  the	  social	  sciences	  in	  which	  we	  (still)	  see	  the	  fields	  of	  psychology	  and	  
psychiatry	  attempting	  to	  straddle.	  	  The	  point	  of	  painting	  the	  picture	  of	  our	  
intellectual	  history	  relating	  to	  madness	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  to	  seek	  out	  a	  
notion	  of	  responsibility	  that	  divorces	  itself	  from	  association	  with	  blame	  without	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defaulting	  to	  the	  disease	  model	  of	  mental	  illness	  either.	  	  The	  disease	  model	  
represents	  an	  overcorrection	  to	  the	  error	  of	  a	  blame-­‐based	  morality,	  and	  rather	  
ironically	  shares	  with	  blame-­‐based	  morality,	  a	  failure	  to	  promote	  responsibility.	  	  
This	  failure	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  the	  disease	  model	  of	  mental	  illness	  and	  a	  blame-­‐based	  
morality	  of	  resentment,	  does	  not,	  on	  my	  view,	  represent	  our	  best	  understanding	  of	  
responsibility.	  	  A	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  responsibility	  requires	  that	  
we	  move	  beyond	  disease	  and	  resentment.	  	  	  
I	  wish	  to	  close	  this	  dissertation	  by	  sharing	  an	  insight	  from	  my	  time	  working	  
clinically	  with	  young	  men	  diagnosed	  with	  Conduct	  Disorder	  and	  believed	  to	  be	  on	  
the	  fast	  track	  to	  psychopathy.	  	  I	  am	  also	  in	  debt	  to	  Levy	  for	  reminding	  me	  of	  this	  
with	  his	  suggestion	  that	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  understand	  the	  psychopath,	  or	  moral	  
responsibility	  for	  that	  matter,	  solely	  from	  the	  armchair	  and	  that	  we	  must	  also	  learn	  
from	  the	  laboratory.	  	  I	  think	  we	  should	  take	  Levy	  seriously	  and	  even	  extend	  the	  
reach	  beyond	  the	  laboratory	  and	  even	  outside	  the	  walls	  of	  the	  mental	  health	  clinic.	  	  
Some	  insights	  are	  shy	  and	  must	  be	  taken	  by	  surprise.	  	  As	  if	  by	  surprise	  and	  arising	  
from	  necessity	  of	  circumstance	  from	  a	  defeated	  clinician,	  I	  found	  empathy	  in	  those	  
young	  men	  -­‐	  more	  importantly	  they	  found	  empathy	  in	  themselves	  –	  in	  a	  place	  as	  just	  
as	  least	  expected	  as	  it	  is	  obvious:	  hanging	  from	  a	  mountainside.	  	  Here	  we	  saints	  and	  
scoundrels	  find	  common	  feeling.	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